

CROZER QUARTERLY

Volume XXII

OCTOBER, 1945

Number 4

CONSCIENCE IN WESTERN THOUGHT AND THE IDEA OF A TRANSMORAL CONSCIENCE

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THE FAMOUS theologian, Richard Rothe, in his *Christian Ethics* has made the suggestion that the word *conscience* should be excluded from all scientific treatment of ethics since its connotations are so manifold and contradictory that the term cannot be saved for a useful definition. If we look not only at the popular use of the word with its complete lack of clarity, but also at its confused history, this desperate advice is understandable. But, though understandable, it should not be followed. For the word *conscience* points to a definite reality which in spite of its complexity can and must be described adequately, and the history of the idea of conscience, in spite of the bewildering variety of interpretations it has produced, shows some clear types and definite trends. The complexity of the phenomenon called "conscience" becomes manifest as soon as we look at the manifold problems it has given to human thought: Man shows always and everywhere something like a conscience, but its contents are subject to a continuous change. What is the relation between the form and the content of conscience? Conscience points to an objective structure of demands making themselves perceivable through it, and represents, at the same time, the most subjective self-interpretation of personal life. What is the relation between the objective and the subjective sides of conscience? Conscience is an ethical concept, but it has a basic significance for religion. What is the relation between the ethical and the religious meaning of conscience? Conscience has many different functions: it is good or bad, commanding or warning, elevating or condemning, fighting or indifferent. Which of these functions are basic, which derived? These questions refer only to the description of the phenomenon, not to its explanation or valuation. They show its complex character and the reason for its confused history.

I

The Rise of Conscience

The concept of conscience is a creation of the Greek and Roman

spirit. Wherever this spirit has become influential, notably in Christianity, conscience is a significant notion. The basic Greek word *syneidenai* ("knowing with," namely, with oneself; "being witness of oneself") was used in the popular language long before the philosophers got hold of it. It described the act of observing oneself, often as judging oneself. In the philosophical terminology it received the meaning of "self-consciousness" (for instance, in Stoicism in the derived substantives *syneidesis*, *synesis*). Philo of Alexandria, under the influence of the Old Testament, stresses the ethical self-observation in *syneidesis* and attributes to it the function of *elenchos*, that is, accusation and conviction. The Roman language, following the popular Greek usage, unites the theoretical and practical emphasis in the word *conscientia*, while philosophers like Cicero and Seneca admit it to the ethical sphere and interpret it as the trial of oneself, in accusation as well as defense. In modern languages the theoretical and the practical sides are usually expressed by different words. English distinguishes *consciousness* from *conscience*, German *Bewusstsein* from *Gewissen*, French *connaissance* from *conscience*—though the latter word is also used for the theoretical side.

The development of conscience, reality as well as concept, is connected with the breakdown of primitive conformism and a situation in which the individual is thrown upon himself. In the sphere of an unbroken we-consciousness no individual conscience can appeal. Events like the Greek tragedy with its emphasis on personal guilt and personal purification, or like the turn towards personal responsibility before God in later Judaism prepare the rise of conscience by creating a definite *ego*-consciousness. The self, says a modern philosopher, has been discovered by sin. The merely logical self-consciousness does not have such a power. Without the practical knowledge about oneself, produced by the experience of law and guilt, no practical self-consciousness and no conscience could have developed. Predominantly theoretical types are lacking a mature self. Even Nietzsche, who attacks more passionately than anybody else the judging conscience, derives the birth of the "inner man" from its appearance. In pointing to the subpersonal character of guilt and punishment in primitive cultures, he praises the discovery of the conscience as the elevation of mankind to a higher level. The fact that self and conscience are dependent on the experience of personal guilt explains the prevalence of the "bad conscience" in reality, literature, and theory. It gives evidence to the assertion that the uneasy, accusing and judging conscience is the original phenomenon; that the good conscience is only the absence, and that the demanding and warning conscience is only the anticipation of the bad conscience. Since egoself and conscience grow in mutual dependence, and since the self discovers itself in the experience of a split between what

it is and what it ought to be, the basic character of the conscience, the consciousness of guilt, is obvious.

Shakespeare, in *King Richard III*, gives a classic expression to the connection of individual self-consciousness, guilt, and conscience:

O coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me! . . .
 What! do I fear myself? There's none else by.
 Richard loves Richard; that is, *I am I*.
 Is there a murderer here? No. Yes, I am.
 Then fly. What, from myself? Great reason why,
 Lest I revenge. What, *myself upon myself*?
 Alack, I love myself. Wherefore? For any good
 That I myself have done unto myself?
 O, no! alas, I rather hate myself. . . .
 My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
 . . . crying all, Guilty! guilty.

In the next moment, however, Richard immerses into the we-consciousness of the battle, dismissing self and conscience:

. . . conscience is a word that cowards use . . .
 Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law.
 March on, *join* bravely, let us to't pell-mell;
 If not to heaven, then *hand in hand* to hell.¹

II

Conscience in the Biblical Literature

While the Old Testament has the experience but not the notion of conscience (Adam, Cain, David, Job), the New Testament, especially Paul, has the word and the reality. Through the influence of Paul—who in this, as in other cases, has introduced elements of hellenistic ethics into Christianity—conscience has become a common concept of the Christian nations, in their religions as well as in their secular periods.

Conscience, in the New Testament, has religious significance only indirectly. It has a primarily ethical meaning. The acceptance of the gospel, for instance, is not a demand of the conscience. It does not give laws, but it accuses and condemns him who has not fulfilled the law. Consequently it is not considered to be a special quality of Christians, but an element of human nature generally. In Rom. 2: 14-15 Paul expresses this very strongly: "When Gentiles who have no law obey instinctively the Law's requirements, they are a law to themselves, even though they have no law; they exhibit the effect of the Law written on their hearts, their conscience bears them witness, as their moral convictions accuse or it may be defend them" (Moffatt). According to these words the con-

¹ *King Richard III*, Act V, Scene 3.

science witnesses to the law (either the Mosaic or the natural law) but it does not contain the law. Therefore its judgment can be wrong. Paul speaks of a "weak conscience," describing the narrow and timid attitude of Christians who are afraid to buy meat in the market because it might have been used for sacrifices in pagan cults. Paul criticizes such an attitude; but he emphasizes that even an erring conscience must be obeyed, and he warns those who are strong in their conscience not to induce by their example those who are weak, to do things which would give them an uneasy conscience. No higher estimation of the conscience as guide is possible. Paul does not say that we must follow it because it is right, but because disobedience to it means the loss of salvation (Rom. 14). You can lose your salvation if you do something which is objectively right with an uneasy conscience. The unity and consistence of the moral personality are more important than its subjection to a truth which endangers this unity. In principle Christianity has always maintained the unconditional moral responsibility of the individual person in the Pauline doctrine of conscience. Aquinas and Luther agree in this point. Aquinas states that he must disobey the command of a superior to whom he has made a vow of obedience, if the superior asks something against his conscience. And Luther's famous words before the emperor in Worms, insisting that it is not right to do something against the conscience—namely, to recant a theological insight—are based on the traditional Christian doctrine of conscience. But neither in Paul nor in Aquinas nor in Luther is the conscience a religious source. They all keep the authority of conscience within the ethical sphere. Luther's refusal to recant his doctrine of justification is an expression of his conscientiousness as a doctor of theology. He declares that he would recant if he were refuted by arguments taken from Scripture or reason, the positive source and the negative criterion of theology. But he does *not* say—as often has been stated by liberal Protestants—that his conscience is the *source* of his doctrine. There is no "religion of conscience" either in the New Testament or in classical Christianity before the sectarian movements of the Reformation period.

In the New Testament the relation of the moral conscience to faith as the foundation of the religious life is dealt with only in two connections. In Hebr. 9:9 the ritual religion is criticized because "gifts and sacrifices . . . cannot possibly make the conscience of the worshipper perfect." Therefore, the writer continues: "Let us draw near with a true heart, in absolute assurance of faith, our hearts sprinkled clean from a bad conscience." Only the perfect salvation can give the moral status from which a good conscience follows. But the "assurance of faith" is not a matter of conscience. The other link between faith and conscience is given in the criticism of heresy. Heresy entails an unclean conscience, because it is

connected with a moral distortion. In 1 Tim. 1:19 and 4:2 libertinists and ascetics are rejected, both representatives of pagan dualistic morals. Against them the writer says: "Hold to faith and a good conscience. Certain individuals have scouted the good conscience and thus come to grief over their faith." They are "seared in conscience." The judgment that one cannot be an heretic with a good conscience has been accepted by the church. The moral implications of heresy were always emphasized, though not always rightly. Heresy is not an error in judgment or a difference in experience but a demonic possession, splitting the moral self and producing a bad conscience. On this basis the church waged its fight against the heretics in all periods.

III

The Interpretation of Conscience in Medieval and Sectarian Theology

Scholasticism raised the question: According to which norms does the conscience judge and how are these norms recognized by it? The answer was given in terms of the artificial (or distorted) word, *synteresis*, i.e., a perfection of our reason which leads us towards the recognition of the good. It has immediate and infallible evidence, being a spark of the divine light in us, the uncreated light in the depth of the soul, as the Franciscans asserted; the created light of our intuitive intellect, as the Dominicans said. The basic principles, given by the *synteresis* are: 1. The good must be done; the evil must be avoided. 2. Every being must live according to nature. 3. Every being strives towards happiness. Conscience is the practical judgment, which applies these principles to the concrete situation. It is *sylogismus practicus*. We are obliged to follow our conscience, whether the *sylogismus* is correct or not. We are, of course, responsible for not knowing the good. But we are not allowed to act against our conscience, even if it were objectively correct. So man has an infallible knowledge of the moral principles, the natural law, through *synteresis*, but he has a conscience which is able to fall into error in every concrete decision. In order to prevent dangerous errors the authorities of the church give advice to the Christian, especially in connection with the confession in the sacrament of penance. *Summæ de Casibus Conscientiæ* (collections about individual cases of conscience) were given to the priests. In this way the conscience became more and more dependent on the authority of the church. The immediate knowledge of the good was denied to the layman. The Jesuits removed the *synteresis* and with it any direct contact between God and man, replacing it by the ecclesiastical, especially the Jesuitic, adviser. But the adviser has the choice between different authorities since the opinion of each of them is

equally probable. Heteronomy and probalism destroy the autonomous, self-assured conscience.

In spite of these distortions the mediæval development has performed a tremendous task in educating and refining the conscience of the European people generally and the monastic and half-monastic groups especially. The depth and breadth of the bad conscience in the later Middle Ages are the result of this education and the soil for new interpretations of meaning and functions of conscience.

Turning to the "sectarian" understanding of conscience, we find the Franciscan idea of the immediate knowledge of the natural law in the depth of the human soul. But two new elements supported and transformed this tradition, the so-called "German Mysticism" with its emphasis on the divine spark in the human soul and the "spiritual enthusiasm" awakened by the Reformation with its emphasis on the individual possession of the Spirit. Thomas Muenzer and all his sectarian followers taught that the divine Spirit speaks to us out of the depth of our own soul. Not *we* are speaking to ourselves, but God within us. "Out of the abyss of the heart which is from the living God" (Muenzer) we receive the truth if we are opened to it by suffering. Since the enthusiasts understood this divine voice within us in a very concrete sense, they identified it with the conscience. In this way conscience became a source of religious insight and not simply a judge of moral actions. The concept of conscience as the expression of the inner light has revealing character.

But the question arose immediately: What is the content of such a revelation through conscience? Luther asked Muenzer, and Cromwell asked Fox, What is the difference between practical reason and the inner light? Both of them could answer: The ecstatic character of the divine Spirit! But they could be asked again: What bearing has the ecstatic form of revelation on its content? And then the answer was difficult. Muenzer refers to practical decisions in his daily life, made under the inspiration of the Spirit, and Fox develops ethics of unconditional honesty, bourgeois righteousness and pacifism. It was easy to ask again whether reasonableness and obedience to the natural moral law could not produce the same results. The "revealing conscience" is a union of mysticism with moral rationality. But it does not reveal anything beyond biblical and genuine Christian tradition. The important thing resulting from this transformation of the concept of conscience is the idea of tolerance and its victory in the liberal era. The quest for the "freedom of conscience" does not refer to the concrete ethical decision, but it refers to the religious authority of the "inner light," which expresses itself through the individual conscience. And since the inner light could hardly be distinguished from practical reason, freedom of conscience meant actually the freedom to

follow one's autonomous reason, not only in ethics, but also in religion. The "religion of conscience" and the consequent idea of tolerance are not a result of the Reformation but of sectarian spiritualism and mysticism.

IV

Modern Philosophical Doctrines of the Conscience

The modern philosophical interpretation of conscience follows three main lines: an emotional-æsthetic line, an abstract-formalistic line, and a rational-idealistic line. Secularizing the sectarian belief in the revealing power of conscience, Shaftesbury interprets it as the emotional reaction to the harmony between self-relatedness and relatedness to others, in all beings and in the universe as a whole. The principle of ethical action is the balance between the effects of benevolence and the effects of selfishness as indicated by conscience. The conscience works the better and more accurately the more the taste for the universe and its harmony is developed. The educated conscience has a perfect ethical taste. Not harmony with the universe but sympathy with the other man is the basis of conscience, according to Hume and Adam Smith: We identify ourselves with the other one and receive his approval or disapproval of our action as our own judgment. This, of course, presupposes a hidden harmony between the individuals and the possibility of a mutual feeling of identification. It presupposes a universal principle of harmony, in which the individuals participate and which reveals itself to their conscience as the divine ground to the conscience of the mystics.

The emotional-harmonistic interpretation of conscience has often led to a replacement of ethical by æsthetic principles. The attitude of late aristocracy, high bourgeoisie, and Bohemianism at the end of the last century was characterized by the elevation of good taste to be the ultimate judge in moral affairs corresponding to the replacement of religion by the arts in these groups. It was an attempt to reach a transmoral conscience, but it did not reach even a moral one, and it was swept away by the revolutionary morality and immorality of the twentieth century.

The second method of interpreting conscience philosophically is the abstract-formalistic one. It was most clearly stated by Kant, and it was introduced into theology by Ritschl. Kant wanted to maintain the unconditional character of the moral demand against all emotional relativism, against fear- and pleasure-motives, as well as against divine and human authorities. But in doing so he was driven to a complete formalism. Conscience is the consciousness of the "categorical (unconditional) imperative," but it is not the consciousness of a special content of this imperative. "Conscience is a consciousness which itself is a duty." It is a duty to have

a conscience, to be conscientious. The content, according to Ritschl, is dependent on the special vocation, a special historical time and space. Only conscientiousness is always demanded. This corresponds to the Protestant, especially the Lutheran, valuation of work. It is the expression of the activistic element of the bourgeoisie, for which vocation is identical with adaptation to the technical and psychological demands of the economic system. Duty is what serves bourgeois production. This is the hidden meaning even of the philosophy of the "absolute ego" in Fichte, who describes conscience as the certainty of the pure duty which is independent of anything besides its transcendent freedom: In the moment in which the transcendent freedom comes down to action it is transformed into an immanent obedience to a well-calculated system of economic services. It is understandable that this loss of a concrete direction of conscientiousness paved the way for very immoral contents in the moment in which they were ordered, for instance, by a totalitarian state.

Against the æsthetic-emotional as well as the authoritarian form of determining the conscience, attempts were made in modern philosophy to have rationality and contents united. The most influential of these attempts is the common-sense theory of Thomas Reid and the Scottish school: The moral sense is common to everybody, being a natural endowment of human nature (like the *synteresis* of the scholastics). Decisive for practical ethics is the sense of benevolence towards the others (Hutcheson). This theory expresses adequately the reality of the British (and to a degree, American) conformism, and the natural benevolence in a society in which the converging tendencies still prevail over the diverging ones, and in which a secularized Christian morality is still dominant. Another attempt to find rational contents for the conscience has been made by Hegel. He distinguishes the formal and the true conscience. About the first he says: "Conscience is the infinite formal certainty of oneself—it expresses the absolute right of the subjective self-consciousness, namely, to know within and out of itself what law and duty are, and to acknowledge nothing except what it knows in this way as the good." But this subjectivity is fallible and may turn into error and guilt. Therefore it needs contents, in order to become the true conscience. These contents are the reality of family, society, and state. In the state as the organization of historical reason the formal conscience is transformed into the true conscience. It is an historical misjudgment to link these ideas to the totalitarian use of the state and the pagan distortion of conscience by National Socialism. Hegel was a rationalist, not a positivist. His idea of the state unites Christian—conservative and bourgeois—liberal elements. His famous, though rarely understood, idea of the state as the "god on earth" is based on the identification of the state with the church as the

"body of Christ," expressed in secular terms. The conscience which is determined by the state in this sense is determined not by bureaucratic orders but by the life of a half-religious, half-secular organism—the counterpart to the Christian-rationalistic common sense of the Anglo-Saxon society. While the Scottish solution is largely dependent on the social attitude of Western Christianity and Hegel's solution on Lutheran Protestantism, the spirit of Catholicism has received a new philosophical expression in recent philosophical developments of which I take Max Scheler as a representative. In his doctrine of conscience he fights against the popular conception of conscience as the "voice of God." He calls this, as well as the quest for the "freedom of conscience," principles of chaos. Instead of the freedom of conscience he demands the subjection to authority as the only way of experiencing the intuitive evidence of the moral principles. It is impossible to reach such an evidence without personal experience, and it is impossible to have such an experience without acting under the guidance of an authority which is based on former experience. In this respect, ethical (we could say "existential") experience is different from theoretical (*i.e.*, "detached") experience. Although this fits completely the situation of the Catholic, it is not meant as the establishment of external authority. "All authority is concerned only with the good which is universally evident, never with that which is individually evident." Ethical authority is based on general ethical evidence. But does such a general ethical evidence exist? Or is philosophical ethics bound to be either general and abstract or to be concrete and dependent on changing historical conditions? And if this is the alternative, can the problem of conscience be answered at all in terms of *moral* conscience?

V

The Idea of a Transmoral Conscience

A conscience may be called *transmoral* which does not judge in obedience to a moral law but according to the participation in a reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands. A transmoral conscience does not deny the moral realm, but it is driven beyond it by the unbearable tensions of the sphere of law.

It is Luther who derives a new concept of conscience from the experience of justification through faith; neither Paul nor Augustine did so. Luther's experience grew out of the monastic scrutiny of conscience and the threat of the ultimate judgment which he felt in its full depth and horror. Experiences like these he called *Anfechtungen*, that is, "tempting attacks," stemming from Satan as the tool of the divine wrath. These attacks are the most terrible thing a human being may experience. They

create an incredible *Angst* (dread), a feeling of being enclosed in a narrow place from which there is no escape. (*Angst*, he rightly points out, is derived from *angustia*, "narrows.") "Thou driveth me from the surface of the earth," he says to God in despair and even hate. Luther describes this situation in many different ways. He compares the horrified conscience which tries to flee and cannot escape with a goose which, pursued by the wolf, does not use its wings, as ordinarily, but its feet and is caught. Or he tells us how the moving of dry leaves frightens him as the expression of the wrath of God. His conscience confirms the divine wrath and judgment. God says to him: "Thou canst not judge differently about thyself." Such experiences are not dependent on special sins. The self, as such, is sinful before any act; it is separated from God, unwilling to love him.

If in this way the bad conscience is deepened into a state of absolute despair, it can be conquered only by the acceptance of God's self-sacrificing love as visible in the picture of Jesus, the Christ. God, so to speak, subjects himself to the consequences of his wrath, taking them upon himself, thus reestablishing the unity with us. The sinner is accepted as just in spite of his sinfulness. The wrath of God does not frighten us any more; a joyful conscience arises as much *above* the moral realm, as the desperate conscience was *below* the moral realm. "Justification by grace," in Luther's sense, means the creation of a "transmoral" conscience. While in the *Anfechtung* God is the accuser and our heart tries to excuse itself, in the "justification" our heart accuses us and God defends us against ourselves. In psychological terms this means: Inasmuch as we look at ourselves we must get a desperate conscience; inasmuch as we look at the power of a new creation beyond ourselves we can reach a joyful conscience. Not because of our moral perfection, but in spite of our moral imperfection we are fighting and triumphing on the side of God, as in the famous picture of Duerer, "Knight, Death, and Devil," the knight goes through the narrows in the attitude of a victorious defiance of dread and temptation.

An analogy to this "triumphant conscience," as developed by Luther personally as well as theologically, has appeared in the enthusiastic philosophy of Giordano Bruno. The moral conscience is overcome by the "heroic affect" toward the universe and the surrender to its infinity and inexhaustible creativity. Participation in the creativity of life universal liberates from the moral conscience, the bad as well as the good. Man, standing in the centre of being, is bound to transform life as it is into higher life. He takes upon himself the tragic consequences, connected with the destructive side of finite creativity, and must not try to escape them for the sake of a good moral conscience.

While in Bruno the transmoral conscience is based on a mystical

naturalism, Nietzsche's transmoralism is a consequence of his dramatic-naturalism. Nietzsche belongs to those empiricists who have tried to analyze the genesis of the moral conscience in such a way that its autonomy is destroyed: Hobbes and Helvetius on the ground of a materialistic metaphysics, Mandeville and Bentham on the ground of a utilitarian psychology, Darwin and Freud on the ground of an evolutionary naturalism—all have denied any objective validity to the voice of conscience, according to their rejection of any universal natural (rational) laws. Nietzsche has carried these ideas further as the title and the content of his *Genealogy of Morals* show. He says: "The bad conscience is a sickness, but it is a sickness as pregnancy is one." It is a creative sickness. Mankind had to be domesticated, and this has been done by their conquerors and ruling classes. It was in the interest of these classes to suppress by severe punishments the natural instincts of aggressiveness, will to power, destruction, cruelty, revolution. They succeeded in suppressing these trends. But they did not succeed in eradicating them. So the aggressive instincts became internalized and transformed into self-destructive tendencies. Man has turned against himself in self-punishment; he is separated from his animal past from which he had derived strength, joy, and creativity. But he cannot prevent his instincts from remaining alive. They require permanent acts of suppression, the result of which is the bad conscience, a great thing in man's evolution, an ugly thing if compared with man's real aim. Nietzsche describes this aim in terms which remind of Luther's descriptions of the transmoral conscience: "Once in a stronger period than our morbid, desperate present, he must appear, the man of the great love and the great contempt, the creative spirit who does not allow his driving strength to be turned to a transcendent world." Nietzsche calls him the man "who is strong through wars and victories, who needs conquest, adventure, danger, even pain." This man is "beyond good and evil" in the moral sense. At the same time, he is good in the metaphysical (or mystical) sense that he is in unity with life universal. He has a transmoral conscience, not on the basis of a paradoxical unity with God (such as Luther has), but on the basis of an enthusiastic unity with life in its creative and destructive power.

Recent "existential" philosophy has developed a doctrine of the transmoral conscience which follows the general lines of Luther, Bruno, and Nietzsche. Heidegger, the main representative of existential philosophy says: "The call of conscience has the character of the demand that man in his finitude actualizes his genuine potentialities, and this means an appeal to become guilty." Conscience summons us to ourselves, calling us back from the talk of the market and the conventional behavior of the masses. It has no special demands; it speaks to us in the "mode of

silence." It tells us only to act and to become guilty by acting, for every action is unscrupulous. He who acts experiences the call of conscience and—at the same time—has the experience of contradicting his conscience, of being guilty. "Existence as such is guilty." Only self-deception can give a good moral conscience, since it is impossible *not* to act and since every action implies guilt. We *must* act, and the attitude, in which we *can* act is "resoluteness." Resoluteness transcends the moral conscience, its arguments and prohibitions. It determines a situation instead of being determined by it. *The good, transmoral conscience consists in the acceptance of the bad, moral conscience* which is unavoidable wherever decisions are made and acts are performed. The way from Luther's to Heidegger's idea of a transmoral conscience was a dangerous one. "Transmoral" can mean reestablishment of morality from a point above morality, and it can mean the destruction of morality from a point below morality. The empiricists, mentioned above, from Hobbes to Freud have analyzed the moral conscience, but they have not destroyed it. Either they were dependent in their concrete ethics on Anglo-Saxon common sense; or they identified utility with the social conventions of a well-established bourgeoisie, or they cultivated a high sense of conscientiousness, in scientific honesty as well as in the fulfilment of duties; or they did not dare, unconsciously or consciously, to draw the radical moral consequences of their dissolution of the conscience. In Nietzsche none of these inhibitions is left, nor is it in Heidegger. But these names are, not without *some* justification, connected with the antimoral movements of Fascism or National Socialism. Even Luther has been linked to them (as in Italy have Machiavelli and Bruno). This raises the question: Is the idea of a transmoral conscience tenable? Or is it so dangerous that it cannot be maintained? But if it had to be dismissed, religion as well as analytic psychotherapy would have to be dismissed also. For in both of them the moral conscience is transcended, in religion by the acceptance of the divine grace which breaks through the realm of law and creates a joyful conscience; in depth psychology by the acceptance of one's own conflicts when looking at them and suffering under their ugliness without an attempt to suppress them and to hide them from oneself. Indeed, it is impossible *not* to transcend the moral conscience, because it is impossible to unite a *sensitive* and a *good* conscience. Those who have a sensitive conscience cannot escape the question of the transmoral conscience. The moral conscience drives beyond the sphere in which it is valid to the sphere from which it must receive its conditional validity. •

TOWARDS A NATURALISTIC RELIGION¹

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"THE GODS are a splendid company. It is a great pity that they are not better known."² These words are from an author who perhaps more than any other one person has brought religion down to earth, so that it can be observed and discussed as a perfectly natural human phenomenon. If, as I believe, Dr. Haydon has thus pointed the way to a constructive and enlightening study of religion, then it is our obligation to carry the study on, in our own particular areas of concentration, and to help perfect the ideas which Dr. Haydon has done so much to help provide.

Examine for a moment the reason why Dr. Haydon's studies are of such basic importance. We hardly need remind ourselves that the reaction in the modern world against supernaturalist religion was clearly evident in the seventeenth century, and that it came, in part at least, as a reaction against the inhibitions to the development of modern science which the churches tried to impose. That this reaction against supernaturalism has come to include many other factors is not to be denied. For example, there has been a pronounced reaction against the opiate aspects of religion which have inclined men to be resigned to the fate imposed on them by social conditions, and have thus held back political and economic reforms and changes designed to improve men's social environment.

But our concern at present is not with the genetic factors which have entered into the modern revolt against religion. I wish only to remind you that the revolt became, for understandable reasons, quite sweeping. Religion had become such a pervasive and central affair in life that for many defenders of scientific enlightenment the only way of preserving and broadening science seemed to be by a total rejection of religion. Others tried to maintain the "essence" of religion, but this became so diluted that, unintentionally where not intentionally, the new wine was allowed to fill the old bottles. Because of the very ubiquity of religion it was difficult, if not impossible, to throw off its reactionary restraints without discarding it entirely. But for the very same reason—namely, the pervasive and central nature of religion—the chances are that a total rejection of it included a rejection of certain important, perhaps even crucial, values of life.

It would be unintelligent as well as futile to try to weigh the lost values, which had been tied up with the institutions of religion, over against the new, liberating values brought by science and free inquiry.

¹ An address delivered before the *Freie Gemeinde* in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, February 21, 1945.

² A. E. Haydon, *The Quest of the Ages* (Harper, 1929), p. 72. See also his *Biography of the Gods* (Macmillan, 1941).

Furthermore, such an undertaking would be quite useless. For Dr. Haydon has provided us with instruments for discriminating the valuable aspects of the great religious traditions of the world without rejuvenating the prescientific, superstitious aspects with which these great values were traditionally confused. In other words, if the scientific revolt poured out the baby with the bath, Dr. Haydon has given us a means of retrieving the baby and cleansing it in a scientific and hygienic manner. The Neo-Thomist and neo-orthodox retreatists are not the only ones concerned with religious values.

How has Dr. Haydon succeeded in accomplishing this important task? Let me try to answer this question in two parts. In the first place, he has shown us how to view the great religions of history with their gods and all their superstitious beliefs and with their deep-going fears and noble aspirations as perfectly natural human affairs. The naturalist today need no longer associate religion with the supernatural. Although most of the great religions in history had definite supernaturalist aspects, yet we can now see that these beliefs and practices were thoroughly natural human reactions within a specific environment. We can look at them, not only critically, but also sympathetically, as natural aspects of the great human enterprise. It is one thing for a naturalist to assert abstractly that the religions of the world are, of course, natural, since all things are a part of encompassing nature. But it is quite another thing to realize concretely that the religions belong to men, to feel their naturalness, and to enter into them without a sense of strangeness or condescension. It is this concrete sense of naturalness which Dr. Haydon has provided. We need no longer fear that in trying to understand religion and the rôles it has played in the human drama, we are lending support and aid to superstition and dogmatism. We can, for example, employ the terms spiritual and aspirational without necessarily giving them a supernatural connotation. In short, Dr. Haydon has shown that supernaturalist beliefs and practices are themselves perfectly natural affairs which are supported or retarded, which are directed one way or another, by the natural social and cultural conditions under which they exist.

But furthermore—and here we come to the second of our considerations of the nature of Dr. Haydon's contribution—we can now begin a *normative* search for the specific social and cultural factors which have called forth and sustained the innumerable and varied aspects of the religions of men. We can try to discriminate the desirable from the undesirable aspects. As we discover the conditions which make for these various features, we can deliberately employ those which are favorable and reject those which are undesirable. After the analogy of the horticulturist or animal fancier who breeds up desirable strains and breeds out undesirable traits, we can try to control the social and cultural environing

conditions in such a way as to promote, for example, human aspiration, courage, great hope, and great effort, while at the same time we strive to eliminate the elements which make for superstition and dogmatism.

Look briefly at one illustration of the application of Dr. Haydon's fruitful analyses which has been made by Professor Laurence Sears, of Oberlin College, to the general problem of distinguishing the ethical from the magical in religious customs. Professor Sears defines religion "as the search for peace from the torment of conscience, and for a life unmenaced by death."³ He then remarks two mixed strains which run through religion: the ethical strain to find peace by living a good life; and the magical efforts to find it by nullifying guilt, as he says, "through some ceremony which brings absolution without the painful necessity of reforming the character."⁴

In regard to death, he points out that the magical strain strives to mitigate the threat of personal extinction by the appeal to ceremony and incantation as a means of preserving life after death. But if and as the ethical strain tended to dominate, then, as Mr. Sears observes, "the stress became less on the life after death than it did on the quality of life before death."⁵ If, as Professor Sears claims, one function of religion, stated naturalistically, is to give to life a meaning which death cannot destroy,⁶ then in regard to this function, religion and science can become harmonized; for there is no justifiable reason why the latter should not be employed to secure and enrich the quality and meaning of life here and now on earth. Thus science can help us live up to the religious responsibility, to use the words of John Dewey,

of conserving, transmitting, rectifying and expanding the heritage of values we have received that those who come after us may receive it more solid and secure, more widely accessible and more generously shared than we have received it.⁷

In referring above to the modern scientific reaction we sometimes spoke of the revolt against *religion* and sometimes of the revolt against *supernaturalism*. Are these two terms, supernaturalism and religion, synonymous? As Professor M. C. Otto has reminded us, "The answer depends, as answers so often do, on how the terms are defined."⁸

Professor Otto continues:

No simple description can do justice to religion even as this has been formulated and practiced in the Occident. But a central feature of our whole religious tradition is its positive relation to the supernatural. To be religious has meant to seek companionship with a friendly being believed to abide behind or within the drift and waste of temporal events. Possibly there is actually a continuity between the "Friend behind phenomena" that men seek, to borrow Gilbert Murray's idea, and

³ Laurence Sears, "Magical and Ethical Religion," *Journal of Liberal Religion*, VI (Winter, 1945), p. 136.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 136. ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 146. ⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁷ John Dewey, *A Common Faith* (Yale University Press, 1934), p. 87.

⁸ M. C. Otto, "Scientific Humanism," *Antioch Review* (Winter, 1943), p. 540.

"the pack which a dog tries to smell his way back to all the time he is out walking." "It is a strange and touching thing," says Mr. Murray, "this eternal hunger of the gregarious animal for the herd of friends who are not there." "And it may be," he continues, "it may very possibly be," that our religious searchings are at bottom "the groping of a lonely-souled gregarious animal to find its herd or its herd leader in the great spaces between the stars."⁹

Clearly enough, if by the term religion we mean this reliance upon a Cosmic Friend, then we have defined the word *religion* in such a way as to exclude naturalism. On the other hand, if we define religion as the sustained effort to instate securely in a way of life the great religious values, then it is possible and perhaps desirable to work out what might be called a naturalistic religious approach to life.

We shall not consider the question of the desirability or undesirability of using the term *naturalistic* or *atheistic religion*. But it is important to consider the concepts which would be included, whether such a term or some other be employed to designate this union of working ideas. Here are three proposals.

In the first place, we should include a concern with human values generally, among which are ethical or moral values. The religious naturalist should be concerned to realize the maximum in the way of human satisfactions and happiness and significance of living. Such an interest is ethical, by definition, I suppose, since it is the pursuit of the good, but it includes many and various values.

Among these other values would be the concern to beautify our environment, the everyday environment of home, community, factory, and farm, as well as the more esoteric aspects which are now usually restricted to our art galleries and concert halls.

Another concern to be included would be the cultivation of conditions favorable for the growth of friendship and mutual understanding among individuals with whom we associate personally and among the peoples and races of the world.

But I wish to emphasize in particular one basic ethical commitment involved in loyalty to the good today. We should not forget the origin in our modern world of the revolt against supernaturalism, and in particular that it was a defense of science. Today science is under both overt and covert attack from many quarters. These attacks often take the subtle form of insisting that the method of scientific inquiry is inherently restricted to certain areas which exclude ethical questions. It is widely maintained by many supernationalists that although science can give us power to construct instruments and tools and machines, yet it cannot by its very nature help us to decide how wisely to use such power and control for constructive human ends. When we encounter such

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 540. The quotations from Gilbert Murray can be found in *The Stoic Philosophy*, pp. 65-66.

objections to the broadening of the scientific approach to include normative questions about the ends of life, we may very well be suspicious that the party making them is holding on to certain values which he fears to submit to the searching and public light of scientific inquiry.

Furthermore, it is quite the fad these days to blame the scientific method for the turmoil and chaos of our times. This is such a complete misreading of historical fact that all the friends of free inquiry can help to refute it. For it is clearly evident that our determination of the ends or aims for which scientific power is used has been anything but scientific. While looking on Sundays over our shoulders to the ancient and mediæval world for prescientific guiding principles, we have tried in our economic activities to practice *laissez faire*, which has come to mean "let the devil take the hindmost." We have not even tried to be scientific in our formulation of social, economic, and political aims and purposes. Accordingly, it is an ignorant falsehood, and in some cases a deliberate lie, to accuse the scientific method for the social and moral deficiencies of our times. Rather we should accuse ourselves, our business civilization, and, unfortunately, many scientists and Christians among us, for failing to try to expand the method of science to the normative question of human aims.

In particular this issue about the limitations of science is seen in the current educational controversies between the so-called progressives in education and the classicists and theologians represented by Chancellor Hutchins, of Chicago, by the St. John's group, by the "hundred-best-books" advocates, and many others. As friends of enlightenment we are obligated to clarify these educational controversies, to sharpen the issues involved, and to support the progressive and experimental movements in education that we may at least learn something from the mistakes which are bound to be made in any case.

So much for a reminder, altogether too brief, of the ethical aspects of religion. The second idea, one which we can only mention in passing, might be called the communal aspect. The ties of personal friendship are one of the great human values which can help sustain human aspiration and effort in times of stress and defeat. But they are not enough for the rich flowering of certain values which have often been associated with the great living religions of times now past. For when we view our own personal achievements and those of our friends, we see how inconsequential and insecure they are in the face of the complex and powerful movements of social forces which operate in groups so large and complicated that the forces appear to be almost completely impersonal. But through the devoted use of scientific knowledge of human beings, as individuals and as groups, we can attain social conditions which will slowly but gradually make for the growth of human trust and confidence in one another. When such conditions are attained, then the following words of the great "philosopher

of a new age," as he has been called,¹⁰ will express not only a hope and an aspiration but also an actual description of life. In the words of John Dewey:

Within the flickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells a sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them. In its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal. The life of the community in which we live and have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship. The acts in which we express our perception of the ties which bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies.¹¹

The third and last central idea of a naturalistic religion, which we have space to emphasize here, pertains to the mysteries of existence. This aspect of life was so intimately tied up with supernaturalist religions that the scientific revolt was taken for granted as an attempt to abolish mystery from the world. Yet this interpretation is based on two misconceptions. And I am persuaded by reflections which were initiated and sharpened through the life and writings of M. C. Otto, and supported by the work of William and Alice James, and by other great artists of the good life, that these misconceptions are serious and should be corrected.

One misconception upon which this unfortunate attitude towards mystery is founded is somewhat the consequence of supernaturalism itself. For in the official supernaturalist religions the response, to borrow the words of Mr. Otto, "is not so much to the awesome mystery itself as to the Being behind the mystery."¹² In other words, supernaturalism has tended to read out of the world the intrinsic mystery of existence and to lodge it conceptually or mystically in a Being beyond this world. It has "reduced" the ineffable aspects of life to one element and has projected or hypostatized that element as something beyond the workaday life of the world. Thus supernaturalism, like materialism, tries to rob the directly experienced world of those intrinsic, ineffable meanings which are there to be appreciated by those who have found out how to perceive them. If we are to find mystery, supernaturalism maintains, it is not primarily *in* the world, but *behind* it. We can acknowledge a debt to Platonic and Christian supernaturalism for their insistence that existence is good, but to do so we must reintroduce the sun and its light to the "cave" of everyday life whence Plato and Christianity helped to remove it.

The second misconception in the modern attitude towards mystery concerns the function of science. Since science explains many things which previously were explained by religion, the development of science is taken to be the eradication of mystery. Obviously, however, the "mystery of existence" which is thus being eradicated is not that which is intrinsic to existence itself but is simply that "mystery" which religious concepts

¹⁰ M. C. Otto, "John Dewey, Philosopher of a New Age," *Social Frontier* (May and June, 1937).

¹¹ John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* (Henry Holt, 1922), concluding lines.

¹² M. C. Otto, "Scientific Humanism," *op. cit.*, p. 542.

had previously lodged *behind existence* in the notion of God or the Absolute. William James has shown once and for all, it would seem, that human explanations, whether scientific or religious, are always in terms of existence, whether the explanatory existences be actual or imagined.¹³ Take such a common experience as that of water. Water is explained chemically as an interaction between hydrogen and oxygen. This explanation may be treated as a reduction of the *idea* of water to the *ideas* of hydrogen and oxygen or to the *ideas* of atoms, electrons, etc. But clearly it does not reduce *existing* water to *existing* hydrogen and oxygen except as it is set to work in the laboratory or factory to do so. When it is thus set to work, the ineffable qualities of the specific water which is being used disappear, but new qualities supervene in the existences of the hydrogen and oxygen into which the previous existence has been transformed.

The technological discoveries of science may be unintelligently applied in our everyday life to reinforce the traditional supernaturalist "reduction" of mystery out of life. They can do this by inflicting on life the deadening routines and standardizations of a capitalistic and materialistic age. For it is these, not science, that blind the individual to the ineffable qualities and patterns which existence is continually putting on and taking off and in which it is, as it were, anxious to submerge itself, given the chance. But such unintelligent use of the power of science is not a part of the scientific method or the scientific attitude. The method and the power of science *can* be used to enhance individuality and to increase and widen the opportunity for the perception and appreciation of the incommunicable delights of nature and of art. Some modern artists and poets have been struggling and experimenting to this end, although current spiritual attitudes and economic practices interfere seriously with their efforts.¹⁴ But modern machines are existences, as are the dime-store gadgets and trinkets which they turn out, and as are even the human beings whose lives they now deaden. We have only to learn of the potentialities which can be actualized in the pattern of the machine and its factories, in the products which it can produce, and in the pattern of the lives of those who operate it, to start on the road of the intelligent and humane use and expansion of science for the perpetual enrichment of life. Science can provide the enrichment which comes with confidence that the terrific powers of nature are being gradually redirected to serve human ends. But it can also promote that enrichment, perhaps more important, which issues from the interest and leisure to savor the intrinsic qualities of existence as it flows subtly and fleetingly through the life of human organisms.

¹³ William James, "The Sentiment of Rationality," in *The Will to Believe* (Longmans, Green, 1927); *Collected Essays* (Longmans, Green, 1920).

¹⁴ Cf. Horace M. Kallen, *Art and Freedom* (Duel, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), Vol. II.

EARLY TRAVELERS IN GREECE

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DURING the greater part of the Middle Ages and, in fact, nearly down to the time of the Turkish conquest Greece was known to educated men of western Europe almost entirely from what they read about it in ancient authors. To be sure during the twelfth, and particularly during the thirteenth century men from the west—Frankish barons, Sicilian Normans, Catalans, Venetians, and others—took possession of more or less of the country and have left behind them some splendid mediæval monuments. The princes and dukes of Achæa and their followers certainly have a place in history; but they, like the others, were in Greece not as travelers interested in the ancient monuments, but for the purpose of exploiting the land. These various elements were constantly at war with one another or with the native Greeks, but the Turkish conquest finally put an end to their squabbles. Before that time, however, a few travelers from the west did succeed in visiting the country and have left us some account of what they saw.

The earliest of these travelers was a certain Niccolò da Martoni who made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land in 1394 and on his way home spent two days at Athens, February 24 and 25, 1395. He tells what he saw in a manuscript preserved in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris.¹ He explains that he was detained by pirates on the island of Cythnos for some time, then went to Ceos, and so to the mainland of Greece. At Athens he visited only the citadel, that is, the Acropolis, and the southern part of the city. He says he saw twenty columns of the "*magnum hospitium dicti imperatoris Hadriani*." This was, of course, the temple of Olympian Zeus, not the palace of Hadrian, and apparently he didn't count very well, for Cyriac of Ancona a generation or more later saw twenty-one columns still standing. Today there are fifteen, besides one lying on the ground. In the Parthenon he was interested in the holy relics only. He speaks of a "*Liber omnium Evangeliorum scriptus per manus sanctæ Elenæ in cartis deauratis ad linguam Græcam qui liber ibi pro magno thesauro reputatur*," that is, a Greek New Testament written in letters of gold by the Empress Helena, and adds that it was regarded as a great treasure. After leaving Athens he visited Corinth. It is evident at once that the information which Niccolò has left us is meagre and of little value.²

¹ See Judeich, *Ath. Mitt.*, XXII (1897), pp. 423 ff.

² In a pamphlet entitled *The English in Athens before 1821* (London, 1926, Anglo-Hellenic League) p. 1, William Miller quotes Matthew Paris as authority for the statement that in the twelfth century an Englishman, John of Basingstoke, who was archdeacon of Leicester in the reign of Henry III, studied in Athens; also that he brought back from Athens a Greek grammar compiled for him there, and other books.

But by far the most interesting of the earliest travelers in Greece was another Italian, Ciriaco de'Pizzicolle, better known to English scholars as Cyriac of Ancona (1391-1455). Cyriac was an interesting character. His curiosity was aroused by the Latin inscriptions on the Arch of Trajan in his native Ancona, and afterwards he copied many inscriptions both in Rome and elsewhere. He was a merchant and traveler and visited Greece, the Greek islands, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Egypt, Thessaly, Thrace, Macedonia, Epirus, Acarnania, Crete, etc.³ He made a practice of sending copies of the inscriptions which he found to learned friends. Besides copying he also collected inscriptions and works of art that were not too large to carry away. He never carefully worked over or edited his copies. After his death his manuscripts remained at Ancona where they were carelessly treated and some of his material lost. Parts of it are still preserved in the Barberini Library in Rome and in other Italian libraries. Cyriac has been accused of including in his collection inscriptions taken from ancient authors, but the fact that one of his inscriptions agrees with one in Plutarch or Stobæus does not necessarily mean that he took it from that source. There are still extant inscriptions mentioned by ancient authors. For example, there is the inscription of the younger Pisistratus quoted by Thucydides (vi, 54, 7) which is still preserved and of which I have a squeeze in my collection.

Cyriac visited Athens twice—in April 1436 and in March 1447.⁴ Among the monuments he saw there and commented on were the Theatre, the Choregic Monument of Lysicrates, the Arch of Hadrian, the Olympieum, the Theseum, the Pnyx, and, of course, the Parthenon. He says he saw great walls everywhere that had collapsed from age, and within the city and outside through the fields "incredible" buildings of marble, houses, sacred shrines and sculptures conspicuous for the wonderful skill of the sculptor, and huge columns, but all in ruins. He notes particularly on the citadel the "great and marvelous marble temple of the goddess Pallas" adorned with very noble sculptures in both its pediments and on its walls.⁵ In a letter from Chios dated March 29, 1447, he speaks of the Parthenon again as "that extraordinary and wonderful temple" and comments on the colossal figures of men and horses of its sculptured decoration.

³ See *Atene e Roma*, XXII (1919), pp. 16 ff.

⁴ See Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen im Alterthum*, pp. 727 ff.

⁵ Cyriac's words give such a vivid description of the actual condition of the ancient monuments of Athens and its vicinity in 1436 that they deserve to be quoted in their original Latin. He says: "*Ad VII idus Apriles Athenas veni. Ubi primum ingentia mœnia undique conlapsa antiquitate conspexi, ac intus et extra per agros incredibilia ex marmore ædificia domosque et sacra delubra diversaque rerum imagines miraque fabrefactoris arte conspicuas atque columnas immanes, sed omnia magnis undique convulsa ruinis et, quod magis adnotari placuit, in summa civitatis arce ingens et mirabile Palladis diæ marmoreum templum, divum quippe opus Phidie . . . ornatissimum undique nobilissimis imaginibus in utriusque frontibus atque parietibus insculptis . . . mira fabresculptoris arte conspicitur.*" In his letter from Chios of March 29, 1447, he says of the Parthenon: "*Exstat vero nostrum ad diem eximium illud et mirabile templum*" and refers to the pediment sculptures with the words, "*magnis colosseisve simulacris hominum et equorum tam ingentis delubri ornamenta. . .*"

Cyriac had all the enthusiasm of the scholar and the antiquarian as well as of the man of artistic feeling and could appreciate the beauties of the Parthenon. He was the last educated traveler to visit Greece before the Turkish conquest, and he had no successor for two centuries. Constantinople fell in 1453 and Athens in 1456, though the citadel, that is, the Acropolis, held out for a couple of years longer.

Then in the latter part of the seventeenth century travelers began to venture into Greece again. The first of these seems to have been a Frenchman named La Guilletière, who visited Athens in 1669, and whose brother named Guillet published in 1675 an account of his travels. La Guilletière was a soldier who fought against the Turks in Hungary where he was taken prisoner and sold as a slave to a Tunisian corsair. He remained in Tunis four years and then got away to Genoa. While there he met two Italians, two Germans, and an Englishman who were eager, as he was, to visit Athens. A sea captain who was about to start on a trading voyage to the Levant agreed to give them passage. It took them eighteen days to get from Genoa to Kalamata in southern Greece. Then, after stopping and coasting along the shore of the southern Peloponnesus they eventually arrived at Porto Raphti on the east coast of Attica, an important seaport in the Middle Ages. They did not put in to Piræus, then known as Porto Leone, because of the excessive taxes levied by the Turks on imports. In fact, the captain remained at Porto Raphti until the Turks made some abatement of the tariffs they at first demanded. La Guilletière comments on the colossal statue still to be seen at Porto Raphti and also on the famous columns of Sunium.

After he got to Athens he saw the sights of the city under the guidance of one of the Janizaries, to whom some of the erroneous statements in the book are probably to be attributed. He was greatly impressed by the beauty of the Parthenon, and says that certain drawings which he made will make clear its beauties. Unfortunately those drawings were not reproduced in the book. He was taken inside the building and found it dark. It was full of Mohammedan offerings, old scarfs, etc., and the wind caused the hanging lamps to strike against one another. Anybody familiar with the interior of a large Turkish mosque can understand this. On the ceiling (the vault he calls it) he says he saw a figure of the Virgin painted. This must have been the mosaic seen by later travelers and not a painting. Brief as his account is, it gives one some idea of what the interior of the Parthenon looked like in 1669.

One curious statement that he makes is that on the front of the Parthenon he saw an inscription *Ἀγνώστῳ Θεῷ* (To an Unknown God). He says it was not cut on the door of a chapel as some people state and that it did not go back to Saint Paul, but was put on by Christians in the third century. What does this mean? Did he really see some letters? Wheler,

who with Spon visited the Acropolis in 1676, calls this statement a manifest untruth. Both Spon and Wheler saw two late Greek dedicatory inscriptions on a column. "*Nous vîmes sous la portique du côté de la façade une petite colonne avec une inscription de chaque côté,*" says Spon; and both he and Wheler quote the inscriptions. Is this what La Guilletière saw? Can we imagine that he saw the holes in the architrave for the bronze letters of the inscription in honor of Nero put up in the year A.D. 61—the inscription deciphered by Andrews? Or could he have seen some painted letters such as commonly accompany paintings in Byzantine churches, for there were paintings on the walls covered or partly covered, with whitewash by the Turks? Spon thinks that he can trace the story back to a letter of Crusius, and he may be right. It appears that a certain Martin Kraus, or Crusius in Latin, who was professor at Tübingen, eager to learn something about the actual state of Athens, communicated with the Greeks of Constantinople. He received in reply from Symeon Kavasila of the city of Acarnania, later known as Arta, a letter in which the Parthenon was called the temple of the Unknown God. The actual words are: *νῦν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐσώτερον ὅπερ ἀκρόπολις, ἐν ᾧ καὶ ναὸς τῷ Ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, ἅπαν ὑπὸ μόνων Ἰσλαμικῶν οἰκοῦμενον* ("But now the inner part, which is the citadel, in which is also a temple to the Unknown God, is inhabited wholly by Turks").⁶ Crusius' letters were published in 1575. I am very much afraid that in this instance, as in some others, La Guilletière, or perhaps I should say Guillet, was drawing the long bow; but it is, of course, possible that his guide undertook to interpret for him some inscription which neither of them could read. Kavasila was not, however, the first to call the Parthenon a temple of the Unknown God, for it is so designated by an anonymous Greek writer in a fifteenth-century manuscript in Vienna.⁷

Fifty feet from the Parthenon La Guilletière says he saw the famous salt well in the Erechtheum, but it is doubtful if he saw more than is to be seen today. Wheler tried to see it, but, as it was included in the harem of a house, that was impossible. He was told, however, that it was nearly dry.

Among the places to which La Guilletière's dragoman took him was a mosque in the lower city, one of the three mosques in Athens. He says that it was really the Pantheon which Hadrian had built there (p. 156) and that he found it much finer than the Pantheon at Rome (p. 269). It is clear from his description of the part of the city which he was visiting

⁶ See Leake, *Topography of Athens*, I, pp. 88 f.

⁷ His words are: *περί δὲ τοῦ ναοῦ τῆς Θεομήτορος, ὃν ᾠκοδόμησεν Ἀπολλῶς καὶ Εὐλόγως ἐπ' ὀνόματι ἀγνώστῳ θεῷ, ἔχει οὕτως. ἵστιν ναὸς δρομικώτατος καὶ εὐρύχωρος.* See Leake, *op. cit.*, I, p. 480. Ἀπολλῶς and Εὐλόγως are, of course, corrupt.

and from the plan which he publishes that the building which he saw was probably not the Pantheon, but the Library of Hadrian, part of which is still standing. This must have been comparatively well preserved in La Guilletière's time, due to the fact that it had been a church before it became a mosque. It was in the southeastern part of the great Stoa of Hadrian. But after mentioning the building, he goes on, "We admired horses in the style of Praxiteles which are still there. Hadrian had them placed there. They are of Praxiteles. That tells the whole story. They are beginning to show signs of weathering (*injure du temps*)."⁸ Did he see any horses, or is this again just moonshine? Spon again quotes from a letter to Crusius, this time from a certain Theodore Zygomalas of Nauplia, in which he says he saw the "Pantheon," and that "over the entrance were two horses which one would say were alive, which it is said Praxiteles carved."⁸ This, of course, was a reference to the Parthenon, not the Pantheon; and the horses were the famous horses of Athena by Phidias in the west pediment. It looks very much as if La Guilletière, or Guillet, was either cribbing here, or had got his notes badly mixed. It is interesting to observe that in commenting on this statement Spon himself makes a bad mistake. He says the horses can't be by Praxiteles for they date from the time of Hadrian!

In the southeastern portion of Athens La Guilletière says he saw ruins of the temple of Artemis Agrotera on a small hill from which he looked down on the stadium which was still "magnificent." He also saw at the foot of the hill a temple of Demeter of white marble still complete and used as a church; and in it he saw a picture of the crucifixion "which deserves to be admired." Wheler, too, saw this temple, that is, the church of the Panagia; and Spon says the painting of the crucifix was faint, but he gives a drawing of it.

It is needless to say more of La Guilletière's account of his stay in Athens. Because of his mistakes it has sometimes been supposed that he did not see what he describes, but got most of his information from ancient authors, or from the publications of a Dutch scholar, Joannes Meursius, to whom he sometimes refers. A careful reading of the book, however, shows clearly a firsthand knowledge of Greece. Some of his errors, as already suggested, were almost certainly due to the misinformation given him by his guide; and some seem to be drawn from some other writer. Yet, in spite of its shortcomings La Guilletière produced a very readable book and one that became deservedly popular. It was in fact a "best seller." The first edition was exhausted in three months and another edition was printed.

⁸ The actual words of Zygomalas are: τὸ πάνθειον, οἰκοδομὴν νικῶσαν πάσας οἰκοδομὰς, γλυπτῶς ἐκτὸς διὰ πάσης τῆς οἰκοδομῆς ἔχουσιν τὰς ιστορίας Ἑλλήνων καὶ ταῦτα τὰς θείας· καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπάνω τῆς μεγάλης πύλης, ἵππους δύο φρουρασμένους ἀνδρομέαν εἰς σάρκα, τὸ δοκεῖν ἐμψύχους, οὓς λέγεται ὅτι ἐλάξενσε Πραξιτέλης. See Leake, *op. cit.*, I, p. 89.

I have referred to the Dutch scholar, Joannes Meursius, to give the Latin form of his name, and I ought to say a few words about him. He was a man of tremendous industry who collected and published with Latin commentary all the passages in Greek and Latin literature concerned with Attica and some other parts of Greece. All his writings are to be found in the fourth and fifth volumes of that monumental publication of Jacob Gronovius, *Thesaurus Græcarum Antiquitatum*, brought out in 1697 in thirteen large folio volumes.

In November and December 1674 the Marquis de Nointel, French ambassador to the Porte, made his famous visit to Athens, when two artists in his employ, one of whom was once supposed to be Jacques Carrey, made the drawings of the Parthenon sculptures which are so important for the restoration of the pediment groups. Both of the artists seem to have been Flemish. De Nointel apparently intended to publish a book on his travels, for some notes were compiled probably for that purpose, but the book was never written.

The next travelers of importance to visit Athens were the well-known pair, Jacob Spon, a Frenchman, and Sir George Wheler, an Englishman, both of whom I have already mentioned. They made an extensive tour through Greece and Asia Minor in the years 1675 and 1676, mostly in the latter year. Both were thoroughly educated men, and each published an account of their travels when they returned home. Spon brought out two substantial little volumes, putting his friend's name as well as his own on the title page. His preface is dated November 15, 1677. Wheler's book appeared at London in 1682 in somewhat larger format. Wheler justifies the publication of his book after Spon's by the fact that he adds certain botanical information lacking in the latter, and that he makes a few corrections. Both men were tremendously impressed with the Parthenon, and though their drawings of it are fantastic their accounts are interesting, for they were the last educated travelers to see the building before it was blown up. It is worth while to quote Wheler. After describing the Propylæa he continues:

We could hardly stay here to make all the observations we might have done we were so impatient to go to the temple of Minerva, the chief goddess of the Athenians, which is not only the chief ornament of the citadel, but absolutely both for matter and art the most beautiful piece of antiquity remaining in the world. I wish I could communicate the pleasure I took in viewing it by a description that would in some proportion express the ideas I had then of it, which I cannot hope to do; but shall give you the figure I took of it there with its dimensions, and so much of the sculpture as I can remember. . . .

Then, after describing the building he passes to the sculptures where he is sometimes at fault, confusing the west with the east pediment. He mis-

takes the Poseidon for Zeus, or Jupiter as he calls him. Then he continues,

At his right hand is another figure with its hands and arms broken off, covered down half way the leg, in a posture as coming towards Jupiter; which, perhaps, was a Victory leading the horses of the triumphant chariot of Minerva which follows it. The horses are made with such great art that the sculptor seems to have outdone himself by giving them a more than seeming life; such a vigor is expressed in each posture of their prancing and stamping natural to generous horses. Minerva is next represented in the chariot rather as the goddess of learning than war, without helmet, buckler or Medusa head on her breast, as Pausanias describes her image within the temple. Next behind her is another figure of a woman sitting, with her head broken off. Who it was is not certain. But my companion bade me observe the next two figures sitting in the corner to be the emperor Hadrian and his empress Sabina; whom I easily knew to be so by the many medals and statues I have seen of them.

This last statement was largely responsible for the absurd idea that the Parthenon sculptures dated from Hadrian's time, an idea advanced in England when Lord Elgin brought them to London. In fact, it was not until the sculptors Visconti and Canova saw them and raved over them that Englishmen awoke to the fact that they had secured some of the world's greatest artistic treasures. The two figures mentioned by Wheler are probably to be identified as Cecrops and Pandrosus.

He speaks briefly of the metopes and has this to say of the frieze:

Within the portico on high and on the outside of the cella of the temple itself is another border of basso-relievo round about it, or at least on the north and south sides; which without doubt is as ancient as the temple and of admirable work, but not so high relieve as the other. Thereon are represented sacrifices, processions and other ceremonies of heathens worship. Most of them were designed by the Marquis de Nointel who employed a painter to do it two months together and shewed them to us when we waited on him at Constantinople. . . .

He continues, after entering the pronaos:

We observed in place of one of the pillars a great pile of stone and lime of most rude work, which they told us the Kislar-Haga had ordered to be so done to help support the roof; because he could never find a stone big enough to supply the place of the old pillar, broken down, although he had spent two thousand crowns to do it.

He comments on the obscurity inside and on the things he saw there such as four "presses" made in the wall and shut up with doors of marble which nobody dared to open because of the story that when somebody did open one he immediately died, and the plague soon broke out in the town. Even de Nointel, he says, had been unable to have them opened. Wheler imagined that they contained church vestments, books, etc. He refers to the window cut in the east pediment in these words:

When the Christians consecrated it to serve God in, they let in the light at the east end; which is all that it yet hath. And not only that, but made a semicircle for

the Holy Place according to their rites, which the Turks have not yet much altered. This was separated from the rest by jasper pillars, two of which on each side yet remain. Within this chancel is a canopy sustained by four porphyry pillars with beautiful white marble chapters of the Corinthian order. But the Holy Table under it is removed. Beyond the canopy are two or three degrees one above another in a semicircle where the bishops and presbyters used to sit in time of communion upon certain solemn days. The bishop sat in a marble chair above the rest which yet remaineth above the degrees against the window.

Towards the bottom of the window he saw the translucent slabs of marble which La Guilletière had also commented on. Continuing he says,

The roof over the altar and quire added to the temple by the Greeks hath the picture of the Holy Virgin on it in mosaic work, left yet by the Turks; because as they say a certain Turk having shot a musket at it his hand presently withered. This temple was covered outwardly with great planks of stone, of which some are fallen down and are to be seen in the mosque.

In one place he remarks, "The Turks, according to their measure of wit have washed over the beautiful white marble within with lime."

But I do not know that it is necessary to quote Wheler further. Eleven years after his visit the Venetians under Morosini besieged Athens, and on the 26th of September 1687 the fatal shot was fired which exploded the powder stored in the temple and turned into a ruin this glorious building which had survived almost complete for two thousand years.

One other traveler in Greece in the seventeenth century I ought to mention, and that is the geographer, or perhaps I should say cartographer, Vincenzo Coronelli. This Venetian was especially famous for his maps.

In the eighteenth century visitors to Greece published accounts of their discoveries especially in folio form, in contrast with the volumes of modest size of the previous century. Here the work of two men, James Stuart and Nicholas Revett, stands out above all others. These two had been in Rome for six or seven years when they decided to go to Athens to make careful studies of the ancient buildings there. This was in 1748; but they did not get to Piræus until March 17, 1751. They worked very deliberately. As Stuart puts it, "We resolved that we would spare no expense or fatigue that might any way contribute to the better execution of the task we had set ourselves. In particular we determined to avoid haste and system, those most dangerous enemies to accuracy and fidelity" (I, p. vii). He explains that they frequently had to remove great quantities of earth and rubbish to get at the foundations so that their measurements might be correct. In fact, they took the greatest pains to have these exact, and checked them carefully. They completed their drawings of the Athenian buildings by the end of 1753 and then went to Salonica. "Because of a most destructive pestilence," as Stuart puts it, they left that town, visited

several Greek islands, and then went to Smyrna whence they embarked for England, arriving there in 1755, "having spent in all near five years in this laborious and expensive expedition from Rome to Athens and thence to London." The results of their work were published at London under the title *The Antiquities of Athens* in four beautiful folio volumes, now much treasured in architectural libraries, the first appearing in 1762. The beauty of their drawings has long been famous. In addition to the more familiar buildings in Athens they give careful drawings of the little Ionic temple on the Ilissus, which Spon thought to be a temple of Ceres, that is, Demeter. "Notwithstanding," says Stuart, "that a great part of this temple has long since been thrown down and destroyed, whatever remains of it is still in good preservation." This building is now entirely gone.

One other work of this period must not be passed over in silence, and that is the *Voyage pittoresque de la Grèce* of the Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier, French ambassador to the Porte. The first of the three folio volumes of this beautiful work was published in 1782. The title is somewhat misleading, for it is not concerned with Greece proper, but with the Greek islands, Asia Minor, and Constantinople. The engravings, which are very fine, are largely of scenery and of the costumes of the places he visited, and the book is thus really a work of travel.

In 1764 the Society of the Dilettanti of London determined to supplement the work of Stuart and Revett by doing for Asia Minor what they had done for Athens. They, therefore, sent out Revett accompanied by Richard Chandler and a young painter named Pars, the results of whose work were given to the world in four large folio volumes, *The Antiquities of Ionia*, the first of which was published in 1797. A fifth volume was added in 1915. As this, however, is not a work of travel in Greece, though important in itself, it need not concern us further.

Chandler did, however, publish his travels in two quarto volumes, one devoted to Asia Minor and the other to Greece which he visited in 1765. On his way from Smyrna he stopped at Sunium and visited the temple, one of the columns of which had recently been thrown down by a Turkish captain, he was told, "to get at the metal uniting the stones." But this can hardly have been the real reason, for the Greeks did not use metal clamps in the drums of their columns. He speaks of the blowing up of the Parthenon and of its being the "sad forerunner of further destruction: the Turks breaking the stones and applying them to the building of a new mosque which stands within the ruin, or to the repairing of their houses and the walls of the fortress. The vast pile of ponderous materials, which lay ready, is greatly diminished and the whole structure will gradually be consumed and disappear." "It is not easy to conceive," he continues,

"a more striking object than the Parthenon, though now a mere ruin. The columns within the naos have all been removed, but on the floor may be seen the circles which directed the workmen in placing them." And further on, "From the rubbish of the ceiling the Turkish boys collect bits of the mosaic of different colors which composed the picture. . . ." "On the walls are traces of the paintings"—a statement true today. He also speaks of a "staircase which leads out on the architrave, and has a marble or two with inscriptions, but worn so as not to be legible. It belonged to the minaret which has been destroyed." Chandler noticed the holes for the Nero inscription on the architrave, but thought they were for the fixture of votive offerings. He laments that "so much admirable sculpture as is still extant about this fabric should be all likely to perish as it were immaturely, from ignorant contempt and brutal violence. Numerous carved stones have disappeared; and many, lying in the ruinous heaps, moved our indignation at the barbarism daily defacing them." What we know to have been the centre slab of the frieze was at that time built into the wall of the citadel. He describes it as representing "a venerable person with a beard reading in a large volume which is partly supported by a boy." It was, of course, the priest receiving the new peplos for Athena. Again he says, "We purchased two fine fragments of the frieze which we found inserted over doorways in the town; and were presented with a beautiful trunk which had fallen from the metopes and lay neglected in the garden of a Turk."

Pars made drawings of 196 feet of the frieze besides other sculptures, mostly from what Chandler calls the "architrave of the colonnade," where he was exposed to accident and gusts of wind, and threats of Turks because he overlooked their houses. Chandler copied inscriptions and bought others and took them away. He found that the little temple on the Ilissus had suffered much since Stuart and Revett saw it and predicted its early destruction. He traveled widely in Greece and finally returned to England in November 1766.

After Chandler's time journeys to Greece became more frequent as did books on Greek travel. Many of these may be passed over in silence, but in some their authors made important contributions to our knowledge of the topography and monuments of the country. In the years 1801, 1805, and 1806 an Englishman named Edward Dodwell made three expeditions to Greece, traveled all over the country, and published the results of his travels in two superb quarto volumes with copperplate engravings at London in 1819. He was an acute observer, and he had a classical background, for in one place (I, p. 284) he mentions an emendation to the text of Xenophon by his great-grandfather, Henry Dodwell. He saw the Parthenon both before and after the removal of its sculptures by Lord Elgin, and he criticizes severely the ruthless way in which the work was

done. He blames the workmen rather than Lord Elgin himself for this. Let me quote him directly:

During my first tour to Greece I had the inexpressible mortification of being present when the Parthenon was despoiled of its finest sculpture, and when some of its architectural members were thrown to the ground. I saw several metopes at the northeast extremity of the temple taken down. They were fixed in between the triglyphs as in a groove; and in order to lift them up it was necessary to throw to the ground the magnificent cornice by which they were covered. The south-east angle of the pediment shared the same fate (I, p. 322).

He found a fragment of the cornice painted in blue, red, and yellow, but the colors "had almost vanished away." He also saw the inner cornice painted with a meander. This is not surprising, for there still remains a painted meander in a similar position on the Theseum. I saw this myself when working on the roof of that building years ago, though I have not noticed its existence mentioned in books.

Dodwell tells of acquiring a male head from the west pediment from a soldier of the garrison who told him that it had been broken off by a sailor. He also records the fact that one of the columns of the Propylæa was thrown down by the Turks, and that he saw cedar blocks from the middle of the drums. Some of these blocks may still be seen in the Acropolis Museum.

Here I must mention Nicholas Biddle, the first American to travel in Greece, who visited that country in 1806. Biddle has left us an interesting account of his experiences in his *Journal*, about which I read a paper before the Philadelphia Classical Club some years ago.⁹ Here in Philadelphia we still have mementos of his visit to Athens in the Old Custom House and the buildings of Girard College.

This brings me to a very interesting figure, Edward Daniel Clarke (1769-1822), whose extensive travels, published in six magnificent quarto volumes, with numerous copperplate engravings, actually yielded their author a profit of £6,595. Clarke left England for the first time in 1792 with Lord Berwick, visiting Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, and remaining for two years in Naples before returning home. Later, that is, from 1799 on, with a man named Cripps he visited northern Europe as well as Constantinople, Asia Minor, Palestine, Egypt, various Greek islands, and Greece. At Constantinople he saw the sultan go to mosque, a ceremonial which I myself beheld in 1898 when old Abdul Hamid was on the throne. At that time there was a special pavilion for the ambassadors and their guests; but in Clarke's day things were very different. He says the British ambassador, his family and guests were stationed in

⁹ Published in *Proceedings of the Numismatic and Antiquarian Society of Philadelphia*, XXVIII, pp. 167 ff.

the stall of a blacksmith's shop which looked into one of the narrow, dirty streets near the Hippodrome through which the procession was to pass. "It was amusing," he says, "to see the representative of the king of Great Britain with his family and friends squatted upon little stools among horse-shoes, anvils, old iron, and horse dung." After the ceremony the sultan sat on a couch of silver in a kiosk. Clarke thought that the couch had come from the treasury of the Byzantine emperors. At the risk of his life, with the connivance of a German gardener he visited the sultan's summer seraglio then unoccupied.

Clarke had an active and well-trained mind. He copied inscriptions wherever he saw them, but what especially interests us today was his attempts to find manuscripts. He says of Constantinople: "Nor is the search after Greek manuscripts so unsuccessful as persons are apt to imagine. By employing an intelligent Greek priest I had an opportunity of examining a great variety of volumes brought from the Isle of Princes and from private libraries of Greek princes resident at Phanar. It is true many of them were of little value; and others of some importance the owners were unwilling to sell. . . . They will often exchange their manuscripts for good printed editions of the Greek classics, particularly of the orators" (II, i, pp. 52 ff.). And again: "Prince Alexander Bano Hantzerli has a magnificent collection of Greek manuscripts," and he adds that some of them were at the time of his writing in the Bodleian at Oxford. His interest also extended to Oriental manuscripts which he purchased both at Constantinople and at Cairo.

It is interesting to note that while he was a Constantinople an American frigate arrived and created a sensation. It was the first time the American flag was seen in that port.

Clarke spent considerable time in the Troad of which he gives a full account, but perhaps more interesting to us is an experience he had at Cos. He says:

A poor little shopkeeper in Cos was described by the French consul as possessor of several curious old books. We, therefore, went to visit him and were surprised to find him in the midst of his wares, with a red nightcap on his head, reading the *Odyssey* of Homer in manuscript. This was fairly written upon paper, with interlineary criticisms and a commentary in the margin. He had other manuscript volumes containing works upon rhetoric, poetry, history, and theology. Nothing could induce him to part with any of these books. The account he gave was that some of them were copies of originals in the library at Patmos . . . that his father had brought them to Cos. They were intended for his son who was to be educated at the Patmos monastery (*ibid.*, p. 210).

Acting on this hint, Clarke and his friend Cripps afterwards visited Patmos, with what results we shall presently see.

After visiting other islands and Syria and Palestine he eventually reached Egypt, arriving after the French had been defeated three times by the British. After the fall of Alexandria he was asked to take charge of the various statues, sarcophagi, manuscripts, and other antiquities which the French had collected, and had them safely transported to England. Included among them was the Rosetta Stone which the French surrendered with great reluctance. Clarke says this famous inscription was not found at Rosetta, but in digging for the fortifications of Fort Julien on the western side of the Rosetta branch of the Nile.

From Egypt Clarke proceeded leisurely to Greece, stopping at several of the Greek islands; but his visit to Patmos calls for more than a passing notice. He tells (II, ii, pp. 334 ff.) how after leaving Egypt on their way to Athens they stopped at Cos where they met a Turkish interpreter, who was also a Greek officer, named Riley, who went with them to Patmos. There they visited the Monastery of St. John. He says of its library:

We entered a small, oblong chamber having a vaulted stone roof; and found it to be nearly filled with books of all sizes in a most neglected state, some lying upon the floor, a prey to the damp and to worms; others standing upon shelves, but without any kind of order. The books upon the shelves were all printed volumes; for these, being more modern were regarded as the more valuable, and had a better station assigned them than the rest, many of which were considered only so much rubbish. Some of the printed books were tolerably well bound and in good condition. The Superior said they were his favorites; but when we took down one or two of them to examine their contents we discovered that neither the Superior nor his colleague was able to read. . . . We saw here the first edition of the *Anthologia*, in quarto, printed at Florence in capital letters A.D. 1494, a beautiful copy.

This, I may remark, is one of the rarest, if not the rarest of Greek incunabula. There is a copy in the Huntington Library in California. Clarke then continues:

At the extremity of this chamber, which is opposite to the window, a considerable number of old volumes and parchment, some with covers and some without, were heaped upon the floor in the utmost disorder; and there were evident proofs that these had been cast aside and condemned to answer any purpose for which the parchment might be required. When we asked the Superior what they were, he replied, turning up his nose, *Χειρόγραφα*. It was indeed a moment in which a literary traveler might be supposed to doubt the evidence of his senses, for the whole of this condemned heap consisted entirely of Greek manuscripts and some of them were of the highest antiquity.

He then mentions a manuscript which the bursar thought was a Homer, but which proved to be "a copy of the poems of Gregory of Nazianzen written upon vellum, evidently as old as the ninth century." They wanted to purchase some of these manuscripts and referred the matter to Riley, as one accustomed to dealing with Greeks. Clarke then continues:

The author, meanwhile, continued to inspect the heap and had soon selected the fairest specimen of Grecian calligraphy which has descended to modern times. It was a copy of the twenty-four first Dialogues of Plato written throughout upon vellum, in the same exquisite character, concluding with a date and the name of the calligraphist. The whole of this could not be ascertained at the instant. It was a single volume in folio bound in wood. The cover was full of worms and falling to pieces; a paper label appeared at the back inscribed in a modern hand *Διάλογοι Σωκράτους*, but the letters of Plato's name, separated by stars, appeared very distinctly as a head-piece of the manuscript.

This was, of course, the famous Bodleian Plato, our best source for the dialogues which it contains. It was written by John the Calligraphist, for Arethas of Patræ in November of the year 896. A lexicon of St. Cyril, two small volumes of the Psalms and of Greek hymns, and a few other things were picked out when Riley told them the Superior had agreed to sell them the few things they had picked out, but even these would be lost if they tried to take more. He agreed to send the things they had bought to their ship, though Riley was allowed to carry two small volumes for them. They visited the library again the next day, but were unable to buy any more manuscripts. The Superior told them that he was willing enough to sell the manuscripts, but, if it were known to the Turks, a very heavy levy would be laid on the monastery. They remained a week at Patmos. Clarke estimated that there were about a thousand volumes in the library, "above 200 being in manuscript."

To continue with his narrative:

The whole of Sunday, October 11th, was passed in great anxiety, being the day on which the Superior of the monastery had engaged to send the remaining manuscripts purchased by the author from the library. Mr. Riley had left Patmos for Constantinople; and we began to fear, as evening approached, that his absence might become a pretext for a breach of contract on the part of the monks. Towards sunset, being on the deck of our *caïque*, and looking towards the mountain, we discerned a person coming down the steep descent from the monastery towards the port; presently, as he drew near, we perceived that he had a large basket upon his head, and that he was coming towards the quay opposite to the spot where our vessel was at anchor. Upon his arrival we saw him making signs for a boat, and we sent him the little skiff belonging to our *caïque*. As he came alongside he said aloud that he had brought the bread ordered for us in consequence of our letter from the Capudan Pasha; but coming on deck he gave a significant wink and told us the Superior desired that we would empty the basket ourselves and count the loaves to see that all was right. We took the hint and hurried with the precious charge into our berth where, having turned the basket bottom upward, we found to our great joy the manuscript of Plato, the poems of Gregory, the work of Phile (a poet of the 13th century), with the other tracts, and the volume of Miscellanies containing the Lexicon of St. Cyril.

He goes on to say that they quickly concealed the manuscripts under a mattress. In this way the precious manuscript of Plato left Patmos.

From Patmos Clarke went to various other islands and finally reached Piræus. His stay in Athens and other parts of Greece does not call for any extensive comment. He deplored the injury to the Parthenon which he saw done when the metopes were removed. He tells us, on the authority of Lusieri,¹⁰ that the artists working for Lord Elgin saw traces of paint and gilding on statues of the west pediment. He says, "As we passed through the town there was hardly a house that had not some little marble fragment of ancient sculpture stuck in its front over the door." He saw among loose stones used as material for a wall near the gate of the citadel a torso of a male figure from a metope of the Parthenon. This he obtained and sent to the University of Cambridge.

Of his extensive travels in other parts of Europe we need not speak. On his return to England in 1803, because of his valuable gifts of sculpture to Cambridge, he was given the degree of LL.D. by that university. In 1808 he was made professor of mineralogy, a subject in which, as well as in chemistry, he was greatly interested. He sold his collection of manuscripts to the Bodleian for £1,000.

As the nineteenth century progressed, travel to Greece and books about that country became still more frequent; and this was especially the case after the expulsion of the Turks. I shall, however, mention only one name and that of a man who has left behind very important contributions to our knowledge of the land. William Martin Leake (1777-1860) was sent out to Egypt to survey it after the expulsion of the French; but had the misfortune to lose all his maps and papers when the vessel on which they were being taken to England, which was also conveying some of the Elgin marbles, was wrecked on the island of Cythera. He was later sent to survey Albania and the Peloponnesus. Leake traveled all over Greece and identified many ancient sites. Incidentally he was taken prisoner by the Turks at Salonica, but won their friendship. He published his *Topography of Athens and the Demi* in two volumes in 1821; his *Travels in the Morea* in three volumes in 1830, to which a supplementary volume was added in 1846; and his *Travels in Northern Greece* in 1835. Leake was famed for his mastery of technical details, and his books, though written so long ago, are still valuable for any one who would really know Greece. During his stay in the country he collected certain marbles which were presented to the British Museum. His collection of coins, gems, bronzes, and vases was purchased by the University of Cambridge.

Leake's publications bring us down to within a hundred years of our own day; and this is a good place to bring to a close our account of the early travelers in Greece.

¹⁰ This was the painter who had superintended the work of removing the Parthenon sculptures for Lord Elgin.

LIVING IN THE GARDEN OF EDEN

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

Florida School of Religion

MUCH of the theological atmosphere today is murky with pessimism. The helplessness of man has become a favorite slogan. His efforts in the past to improve the world are said to have been quite misguided. This task, we are told, can be performed only by God, and the truly virtuous man is he who awakens to an awareness of his utter helplessness before the transcendent Deity. It is simply sinful pride on the part of one who assumes that he can be God's indispensable helper in bringing about a nearer realization of the kingdom of heaven on earth.

On the contrary, my own conviction is that the kingdom will never come until God can find men who are competent and willing to serve as his agents in bringing the hope of salvation to fulfillment. This may be a great perversity on my part but the opinion, I fear, is ineradicable. It stems from an experience of my youth and was one of the very first religious ideas to sprout in my virgin mind. The lapse of half a century has only intensified the original conviction, which sprang from an imaginary visit to the Garden of Eden in the days of Adam and Eve.

My boyhood was spent on a farm. It was not one of those spacious Midwestern farms composed of wide acres of smooth and fertile fields. It was a much less congenial setting that offered obstacles to be overcome on every hand. There were steep hills and narrow valleys and stony plots of land whose fruitfulness had to be wrested from a grudging soil worked by the hand of man and with much sweat of his brow. No skillfully wrought and power-driven machinery lightened the burden of human toil. The most conspicuous laborsaving device for the operator of the farm was a boy with a hoe. I was the boy.

Of course it was conceded that a boy just entering his teens could not be expected to perform the heavier parts of the agricultural operations. He did only "chores," as his elders were wont patronizingly to remark. And one of these chores was the care of the garden after the ground had been prepared and the seed planted by more mature hands. That climate and soil seemed especially adapted to the luxurious growth of weeds. Before the delicate green blade of the carrot or the pinkish leaf of the beet had pushed its way to the surface a healthy young growth of weedy verdure had covered the ground. Then the boy was turned loose in the patch. On bended knees and with aching fingers he worked his way slowly up and down the rows plucking the weeds from a ribbon of earth a few inches wide around the plants that promised a crop. This task

completed, he tackled with his hoe the wicked growth of audacious tares that Satan had sowed with lavish hand between the rows.

Scarcely had the last hack of the hoe been delivered at the far extremity of the field when the process had to be started all over again. It seemed that Satan had maliciously planted some of his troublesome seeds more deeply than the rest and these latecomers now shot their heads through the soil to mock the first efforts of the cultivator. And so the struggle went on for weeks, and the boy could not be sure that he had won even a moderate triumph until he had fought over the same ground again for a second and perhaps a third time. Had he been wiser and more industrious, he would have kept up the conflict throughout the season, but when the vegetable growth had become strong enough to overshadow the weeds, the latter were left to mature in their comparative obscurity and thus supply ample seeds for Satan's planting the next season.

Then, too, there was the potato patch that next claimed attention. The task here was not quite so delicate, for these plants had more inherent vitality and grew so luxuriantly that they could not be easily choked by the weeds. The boy would have been quite content to let the two rival growths remain together until the harvest. But this was one biblical injunction that he was not permitted to observe. The hoe had to be plied with vigor up and down those long rows not only to grub out the weeds but to heap the stubborn earth up around the stocks in well-rounded hills to house the swelling tubers of the new crop.

And in those days a new enemy had recently appeared in those regions. This was the potato beetle, but we always addressed him by the less dignified title of "bug." Science had not yet developed ways of treating the seed and the vines to thwart the depredations of the pest; so his elimination was one more chore for the boy to perform. A tin pan and a stick and a small pile of straw soaked with kerosene were the implements of his science. The intruders were knocked from the vines into the pan, which was all the while vigorously shaken and whirled to prevent the bugs from crawling up its sides. Then they were dumped into the centre of the straw pile and delivered up as a burnt offering to their demonic creator. The odor of their burning left no doubt as to the Satanic character of their tutelary divinity.

Sunday was a day of rest for everyone in that God-fearing rural community. Religion was taken quite as seriously as agriculture, and of course the boy went to church. He had to; no other course of procedure seemed possible. Undoubtedly the minister was thoroughly good and orthodox. But nothing that he ever said made any abiding impression on me as a boy until one Sunday he took his text from the second chapter of the book of Genesis. I had long been familiar with the biblical story of man's creation and his unhappy exit from the Garden of Eden, for the Bible had been the most used book in the home. But today a new ray of

light shot forth from its pages as the minister solemnly read: "And the Lord God took the man and put him into the Garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it." For the first time a preacher's text arrested my attention.

I have not the slightest idea about what the preacher said in his sermon. Probably he delivered a powerful discourse, as was his custom, and one entirely beyond my comprehension. But even his sonorous oratory could not divert me from the train of adolescent thinking that had been awakened by the text. Heretofore I had taken it for granted that the Garden of Eden was a place of absolute perfection. I had not imagined that any weeds could grow in its vegetable patch or that any pests preyed upon its vines. And yet the Bible said that man had been placed in this garden "to dress it and to keep it." Apparently my immature theology needed revision. Perhaps Adam had to pull weeds and fight potato beetles, and I began to feel sorry for him because as yet he had no boy to help with the chores as I did at home.

It was a long time before these accidental sproutings of a youthful mind bore their full crop of mature fruit. But in the course of the years they have made me ever more convinced that man's place in the world is one of inescapable responsibility for the care and keeping of all the good things of life. These things remain ours only so long as we cherish them with care. Eternal vigilance is the price of continued possession. We are prone to lapse into the old Calvinistic delusion that the power and grace of God operate without reference to human effort. We would like to think that our blessings when once acquired are goods that can henceforth be enjoyed in ease and comfort; our Edens will keep us, and we do not need to labor further in cultivating them. Perhaps we forget that even an ideal paradise of God's own planting still needed a man to dress it and keep it. Both divine and human providence are essential to the maintenance of a good world.

The struggle toward renewal and growth is a fundamental law of life. Whether it be the skill of the hand, the power of the mind, or the sensitivity of the spirit, excellence can be maintained only by constant discipline. When lying idle, the deftest fingers lose their cunning. The wisdom of the scholar grows stale and musty with disuse. The artist whose restless eye does not struggle toward the vision of some new truth and beauty loses the power to depict the glories that he once beheld. When we cease to strive to be more pleasing to our friends, more just to our neighbors, more faithful to duty, more serviceable to our city and state, and more genuinely sincere and devoted in our living, that moment a process of deterioration sets in.

This truth is especially valid for our spiritual struggles. To apply it only to our concern for material things and to cast the responsibility for religious betterment upon the shoulders of God is to shirk our gravest

duty. To interpret our existence as though it were merely the operation of a physical organism wearing itself out with the revolution of its own cylinders and leaving nothing by which it is to be remembered but the monoxide fumes of the engine's exhaust is to ignore the most significant thing about man's life. Of course he must do the world's work as the engine pulls its load and wears out at its task. But men who live worthily do vastly more. They are inventors, creators, inspirers, and leave behind the deposits of their mental and spiritual efforts to make this world a better place in which the next generation will live. They are the architects of the kingdom of God on earth.

It is the continuation of this creative effort that preserves for us the values of the past and inspires assurances for the future. If we cease to accept our personal responsibility for making today's world better than yesterday's, and are content with the reposed life of an inactive faith in supernatural efficiency to remedy the ills of the world, then will our Garden of Eden become hopelessly overgrown with thorns and infested with devastating parasites. God has designed that its care and keeping should be man's responsibility, and all who seek to do his will must be ready to accept the trust.

Perhaps in these days of severe distress the task seems so stupendous as to be impossible of attainment. Frequently we are told that man is not equal to this high endeavor, however richly he may have been endowed by the Creator. Human frailties, it is very true, are only too abundantly apparent. Even man's physical strength is feeble in comparison with that of the beasts. The ox he yokes or the lion he cages could easily worst him in a muscular encounter. Yet he yokes the ox and cages the lion. By mental equipment he is endowed with power to master all other living creatures. The forces of nature are likewise subject to his will. The fiery thunderbolt can smite him with death in the twinkling of an eye; yet he grasps the lightnings in his hand and makes them drive his machines, light his dwellings, propel his vehicles, and carry his words around the globe.

In the sphere of cultural and religious advance the coöperative activity of man has been most conspicuously evident. From the days of primitivity down to the present moment there has been a process of phenomenal growth, slow but steady and truly marvelous when viewed in the perspective of historical time. In this realm of attainment man perceives the real mission for which he has been created; it is his task to coöperate with God in making the earth a more congenial habitation for the human spirit. If the process has lagged at times, or moved at a mere snail's pace, it is because men have failed to perform their part in the ordering of the good life. And God has not chosen to adopt any other means for its accomplishment. To expect him to act differently tomorrow is a vain hope of weary souls who are constructing for themselves a fool's paradise.

UNIVERSITIES: GUARDIANS OF DEMOCRACY

ABRAHAM A. NEUMAN

Dropsie College

It is a great privilege to be part of this Convocation,* to share with the graduates the high mood of this hour, and to be able from now on to look upon this venerable university with the affection and pride of an honorary alumnus.

These are soul-stirring days for the college youth and heart-searching days and nights for those entrusted with the destinies of our colleges and universities. To students, war is more than a terrifying experience; it is more than a gamble with life; it is a challenge and a threat to all the ideals that make life precious and meaningful. The greatest hazards in war are not life and limb but soul and spirit. Fill the heart of a brave American with an ideal to which his soul is committed, and no sacrifice will be too great for him to bear. A poet who witnessed a pilot come crashing down in a plane on fire exclaimed, "There goes a flaming meteor." This, it seems to me, is an inspired description not only of an aviator, but of every soldier or sailor on land, in the air, or in a typhoon at sea, who makes the supreme sacrifice when the sacrifice is illumined by the hero's faith in the cause for which he gave his life. They are all flaming meteors, stars of a night, lighting the horizon around us with a mystic light and a divine fire.

All accounts agree—whether they are drawn from the letters and the diaries of the boys themselves or from the reports of their chaplains and the writings of correspondents on the battlefield—that underneath the swagger and the fatalistic veneer on ships, in barracks and fox-holes, there is elemental hunger for spiritual assurance on the issues of life. Americans crave for something spiritually deeper and richer than the urge for personal salvation of the mediæval warrior. They are concerned not only with their own well-being, whether on earth or in heaven, but far more so with the world in which they and those they love will live. Surrounded by destruction and death, filled with the cries of agony and suffering, they ask in wonder and in bewilderment whether these are indeed the death throes of a dying civilization or the birth pangs of a new world dedicated to justice among nations, righteousness within the nations, and enduring peace for all groups within the fabric of society. Called upon to give their lives in the name of democracy, the definition of democracy looms big in their thinking. They probe deeply into its meaning. Is it

* This address was delivered at the Convocation of the University of Pennsylvania, March 6, 1945.

another mirage, perhaps a new Moloch demanding myriads of human sacrifices, or is it the gateway to freedom, to justice, and to peace? In their quest, some turn earnestly to their chaplains, others commit their thoughts to writing. Countless numbers turn nostalgically to their alma maters, the colleges and universities to which they look for vision and reënforcement in the hour of supreme crisis. It is the recognition of this moral bond between students and their alma mater which impels me to speak on the theme: Universities: Guardians of Democracy.

When the history of this war is finally written after the peace and an analysis made of the basic institutions that contributed to victory, a grateful nation, it is hoped, will applaud the heroic rôle played by our colleges and universities. For the present, no one removed from the academic life and its responsibilities seems to realize fully the dilemma which confronted our institutions of higher learning, and the miraculous manner in which they turned weakness to strength and became a bulwark of national defense. Faced on the one hand by the depletion of students as a result of the Selective Service Act and confronted by the superstitious prejudice which supposed realists feel toward the alleged visionaries and dreamers of the cloistered life, many of the colleges of the country faced extinction through bankruptcy or, what in the long run might have been worse, absorption by the armed forces. That neither of these alternatives came to pass, that the classroom, the laboratory, and the campus were coördinated into a scientific and intellectual arsenal of democracy without utter destruction of humanistic values is a tribute to the devotion of the teaching and research staffs of our institutions of higher learning and in particular to the statesmanship and resourcefulness of the college presidents and their executive aides.

But it is not the war effectiveness of universities which would entitle them to the high rank of guardians of democracy. I recall a pertinent incident in Palestinian history about two thousand years ago. In that little Jewish commonwealth, universal compulsory education for boys was introduced in that early period. A commission of educators was sent on a tour of inspection. Whenever they entered a city, they called upon the chief magistrate to introduce them to the guardians of the city. Invariably the police officials, the judges, or the heads of the military garrison were summoned. But the commissioners shook their heads sadly. "These are not the guardians of your city," they exclaimed, "they are symbols of disorder in your midst. Bring before us your teachers. They are the guardians of your city."

Universities are guardians of democracy because they are essentially instruments of civilization, and because their native spiritual climate is democracy. By nature, they are tools of peace, not of war, and the riches

which they create are democratically distributed to all who seek knowledge and truth. Great as has been their contribution to this war of destruction, their long history is contiguous with the growth of civilization. For of wisdom hath it not been said, "Her ways are ways of peace." So it may be confidently premised that in the immediate future, too, the universities will come into their own as builders of civilization, guardians of democracy.

Already countless projects are engaging the best minds of our academic institutions, and there will be many more as the days of peace draw near. These projects will range over the whole realm of human thought and inventiveness. Indeed, I do not know of any era when a government has drawn so heavily upon the learning and the specialized knowledge of the scholars of the country as in our time, both in the prosecution of war and in the planning for the peace and the new world order after the war. But quite apart from individual projects and publicly sponsored designs that will be fostered by men drawn from academic ranks, the universities of the country collectively will bear great responsibility for national education in the broadest sense. Theirs will be the task of public enlightenment to prepare the nation for the new rôle which America must play in the concert of nations. Theirs will be the duty to inculcate a deep sense of social responsibility where it is most needed in order to relieve tensions and prejudices which threaten the well-being of the American people. Above all, theirs will be the privileged rôle through education to deepen the concept of democracy in the national conscience, so that American civilization may indeed become the hope of the world as it was envisaged in the dream of the fathers.

For, basic to the life of American civilization is the belief in democracy. But what is the popular concept of democracy? It was not necessary to poll the country before the war to prove that the national understanding of this concept was vague and shallow and confused. A metropolitan newspaper revealed to a startled world how widely prevalent was the ignorance of the facts of American history. To me it was far more appalling to note the general ignorance of and apathy to the concept of democracy, which, after all, is the driving force which gives meaning to American history and civilization. The war has remedied this situation in part. One cannot long continue to suffer and make sacrifices for a cause without intuitively grasping at its meaning. I have seen, as you no doubt have, impromptu reflections on democracy written by young soldiers on the battlefield that are startling in their grasp and maturity. But this new acquisition is not altogether general, and the tuition fee has been far too costly in blood and tears. In the future it will be our responsibility as educators to plough deep the seeds of democracy as part of our national faith.

For democracy is a faith. It is not mere governmental machinery. Representative government is the agency through which this faith is best expressed, but one must not confuse the instrument with the ideal. Democracy is the assertion of a faith in man and his place in the universe which grows out of a belief in God, the Creator. Genetically at any rate, this has been the American credo of democratic faith. Man is primary; government is secondary. The perfect society is more important to the realization of the democratic ideal than perfect government. That our democratic way of life is incomplete, that it has deep, blighting imperfections no lover of democracy will deny, but the cure of the ills of democracy is more democracy. If we may for the moment borrow religious terminology, democracy can be either a faith by which we live or a heresy which leads man to perdition. The history of democracy is rich in illustrative examples.

The first and noblest expression of the democratic faith is the biblical narrative of creation. "And God created man in his own image . . . the Lord formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul." This is the text and inspiration of all true democracy. As a child of God, man is endowed with dignity: his soul is a spark of divinity; he is born free, equal in his rights before man and God. To focus the lesson of racial equality more sharply an early Hebrew legend adds this embellishment. The precious bit of earth from which God formed man was gathered from the north and the south, the east and the west, so that no country might at some future time say: "Of us alone did God create the human race."

Mosaic laws, prophetic exhortations, sage proverbs crystallized this democratic passion in the hearts of the Hebrew people. With all the fervor and rich imagery of the New Testament, this gospel was carried by the early apostles into the larger world beyond the borders of Galilee and Judæa. For a time it appeared that the essence of democracy might be distilled as the political social doctrine of the Judæo-Christian world. But the momentous alliance between church and empire proved fateful. Imperial interests and traditions frustrated the social idealism of the new religion. The church became part of the feudal order. Aiming for spiritual supremacy, it compromised with the brute force of the Roman-Teutonic world. It became entangled as an integral part of a social order which spelled tyranny, oppression, and serfdom for the masses.

As a result, when at last in eighteenth century France the human spirit was driven to rebellion against tyranny, the rebels directed their attacks against the citadels of religion no less than against the castles of the hated nobles. The battlecry of the French Revolution, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," was not the shout of religion. It was not because

man was endowed with Godlike attributes that he was declared a sovereign being, free and equal. The Revolution was in essence a rebellion of man against God. For God was to be deposed as lord of the universe. Man in the nakedness of his animalic existence proclaimed that he was the ruler of the universe. Henceforth he was to be master of his own destiny without resort to a supernatural being. By the powers of brain and brawn alone he would conquer the world and make it his domain.

How high the hopes, how steep the fall caused by this, shall we call it, heretical democracy! We of our generation who have twice witnessed the world in flames and ruins are living witnesses of the ravaging effects of this social heresy. We are the long-range victims of man's self-deception and conceit under the mask of democracy.

For man did not long stay at the helm of the universe. How could he? Without God as Father, man was but an animal, high in the stage of evolution, it is true, but an animal, nevertheless, whose survival was determined by the laws of the jungle. Morals were removed from the trend of history, ethics became irrelevant in the conduct of sovereign nations, and the laws of biology were substituted as norms in the struggle of national survival. It was right for nations to break treaties, to deceive, to betray, to rob, to murder, if greater power could be attained thereby, for is this not the law of the jungle?

It is a straight, precipitate line of descent from God to man to beast to the machine age and to the abstract state as the controlling power of human destiny. There is no retreat from this course of doom save by one gateway, the path which leads to the highway of American democracy.

American democracy differs from the European form in essence, in the source of its inspiration, and in the course of its development. With us, democracy was not a rebellion but a faith to live by. It was not the creature but the creator of political and social revolution. It inspired the Declaration of Independence, it lived in the hearts of the rebels of '76, it fostered the Constitution, it moulded and shaped the Bill of Rights, it charted the course of the republic from Washington to Roosevelt. But its essence is not political theory but spiritual perception. It is rooted in the conviction that moral purpose lies at the heart of the universe. It is founded on the principle that man is not just another animal but bears the divine image in his soul. Because of man's Godlike attributes, the Declaration of Independence makes bold to declare that man "is endowed by his Creator with certain unalienable rights." It is the faith of American democracy that man has the capacity and the high prerogative to complete the plan which God designed, the building of the ideal society in which poverty, ignorance, hatred, and exploitation shall no longer curse the human race, but truth, justice, love, and mercy shall set man free.

In this faith America was nurtured. It was the spirit which impelled the Pilgrim Fathers and the Puritans to embark upon the high adventure to build on this continent a replica of biblical civilization—the New Canaan or the Promised Land, they called it. As with all prophetic inspiration, the vision far exceeded the realization. Great is the structure of American civilization reared on these foundations. But incomparably greater is the challenge and hope of the future.

The challenge becomes daily more compelling as the end of the war becomes faintly visible over the bloodstained horizon. Three Titans met at Yalta to decide the fate of the world. Great was the distance they covered since the days of Teheran. Steep will be the road from Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco and then onward. Vast stretches of mind and ideals are still to be explored. Not the statesmen alone but all the United Nations need a compass by which safely to traverse uncharted areas. That compass, that star is the faith of democracy. To bring down that star from its dreamy heights to the grasp of toiling men and women throughout the world is the greatest privilege of all time. It will be the high prerogative of the scholars, scientists, philosophers, and teachers who man our universities, the guardians of democracy.

HIGHWAYS OF THE NEW WORLD

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As we look into the new world that lies ahead, what highways of advance for the Christian mission can we discern? What emphases will be needed to make the world-wide work of the church effective in producing in some worthy measure a Christian world, a world of Christian personalities and Christian life?

Emphatically the most important thing is the securing of a genuine world Christian fellowship, bringing the Christians of the world into a sense of oneness and into an organized unity that will forge an unbreakable bond uniting them all, a bond that no threat of international conflict will break, or can break. In the century and a half since William Carey evangelical Christians have increased from small groups in western Europe and eastern North America, southern India and South Africa, and Indonesian islands, to a great company of more than 135,000,000 communicants, spread across almost every land throughout the world. This ecumenicity is the most significant fact in our Christianity today—it is world-wide. Never before, as now, have we Christians had the chance to impress our Christianity upon the world, upon relations between peoples, upon governments and international contacts, so as to control and guide the world's life. One Christian group alone cannot do this, the church of one land or two; but now there is a world fellowship, and all the strength of all can be thrown into the situation confronted by any.

A close sympathy and understanding have grown up among the leaders of Christian groups in different lands. Even during the present war earnest efforts have been made, with some success, to keep alive the communications between leading Christians in the opposing countries. But it is all too apparent that among the rank and file of the world's Christians an unbreakable bond has not yet been established. Nationalism has proved stronger than the ecumenical spirit, and national loyalty more compelling than loyalty to the supranational church of Christ. For the most part, Christians in separated lands feel no sense of oneness, and no challenge of common loyalty unites them against the political forces that so easily set them into warring camps. But the loyalty that Christians of all lands owe to Christ, the one Lord and Master of them all, is a higher loyalty than loyalty to country; and the allegiance that all Christians owe to Christ demands and necessarily involves a loyalty to one another above and beyond the claims of national allegiance and loyalty. Until we recognize that higher loyalty of our world commonwealth in Christ we shall continue to have war.

So that the most compelling demand as we move into the new world is boldly to assert our oneness with Christians of every land, and to seek by every effort possible, and every means that can be discovered or created, to establish and maintain a real Christian world fellowship.

Another highway that we must travel in the new world, if the Christian mission is to achieve its full purpose, is Christian unity. The most striking statement made at the Madras meeting of the International Missionary Council six years ago was that of representatives of the churches of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in which they pointed out the "passionate longing that exists in all countries for visible union of the churches. . . . We are often torn," they said, "between loyalty to our mother churches and loyalty to our ideal of union. We therefore appeal with all the fervor we possess, to the missionary societies and boards and the responsible authorities of the older churches, to take this matter seriously to heart, to labor with the churches in the mission field to achieve this union, to support and encourage us in all our efforts to put an end to the scandalous effects of our divisions and to lead us in the path of union." Bishop Azariah, of India, at the Edinburgh meeting in 1910, expressed it in this way: "Unity may be theoretically a desirable ideal in Europe and America, but it is vital to the life of the church in the mission field."

There are many ways in which interdenominational unity may be expressed or organized. No plans for organic union, as thus far proposed, are broad enough in their conception to include all, or even most, churches; they assume and demand either creedal or ecclesiastical uniformity. Ultimately we must recognize the inevitableness of difference among Christians, in attitude and conviction, and find an expression of unity that will include churches differing in theology, or ecclesiastical polity, or forms of worship. We await with eagerness the results of the independent thinking and action of Christian groups in lands now without missionary leadership, like Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the contribution of strong and qualified leaders in China, and the experience of the national united church of Christ in Japan, for new expressions of Christian unity, as contributions not only for those lands but for the West as well. What we need most is not unity in organization, or theoretic or dogmatic agreement, but unity in action. We must set ourselves with definite purpose and earnest study to discover ways, not simply to detached pieces of coöperation, but to thoroughgoing fellowship and unity of action in any specified area; so that all that we have—knowledge, skill, experience, leadership, organization, spiritual power—shall be united in the supreme effort to establish Christ's rulership and spirit in the hearts and the life of the people of the whole area, and ultimately of all people everywhere. No demand is more searching and compelling as we move into the new world.

Still another highway of advance that opens to us in the new world ahead is that of evangelical liberalism. Old approaches, old formulas of

truth, old methods of presenting the eternal gospel will not suffice or fit into the needs of the new situation. We shall not "go back to normalcy." We ought not to desire to go back, but to go forward, to welcome the new, to greet with eagerness the opportunities for new adventures, new ways, new life. The creeds of councils of fifteen centuries ago may not be authoritative for the days ahead. The interpretations of Scripture that held for a past generation may give place to radically new understanding in the light of new experiences and new racial contributions. The emphases that have seemed basic to many of us in the West may mean little to new peoples to whom the message comes. The new knowledge and new interpretations of the world that science and thought are giving, and will give, may demand adjustment in attitude, in thinking, in emphasis, in method. Freedom, the liberal spirit, is what the new world requires of us. It is futile to send to China, for example, missionaries whose attitude to theology, to science, to social organization and custom, to church relations, to evangelistic approach, is that of two generations, or one generation, ago. So elsewhere. The emphases in our message must be those that will fit into the needs and the thinking of those to whom it is brought. Our Christian gospel must find points of contact in the religions of all who reach out toward God. The assured results of science must provide us with a language that will give meaning to our teaching among thinkers as well as outcasts. The new world demands a new freedom, a new fearless seeking of the truth in the spirit of him who is the Truth, a new evangelical liberalism. Nothing is more important as we make our way into that new world.

Still another highway along which we must travel is that of social evangelism—a frank recognition of our Christian responsibility for bringing the transforming power of Christ into all the phases, relations, activities of men's lives, not simply into that which we call, by a limited use of the term, "spiritual." We are as responsible for guiding, training, directing, building into right use of mind, body, social contacts, and everyday relationships, those whom we bring into the fellowship with God, as for bringing them into fellowship with God in the first place. We must include in our world program—frankly, honestly, energetically, and in a far larger way than now—not only Christian evangelism, Christian education, and Christian medical service, but Christian economic help, Christian ministry to the home and industry and politics. Authority is ample both in the words and example of Jesus and in Christian history for enriching with Christ's spirit and power all the life of which men are a part.

What has been done is only a beginning. In the new world ahead old needs will be intensified, many new needs will call for Christian ministry. The world-wide revolutionary interest in education will demand research and coöperation such as it has not begun to receive. Literacy

projects are enticing opportunities for meeting a basic need in almost every land. Economic betterment calls for enlistment of trained leaders in churches and missions throughout the world. Social organization, home life, business and industry, political activity and government relations, all these are wide open fields for Christian experimentation and service. What difference does it make, in the lives of people as they live among their fellows, what difference in the character life of a nation, that there are Christians and Christian churches? This is a fair test, and an all-inclusive test. Evangelize we must and will, but in the new world just ahead our evangelism must include not only embedding in men a new life principle and power in Christ, but also ministering to men's souls as the tremendous forces of the common life of which they are a part pound relentlessly upon those souls. The highway of social evangelism is one that invites us with the promise of thrilling adventure, if indeed with danger.

With danger! Of course there is danger. Danger in the whole enterprise. Danger of interesting ourselves disproportionately in men's physical and economic and social needs, but danger of limiting our thought of God's grace to one compartment of life. Danger of superficiality in the breadth of our thinking and our activity, danger, too, in dogmatic traditionalism and habit. Danger in the emphasizing of international Christian loyalty, danger in substituting patriotism for the world-wide dominion and church of Christ. There is no way of avoiding danger, except in following the light that is in Christ, and in spreading that light as faithfully and widely as possible. So I point to another highway of the new world, the highway of the universal proclamation of Christ. We are not speaking of evangelism in old forms and methods. These will be effective among some and in some places, but already we have found it necessary to discover new methods to meet changed conditions. And still greater changes await us—are already taking place. The situations that Christian evangelism will face will be radically different from those into which we have carried our message in days past. In great areas even today no preaching is allowed outside of definitely licensed buildings, and the familiar evangelism in streets and village squares and halls is gone. In increasing numbers governments have forbidden religious teaching and worship in schools, private and mission as well as public, and the evangelistic opportunity that we have long thought of as greatest is taken out of our hands. People after people who have been religious in every phase of their life and whose religious consciousness has been a way of contact and approach with the gospel of Christ have become saturated with secularism and are no longer interested in religion of any kind. And political and social movements are reminding us that the Christians whose numbers we have proudly reported are after all only

a small minority, tremendously outnumbered by non-Christians—330 to 1 in Japan, 780 to 1 in China, over 2,000 to 1 in the Moslem Near East—and that they come for the most part from an uninfluential segment of the population; the powerful Hindu, Moslem, Buddhist, and secularized groups are as yet practically untouched.

All of this calls for new emphasis, new energy in proclaiming Christ, and vigorous exploring of methods and approaches. We have become too complacent in our acceptance of the moral bankruptcy of peoples of all lands, too comfortable in keeping our American churches in their own social class instead of serving those who most need the church's ministry, too wont to admire the cultures that we have discovered among those we used to call heathen, too easily satisfied with a smug confidence that "ultimately," or "in God's own time," or something like that, the world will discover its need of Christ and will come to him; so that all that may be expected of us is a steady-going, rather moderate, not too costly missionary work, playing safe in evangelism and not disturbing overmuch our friendly relations with those not Christian by radical gospel preaching. But "to the Christian there comes a new imperative. It is not sufficient for him to live Christianity where he is, although that is at once the most difficult and the most important thing he has to do. It is not enough even to seek to make his own nation Christian. The times compel him to a new endeavor to secure an acceptance of the Christian faith across the world."¹ What this war should teach us, above everything else, is the overwhelming demand for insistent, burning, compelling evangelism, like that of early Romans and Persians, like the Irish in the eighth century, like the Franciscans of the thirteenth century, or the Moravians of the eighteenth, or the pioneer missionaries of the nineteenth, to bring the love of Christ and loyalty to him into millions of hearts and lives all over the world. It is that which must be our dominant purpose and activity in the days ahead.

But such a purpose, fine as it will be, will be futile unless in the new conditions and new limitations of the new world we discover new contacts, new channels of appeal to the interest and conscience and need of those to whom we go with the message. How, for example, shall we reach with some degree of adequacy the caste Hindus of India, the Buddhists of Burma and Japan, the Moslems of Java and western Asia and north Africa, the Roman Catholics of South America? A restudy of their faiths, their cultures, their religious appeals and responses is necessary, with all the help that history and anthropology and religious psychology and comparative religion can give us. And bold new experimentation and adventuring in methods of evangelism. Can we make more use of the terms, the forms of worship, and the modes of thinking that belong

¹ L. J. Shafer, *The Christian Mission in Our Day*, p. 83.

to the religions that Christianity meets? Ought we, in view of rapidly increasing literacy of whole peoples, to bring literature into a more commanding place in our program? Can we put evangelism into our literacy campaigns and our social ministries in new and bolder ways? Dare we use political influences and community organization to gain an ear for the gospel? What of radio and drama and processions and coöperatives and colonies? Or exchange of evangelists between lands west and east? In adventurous times, when men have cast off their moorings for exploring other worlds, we cannot be less bold and ingenious in the greatest of all adventures. Those of us who can be inspired by the thought of a world community of Christians, by the hope of a practical unity of churches of every name in the one Name that is above all other names, by a bold freedom in thought and activity that is willing to dare for the truth, and by the thrilling vision of an evangelized world, must set ourselves with new and adventurous purpose to the exploring of new methods and attitudes, the facing of new and dangerous opposition, the paying of cost in time and money and sacrifice of other ambitions—set ourselves to the universal proclamation of Christ through all the world, as the only sufficient Saviour and hope of mankind.

All that has been said brings us back with emphasis to the fundamental need of world-mindedness on the part of every Christian. The war has made us familiar with a global geography. But long before modern statesmen talked, or thought, in world terms, Jesus is reputed to have said, "The field is the world," and to have challenged his disciples with his commission to be witnesses of his saving gospel "unto the uttermost part of the earth." Now as never before must we come back to Jesus, view our mission as he viewed it, and set it in relation to the world and the ecumenical Christian fellowship—include in our local church plans, for example, the rebuilding of churches in war lands as we enlarge our own equipment, and stir ourselves with the thrill and novelty of prayer for new and greater needs around the world. Christians now must be world-minded.

Here are some of the highways of the new world. John Middleton Murry puts the situation thus: "Mankind has never been faced with a problem of a fraction of the magnitude of this one. If all the imagination and all the heroism of all the world were united in a single effort to bring humanity safely through this crisis without the loss of precious and noble values, it might not suffice. I do not say it *would* not suffice; but I do say, it might not."² Yet just this is given to us as our glowing privilege and our glorious responsibility. These are the highways that beckon us as we look ahead.

² Quoted by L. J. Shafer, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

THE TEACHING OF TALENT

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WE CALL some men *capable*, others *talented*, and still others *men of genius*. The terms are all relative. We can avoid confusion if we say, instead, *capable*, *more capable*, and *most capable*. Some men, of course, are endowed as other men are not. Because of differences—mental, spiritual, and physiological—men cannot all develop in the same direction. The world would be a curious place if all of its inhabitants were lawyers, or painters of pictures, or inventors of machines. But granted the diversity of interest, capacity, and bent, there is no sharp distinction between abilities that may be acquired and abilities that are God-given. There is no justification for the idea that a man may be taught to write clearly and grammatically and even rhetorically, but may not be taught to write poetically, or dramatically, or movingly; that a man may be taught economics, banking, and marketing, but may not be taught how to carry on a business profitably.

A part of education is to learn to do things. Another part is to learn to appreciate the things that others do. Both are important, and they should be taught, I believe, in much the same way. Some systems of formal instruction seem to me to be defective on both counts. For doing, we concentrate upon technique without enough regard for the objectives of technique, while, for appreciating, we reach only the foreground. We are too much inclined toward a systematic progression from the simple to the complex and from the concrete to the abstract. To reverse the order would be worse, but to carry the instruction forward on the broadest possible front would be much better, and should give superior results both for doing and for appreciating.

Technique must be learned, but the only reason for using technique is to create something with meaning; and the only reason for understanding technique is to discover the essence of what has been created. There are two distinct kinds of meaning. An important kind is that which can be expressed in words. The still more important kind can never be expressed in words but only in the medium in which the work is done. I shall try to explain what I mean by citing examples from science and from arts. I shall lean occasionally upon music only because it is the most abstract medium of expression and interposes a minimum of distractive elements.

To compose music (or to understand it) we should know something of the devices of rhythm, counterpoint, harmony, and form. But these things are merely parts of a technique to express meaning, and they can be learned most rapidly and most intelligently not as colorless formulæ but

in relation to the meaning they are intended to express. One kind of meaning is concerned with moods, such as tranquillity, excitement, or mystery. These moods may be apprehended by nearly everyone. The other kind of meaning is definable only in terms of music itself and is apprehended with widely differing degrees of clarity. In fact, the unmusical are as completely unconscious of such meaning as they would be of inaudible frequencies—and yet this, alone, makes a composition great.

This meaning which cannot be expressed in words is merely logic—but it is logic that cannot wait upon cumbersome analysis even if this were possible. It must be grasped intuitively if at all. The logic of a primitive mathematical expression or of a primitive harmonic progression can be defined with pages of reading matter, but any definition is a pedantic substitute for the thing defined. And long before either mathematics or music can become complex enough to possess the slightest degree of intellectual value, the words of logic become a jargon, and logic must adopt a symbolism of its own. The capacity of the human mind is severely limited for the logic of words but it is astonishingly great for the intuitive recognition of logical processes in works of genius of all sorts. The quality of work depends upon the quality of the logic employed. Some of the tenderest and most charming poems are characterized by profound or brutal logic, and in stately guise the logic may be mischievous or perverse.

In the painting of pictures, general excellence cannot be measured by the correctness of the drawing, the beauty of the color combinations, the originality of the composition, or the interest of the subject. Here, too, we have the important and almost universally apprehended meaning that may be described in terms of the subject or mood, and the other more important meaning concerned with an artistic logic which can be described only in terms of art itself. And the latter quality, alone, makes a picture great.

It would be my contention that the "elements" of creation should not be taught without, at the same time, parallel instruction in the effects of technique upon the kind of meaning that cannot be explained with words. In particular, technique should be taught with reference to the kind of meaning that has nothing to do with the subject. No two works can have exactly the same significance, but it is possible to have a landscape that means, in an artistic sense, nearly the same thing as a portrait, or to have two widely differing conceptions of the same subject. Two projects in scientific research may resemble each other closely in scientific logic in spite of the fact that they have no elements or substances or reactions or aims in common.

Those who have superficial competence can tell if a symphony is heroic or pastoral, joyous or sombre. This is the first phase of learning.

The more competent can call upon a technologic background to tell if the orchestration is effective, the form is original, or the style is consistent. This is the second phase. But only the most competent can know if the music is good or bad. Only he can predict the outcome of the ultimate test of any work of creation—whether the work will grow or diminish with time and familiarity. This is the third phase. If he takes enough trouble about it, a newspaperman can give a factual story about a new product. He can describe its properties, uses, price, and availability. This is the first phase of learning. The technologist can tell about the reactions, equipment for manufacture, and process economics. This is the second phase. But only the most competent can tell if the development represents a significant step forward by science or business. This is the third phase.

Too often the teaching of both creation and appreciation is limited to technology. In æsthetics the first stage is avoided because of a mistaken and self-conscious fear on the part of the teacher of the vulgarity of the subjective. Factual meaning is avoided because it is unacademic. But in no case should the three phases of a subject be taught in any order. They should be taught concurrently. The first phase requires only ordinary intelligence, but it is essential to the third phase because it inspires the imagination. The second phase requires reason and memory, while the third and most important phase requires intuition. Reason and memory and intuition are all manifestations of intelligence and all may be developed, but I do not know of any way to develop intuition except through experimentation. The student must be induced to become familiar with great works—not merely by contact, which alone may destroy understanding instead of fostering it, but by discovering the effect of *variations* in technique on ultimate significance.

A homely example is the cultivation of taste for fine foods. This cannot be accomplished by consistently eating fine foods and becoming accustomed to them. The approach must be experimental. The connoisseur becomes discriminating by learning the effects of variations of technique of preparation upon taste. One kind of food quality can be expressed with words such as appetizing, nutritious, and vitamin-bearing. But there is no way (except by taste) to define the superlative appeal to taste.

Shakespeare's works are disliked by many who have had to read too much of them uncritically. They are unable to comprehend their real greatness because they have not experimented with them.

The difference in technique between a work of genius and a work of mediocrity is tangible. The construction of a Schubert song may seem magical, but it is not. The differences are physical. Nothing is there that cannot be measured and used by others to obtain comparable effects provided, of course, that the others understand how to make logical inven-

tions. For technique itself is not invented—it is evolved. In every great creator there is something of the creators who have gone before, and usually only a little that is new. This refers, of course, to technique rather than to conception. Additions to technique affect individuality but are unrelated to originality of conception or to general excellence.

No one can have mathematical intuition except the mathematician; chemical intuition except the chemist; philosophical intuition except the philosopher. Each must learn a special language without words before he can create or understand works of lasting value. An essential part of his instruction must be in this special language.

Technology is a dull exercise without imagination. No one makes a voluntary effort to go unless he knows where he is going and why. And talent cannot be learned without voluntary effort. Talent cannot be taught by those without talent. Technique can be taught best by those who not only know technique but also know what it is for. But, unfortunately, talent cannot always be taught by those *with* talent. History provides more examples of failure than of success.

Socrates knew how to convey his genius to Plato who, in turn, knew how to pass it along to Aristotle. Aristotle seems to have been unable to carry it further in his lifetime. It may be presumptuous to attempt from this distance to discover why Socrates and Plato succeeded while Aristotle apparently did not. The first two scorned the experimental method for physical things, but they applied it profusely to mathematics and ethics. The use of this experimental approach to abstract thinking was the predominant characteristic of their teaching. Aristotle, on the other hand, had had his abstract ideas rather well crystallized by his predecessors. His statements give the impression of finality rather than of searching after truth. Paradoxically, he seems to have been about the first to see the value of experimentation with material things, but his advocacy in this direction was feeble and unpopular, and was presumably as uncharacteristic of his teaching as it was of his own practice. This may account for the fact that while others could not learn from Aristotle the man, they could and did learn from Aristotle's great works.

Men of talent sometimes seem lonely in their eminence because their capacity for appreciation of others' gifts is too limited. They acknowledge the reality and importance of their own special medium for expression, but they are skeptical or scornful about other media which they do not understand. The scientific man, for example, is inclined to forget that he is dealing with mental processes that are quite as indescribable as those of religion or art. Perhaps they are even more so. The essence of religion is more comprehensible to more people than the essence of science. It is strange that the scientist should characteristically insist upon the unreality

of things that cannot be described in ordinary terms when science is based upon conceptions that cannot be even imagined, and that can be discussed only by imperfect analogies. Even the tools of the scientist are esoteric. Who would presume to explain a multiple integration of a function to the most intelligent man who has not learned to think in mathematics?

Einstein's works can be described, to a limited extent, in words, but the real meaning of the theories can be defined only by the equations themselves. Appreciation of the transcendent quality of Einstein's work depends upon our mathematical intuition. Appreciation is obviously impossible without proficiency in mathematics, but it requires more than technical proficiency—just as the appreciation of music requires more than technical proficiency in musical composition. Why did Einstein write a few equations instead of a few pages of reading matter? Not because the equations were more concise, but because the essence of his discoveries could be neither expressed nor understood in any other terms—just as music can be neither expressed nor understood without a score to hear or to read. The ultimate meaning of a poem cannot be adequately expressed in prose. It is possible to write volumes of description of any human enterprise, but the essence remains elusive except in the wordless language of the enterprise itself.

It is interesting to imagine what might have happened in the year 1800 when Beethoven could have celebrated his thirtieth birthday by inviting a strange assortment of men whose works were destined to live through the centuries. Probably few of those present would have enjoyed themselves at such a party because there would have been too many languages without words. Beethoven himself and Haydn (then 68 years old) thought in music; Kant (75) in philosophy; Goethe (51) and Byron (23) in poetry; Goya (54) and Blake (43) in painting; Lagrange (63) and Laplace (51) and Poisson (19) in mathematics. Then there could have been present that distinguished group of men whose names are used today to designate electrical units—Watt (64), Coulomb (64), Volta (55), Ampère (25), and Gauss (24), all of whom thought in physics. Fulton (35) who built the first practical steamboat would have been interested in Watt who built the first practical steam engine because both could think in engineering. Incidentally, no one would have paid any attention to two little boys—each then nine years old—Morse who was to invent the telegraph and Faraday who was to invent the dynamo.

There is little evidence that any of these men of genius were successful teachers of talent. They were, perhaps, more interested in creating their own works than in teaching others to create on the same high level. Some of these men were teachers by profession, but with them teaching was a congenial way of making a living—an appropriate setting for scholarly achievement rather than an end in itself. The reputations of these teachers

were to be based not upon the number of outstanding contemporary students they developed, but upon the incontrovertible exhibits of their own genius. However, these exhibits in themselves were to become powerful instruments for the teaching of talent. These men, like Aristotle, through their works were responsible for the development of talent in countless of their successors.

Men can and do acquire all degrees of competency without formal instruction. But to argue from this that formal instruction should be abandoned is like maintaining that a field with a sparse growth of healthy plants cannot be improved by the use of appropriate fertilizers. The only question is the specific nature of the system for promoting growth. The most significant problem of pedagogy today seems to me to be to provide a stimulus for the teaching of talent.

The problem solves itself in business and industry. Teaching is not all done in the schools. Every executive from a corporation president down to the lowliest foreman is predominantly a teacher of talent. His success depends entirely upon the passing along of his own kind of talent to his associates. The incentive is compelling. The man who develops a great business has a genius for business. He, too, has a special language without words. But unlike the painter or the inventor, he cannot do his work alone. He must have an organization of gifted men, and his talent must filter down to take root and ripen in these men. In the process, the talents of his men take many strange new forms of specialization and these essential forms are transmitted both down and up. Every man in the organization who depends upon other men becomes a teacher of talent, and talent has a way of growing instead of diminishing as it goes from man to man.

We say of successful executives that they know how to pick the right man for a job. A better way of expressing the fact is to say that they are able to develop to the maximum the men who happen to be available. The personnel turnover of a successful executive is no greater than that of the failure, and chance plays a major rôle in determining the available men. It is true that selection is involved to the extent that men are developed in the direction in which they can be most useful, but this is secondary.

Industrial research establishments are schools for the teaching of talent because the technical output is not the sum of individual achievements but the result of organized effort. The incentive for teaching is from the bottom up as well as from the top down. A man's success depends not only upon the capability of his subordinates, but also upon the understanding of his superiors. The over-all talent of the organization is determined by the continuous interplay of these forces of genius—the teaching of all by all of a multiplicity of languages without words.

Organizational teaching of talent is good as far as it goes, but it does not go very far. There are several obvious limitations. The cultures in organized work are too highly specialized; many people are not in organized work; and the best age for learning is the period of formal education. The burden must remain on our institutions of learning to develop a nation of men and women with at least one primary talent and with a number of secondary ones. We should not depend upon chance for the discovery of aptitudes or upon fortuitous circumstances for development.

Some exceptionally capable men attribute their success less to formal education than to chance. One man in his second year in college happened to read a book of biographies of the outstanding men of his subject who had worked in earlier centuries. The ideas of these men were primitive, but their work appealed to his imagination, and he had a glimpse of the quality of logic that has made their work almost immortal. He began to see dramatic colors in what had been a mere drawing. Many a man can look back upon casual contacts with men and affairs or perhaps only a remark that has given him the clue to meaning—that has made his formal study seem like a line in a brush stroke.

Many students, of course, have been fortunate enough to have had talented instructors with a passion for developing talent in others. But even here is an element of chance, for the instructor might have been a man without talent or a man who preferred to pass along his talent through his works. It is unnecessary to point out the obvious effect upon human progress of developing contemporary talent in parallel with the creation of monuments for future use. From the instructor's standpoint there is little to commend the former except its altruism. Posterity pays little attention to the begetting of genius in others. This is not as it should be. Posterity is wrong, and will some day discover that it is wrong.

In the meantime, what can be done? One step in the right direction would be to modify our systems of instruction. In the teaching of chemistry, for example, we usually begin with an assortment of names and facts and figures. They are selected because they require a minimum of comprehension—little more than studious persistence. They are naturally uninteresting because they have no significance in themselves. They do not inspire the imagination. They give no clue to the meaning of chemistry. This is kept darkly secret, perhaps because of the fear of overwhelming the young mind. The fear appears to be so great that some of the facts are distorted to make them simple, and years later the student learns that his laboriously assimilated facts are less than truths, that laws are only approximations, and that the obsolescence of what he has learned is more than the happy phenomenon of progress. As time goes on, we offer more and more com-

plex material, but too often the moment never arrives for the unveiling of the substance of the science of chemistry.

This system of instruction is clearly inadequate for chemistry as a culture. It is still less adequate for chemistry that is to be used to create. In both cases the important things to know are the fundamentals, and the fundamentals are quite independent of the names and facts and figures. The lustre of the classical researches of the nineteenth century has been dimmed no more by the prodigious advance in technique than has the quality of Renaissance art. And the great work of today will live in the future no matter how naive our present conception of natural laws may seem to our successors. The reason for this is that inferences may be valid without regard to truth.

To teach the meaning of chemistry along with the necessary impedimenta of technology would make for slower progress with some students who lack aptitude, but would make for much more rapid progress with all of those who have the capacity ultimately to learn. Should we be concerned with those who have not this capacity?

It is possible that a system of instruction could be devised which would demand talent on the part of the instructor and which would provide a stimulus (as a substitute for an incentive) for the development of contemporary talent. We should be encouraged by the evidence that talent has been sometimes successfully taught in the past and is undoubtedly being taught on a limited scale in the present. The problem is worthy of intensive study because its solution would have revolutionary consequences. I have tried imperfectly to outline my own view of the matter in foregoing paragraphs, and I now venture to add a few specific suggestions in the field I know most about.

From the very beginning, chemical theory should be based upon undistorted fundamentals in order to avoid the distortion of chemical logic. The student should visit the modern fairyland of conceptions of the constitution of matter. However, the theories should be regarded as tentative working hypotheses. The student should be challenged to try to disprove the theories we accept today. Nothing stultifies ambition or dulls the imagination more than the idea that "This is the truth." Nothing can be less scientific than the attitude of condescension toward the past and complacency toward the future.

Concurrently, instruction in the application of chemistry should be based primarily upon analysis of achievements of excellence. Both classic and modern examples of pure and industrial research should be studied in critical detail. The study should be experimental in the sense that effects upon the quality of the logic should be evaluated by assuming variations in construction. It is only in this way that the student can learn to dis-

criminate between the good and the bad. Generalizations should be stressed, but the student should be told that his entire active career will be devoted to a search for exceptions and anomalies—and the finding of them.

These few precepts are concerned with imagination, enthusiasm, humility, discrimination, and meaningful originality which stimulate the development of an intuitive apprehension of logic. This apprehension determines the quality of talent.

This nation, like Russia, has become powerful partly because of the widespread development of essential talents that are characteristic of organized endeavor. To attempt to extend such development to more people and more kinds of talent should be a notable experiment in human welfare.

PROLEGOMENA FOR A REALISTIC BAPTIST THEOLOGY

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IN 1904 Augustus H. Strong addressed the Baptist Anniversaries meeting at Cleveland on the subject, "Our Denominational Outlook." In that address are the following words:

But I hold . . . that there is progress in our Baptist apprehension of the truth; that it is duty to accept the new light that true science gives; that the formulas of the past need some revision in order to satisfy the demands of the present time; yes, that the impulse to this revision is itself divine, an impulse from Christ himself, whose Spirit is promised to guide us into all the truth. Is it our advantage that we have no authoritative creed to define our theology once for all; and this ensures us freedom and right of development. A creed expresses one age and set of thought; the Bible is of many ages, minds, purposes. Accepting it as authority, we still affirm the duty of bringing out of that treasure things new, as well as old. A Baptist theology must continually seek the truth, must keep abreast of public intelligence, and must be a progressive theology.¹

Today as we Baptists are caught in the midst of a denominational and theological crisis and are in some quarters seeking to resolve the crisis through the writing and signing of creedal forms, it is expedient that we once again read and seek to understand the meaning of Dr. Strong's words, for here in this paragraph is prolegomena for a realistic Baptist theology.

First, "a Baptist theology must continually seek the truth." A true Baptist is no thoroughgoing traditionalist. He recognizes the value of the past, but the past is no idol which requires the whole man. A true Baptist takes very seriously the biblical words, "When the Spirit of truth is come, he shall guide you into all the truth." Upon this the Baptist bases one of his cardinal principles, the right of individual interpretation. Each individual is free to read and to interpret as he is guided by the Spirit of God. And in so doing he recognizes his Christian brother's right to the same privilege. Through careful and prayerful discussion the search for truth is carried forward. In this the authority is Christ, who lives at the heart of each consecrated believer. "He is the only ultimate authority; and he abides, by his omnipotent Spirit, in his people, opening to them the Scriptures even as he did to those disciples on the way to Emmaus, showing them the things concerning himself, enabling them to compare

¹ Augustus H. Strong, *Our Denominational Outlook* (American Baptist Publication Society, 1904), pp. 12 f.

spiritual things with spiritual, and so leading them gradually but surely into all the truth."²

Such thinking must be independent and sacrificial. One of the real dangers of the present war situation is totalitarian thinking. With centralized control of the war machine, of economy, of propaganda, we are prone to complacency in exercising any genuinely independent thought concerning the present situation. We give in so easily to the thought patterns which are handed down to us. This seems to characterize much of our denominational life. Men say: "Give us something to believe. Hand us a set of beliefs to which we can subscribe." Or as a student recently said when it was suggested that he read a certain book: "I don't want to read that book, for if I do I may have to do some rethinking of my beliefs, and I don't want to rethink my beliefs."

This attempt to find a substitute in some totalitarian authority for independent thinking is most un-Baptistic. No Baptist worthy of the name will relinquish his God-given right of independence. The very structure of Baptist churches is founded upon this individualism. A true Baptist church is a fellowship of independent Baptists who in democratic fashion seek to think, to worship, and to act, according to the dictates of their individual consciences in common loyalty to Jesus Christ.

In the face of a growing totalitarianism realistic Baptists will assert their independence sacrificially. Independence always costs something. One cannot enjoy the shelter of the fold without giving up the freedom to graze where one will, regardless of the risk. Roger Williams could have enjoyed the privileges of Boston, had he chosen to shackle his conscience; but he would not. Rather he took a chance on the Indians and Rhode Island and kept his conscience and gave to America a large portion of its democratic foundation. Baptists today would do well to assert this part of their heritage. Rather than fleeing in desperation into some creedal fold with its freedomless comforts, Baptists should once again seek that truth which makes men free by launching out into a real crusade for free and independent thinking on the part of ministers and laity.

Secondly, "a Baptist theology must keep abreast of public intelligence." Christianity's greatest lag is at the top and bottom of the intellectual and economic scales. The educated and the ignorant, the employer and the laborer, are not found in large numbers in the churches. It is a truism that American Protestantism is a middle-class religion. The basic reason for the church's loss of such large and important groups is its failure to keep abreast of public intelligence. The intellectual with his interest in science and philosophy finds little in the life of the church to challenge his mind. He feels with real justification that much that is said and done in the church is without reason or is scientifically unintelligent. It

² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

is true that many sermons which he hears have scientific illustrations and allusions. Yet these are based in many instances upon a science so inadequate or outmoded that from his point of view they are ludicrous. And then from some quarters he hears science attacked as if it were of the devil himself. It is little wonder that men of science and philosophy, men with the highest intellects and the most dynamic minds, are outside the door of the Christian church.

Similarly, many in responsible business and executive positions are unable to find much in common with the church. True, they are in many instances involved in a system which their consciences declare is, in part at least, unchristian. But that is not their main reason for failure to support the Christian church. They find no intelligent understanding of themselves or their problems on the part of church leaders. There is little comprehension on the part of church leaders of the complicated structure of present-day economics. Surely the church must become intelligent here.

Similarly labor is without much contact with Christian forces. That is not because labor is unwilling. The essence of the labor union movement is to obtain justice for those who contribute the work of their hands in the creation of the goods of society. Far too often the church has shrunk from its social responsibility of identifying itself with the cause of the workers, and consequently it has let the leadership of the workers' movements for justice slip from its hands, and with it has gone the interest of the workingman in the church.

The church is not keeping abreast of public intelligence when it allows the basic problems of any group to escape its understanding and ministry. Religion then becomes relevant to but one part of life or one segment of society and is on the way to becoming entirely irrelevant.

It is the present duty of the church to keep abreast of the public intelligence and from the vantage point of a comprehensive knowledge to evaluate modern culture and bring to it the light of the knowledge of God. No half-baked scholars can do this. No poorly trained ministry can do this. The best intellectual and cultural advantages must be offered the leadership of the church, for no critique which is not founded upon fact and intelligence will be listened to for a moment by modern culture. The church's message must be implemented with the best technical knowledge and a profound sympathy for and understanding of those who belong to groups which do not now in large measure enter into the life of the church. In this way the church will keep abreast of public intelligence.

Thirdly, "a Baptist theology must be a progressive theology." In setting this down as a criterion of Baptist theology Dr. Strong did not for a moment envision or encourage the formation of a "progressive party"

within the denomination as over against a "reactionary party." Such progressivism can often become as rigid in its form of orthodoxy and as intolerant in its attitude as any party of reaction. Strong's aim was of a different sort. It had to do with Baptist theology as it is essentially understood. That theology by its very nature is a progressive theology. As he states: "It is our advantage that we have no authoritative creed to define our theology once for all; and this ensures us freedom and right of development." Baptists by their reliance upon the individual's own interpretation of the Scriptures under the guidance of the Holy Spirit have a progressive method. One side of a Baptist's theological system is always open to the ingression of new truth. And if that truth as it comes makes necessary a revision of the system itself, the Baptist, if he is true to his calling, is ready to revise. No true Baptist group ever legislates as final for faith and practice a creedal statement. As Strong says: "A creed expresses one age and set of thought; the Bible is of many ages, minds, purposes. Accepting it as authority, we still affirm the duty of bringing out of that treasure things new, as well as old. . . . A Baptist theology . . . must be a progressive theology."

Such a progressive theology will find its centre in the Scriptures. As historical and literary study of the Bible progresses, the theologian will profit by an increased understanding of its meaning in the light of historical facts and correct literary forms. The theological interpreter under the influence of the Spirit of God will seek the truth of the Bible in the light of its primary revelation of God in Christ. He will allow the light of an increased understanding of the Scriptures and the cultures out of which the Scriptures came to bring to him a progressively developing knowledge of God and of God's relationship to man. This method of approach is peculiarly Baptist. With the Baptist trust in individual interpretation, with its respect for the free conscience of the brethren, this method opens the way to a regaining of that vitality which has been a particular possession of Baptists. True Baptists have always sought in the Bible, as freely interpreted by the believers, a vital and valid source of theology. This method if followed conscientiously will lead to progress and make a real contribution to evangelical Christianity. It is the solemn obligation of all Baptists to shun all traditionalisms which would bind them to any creedal form and seek that progressive approach which will yield an increased knowledge of God and of his relationships to man.

It is time that Baptists recognize that to make a real contribution to the religious life of America they must once again seriously turn their attention to theological thought. In the words of Dr. Strong: "A Baptist theology must continually seek the truth, must keep abreast of public intelligence, and must be a progressive theology." This is sufficient prolegomena for a real start towards the development of a genuine understanding of our Baptist heritage and our Baptist future.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

FROM TIME to time attention has been called in these columns to the mischievous, but very common, practice of quoting fragments of biblical verses with no regard to either context or completeness. At times, it is achieved by simply ignoring an inconvenient negative or qualifying phrase: thus the thief who sought to justify his action by the biblical injunction, "Let him that stole steal" (Eph. 4:28); or the equally disingenuous preacher who took as his text for a sermon on Mother's Day, "For his mother was his counsellor" (II Chron. 22:3). At other times, while the results are as vicious, the method may seem superficially less violent. An example may be found in the letter to the Colossians. I have been told that it is by no means an uncommon practice for some preachers, who observe days and seasons, to use as a handy text for a rousing temperance sermon Paul's word, "Handle not, nor taste, nor touch" (Col. 2:21), thus finding it a convenient support for amplifying and making more specific the ancient adage not to *look* upon the wine when it is red, and incidentally for indicating the notable advance from Old Testament days to the Christian dispensation. Be that as it may, I myself saw this text so suggested a few years ago in one of those pestilential aids to the weak and dishonest, the *Preacher's Annual*, with its hundred-odd add-hot-water-and-serve recipes for use by lazy and ignorant clerical short-order cooks. And, of course, there was not a word to indicate that far from applauding this suggested abstinence, Paul was contemptuously dismissing both the injunction and the attitude that led to it as being after the precepts and doctrines of men, of no value against the indulgence of the flesh, and unworthy of one who had died with Christ from the rudiments of the world. Charity is undoubtedly a virtue, but it would not seem appropriate here. The man who can trifle in such a manner has no place in the pulpit—any pulpit—be the cause ignorance, laziness, or deliberate dishonesty.

There are many other cases, as every conscientious interpreter of the Bible knows all too well. There are many cases in which a quotation in its entirety and accurately translated may be very misleading unless the point of view of the author—what may be called the "larger context"—be considered. A particularly clear case of this sort is to be found in the midst of the story of the raising of Lazarus, in the famous shortest verse in the Bible, "Jesus wept" (John 11:35). Regularly this is interpreted as an indication of Jesus' sympathy for Lazarus, quite despite the fact that according to the story (see verse 6) Jesus had waited two days before starting for Bethany, apparently to be sure that Lazarus would be dead and buried before his

arrival. Yet, though this prize of misinterpretation is to be found in many commentaries—and not all of them by any means are of the more glaringly homiletical variety—the immediate context of the story should make it clear to all who know the Gospel of John in its entirety and not simply as a catena of golden texts and paragraphs of liturgy that this is not the meaning of the author. For he immediately continues: "The Jews therefore said, Behold how he loved him!" It is idle to argue the point: The evidence is conclusive. As the writer of this gospel tells his story, the Jews invariably misunderstand and misinterpret every word and deed of Jesus. Whenever he pens the word, "Then said the Jews," his meaning is crystal-clear: Precisely the opposite of what they have said is the actual fact. So here. From the point of view of the author Jesus' tears are not of sorrow at the death of his friend; Lazarus' happy state is assured and will be revealed momentarily. His tears are either tears of anger—the Jews in their blind unbelief have dared to weep for the dead in the presence of him, the Lord of life—or a part of the ancient thaumaturgic technique preliminary to a portentous miracle.

There is another verse in this same misquoted gospel of essentially similar import—John 5: 39. Here, however, the interpretation is further hampered. At one point Greek is obscure. Not infrequently it is difficult to be sure whether a verse is affirmative, interrogative, or imperative. Because of the fact that the person and number of the subject were shown by the inflectional ending of the verb, the subject (unless it chanced to be a noun) was regularly, as in Latin, omitted. Thus inversion of subject and verb, such as is invariable in English and other uninflected languages, to indicate a question is not found. Similarly the absence of expressed subject makes it at times perplexing to determine whether the verb is indicative (that is, simply affirmative) or imperative. Many interpreters of the verse in question (John 5: 39) understood the opening word as an imperative: "Search the scriptures," and found accordingly a convenient proof text. Most modern interpreters are agreed that that was not the author's meaning, and have rendered it, "Ye search the scriptures . . .," although, as in the case of the American Revision, noting the imperative in the margin as a not impossible second choice. Here again we have a case where the larger context, that is, the author's manifest point of view, not the syntax of the sentence, casts the determining ballot. Jesus is talking to the Jews, his opponents, and after the possibly enigmatic opening word continues, "because ye think that in them ye have eternal life. And these are they that bear witness of me." Once more there can be little question of the author's meaning. The words, "ye think," make it all too clear. The Jews are wrong. Eternal life is not to be found in the scriptures as they mistakenly believe; rather it is found, and found alone, in the one who characterizes

himself as "the way, the truth, and the *life*." Thus Jesus is not being made to urge them to search the Old Testament for eternal life, as so frequently the words have been misinterpreted to mean, but to criticize their blindness: they are wont to search the pages of the scriptures for what is not to be found therein. Eternal life is to be found in him alone; and him they refuse to heed. And this is buttressed by the following words, "And these are they that bear witness of me." That is, the scriptures themselves, over which they pore in vain trying to find what is not there, are of a quality to point them, would they but look, to the well that is full of the water of life.

But at this point it is easy to rejoin: Is this statement, even when correctly translated and understood, correct? Do the scriptures, that is, the Old Testament, bear witness to Jesus? Can it be soberly said, as the author continues, "For if ye believed Moses, ye would believe me; for he wrote of me"? The point is well taken, but it is a totally different point—the fancied Messianic prediction of the Christian movement and of its central figure in the pages of the Old Testament—and one which must be reserved for a more convenient season. The first task of sober and honest exegesis is to discover *what* the ancient writers meant and said. Not until that has been achieved are we warranted in attempting the still more thorny question, Were they justified in the views they held?

From Off the Campus and On

PROFESSOR TILlich is a theologian of international reputation. He was born and educated in Germany. During World War I he was a chaplain in the German army. At the end of the war he spent six years in the University of Berlin as a *privatdozent*. In 1924 he joined the faculty of the University of Marburg as professor of theology. He subsequently held similar chairs at Dresden and Leipzig, becoming professor of philosophy at Frankfurt am Main in 1929, where he remained until 1933. Since that date he has been on the faculty of Union Theological Seminary, as professor of philosophical theology. He holds doctorates from Breslau, Halle, and Yale. He is a past president of the American Theological Society. He is the author of many books and articles, in German and English, on theology, philosophy, and politics. Two of them, *The Interpretation of History* and *The Religious Situation*, have had wide influence on contemporary thought. The CROZER QUARTERLY is happy to welcome this distinguished scholar to its pages.

Dr. Fries, an associate professor of philosophy in the University of Wisconsin, may be introduced in his own words:

Since my early graduate work in psychology under Kurt Koffka (in this country) I have been interested in the problem of science and value. Most of my papers in professional and semipopular journals have dealt with aspects of this problem. I am now working on what I hope will be a book, *Citizen-Scientist*, with this as its central theme. I began teaching at Lawrence College under the guidance of John Herbert Farley, who will doubtless be remembered by some Crozer readers. I came here [Wisconsin] in 1937, where it continues to be my exceptionally good fortune to have most of my duties and pleasures combined in the teaching and study of philosophy.

Professor Bates joined the faculty of the University of Pennsylvania in 1895, following nine years at Harvard as student and instructor. Since 1939, when he retired from Pennsylvania, he has been professor *emeritus*. For sixteen years he was editor of the *American Journal of Archaeology*. Since 1902 he has been a member of the Managing Committee of the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, and served as professor of Greek and acting director of that school, 1905-1906. He is the author of many books and articles on classical subjects, among which may be mentioned *Euripides: A Student of Human Nature*, and *Sophocles: Poet and Dramatist*. He is no newcomer to our pages. It is a pleasure to have another study from the pen of this gifted classicist.

Dean Case needs no introduction to readers of the CROZER QUARTERLY.

For thirty years he was on the faculty of the University of Chicago, for many years chairman of the department of church history. He retired in 1938, having served as dean of the Divinity School for five years. The next year he became professor of religion and dean of the Florida School of Religion. He was for eight years editor of the *American Journal of Theology*, and for twelve years editor of its successor, the *Journal of Religion*. His books and articles in the field of early Christianity have been many and influential. In 1926 he was president of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.

We are particularly happy to be able to present Dr. Neuman to our readers. In 1913 he joined the faculty of Dropsie College, Philadelphia, becoming its second president in 1941. In addition to his college duties he was rabbi of Congregation B'nai Jeshurun, in Philadelphia, from 1919 to 1927, and of Mikveh Israel, from 1927 to 1943, when he retired as honorary rabbi. He is one of the editors of the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, a journal of scholarly eminence in the field of Semitics. He holds degrees from Columbia, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and the University of Pennsylvania. The essay which appears in this issue of the CROZER QUARTERLY was delivered at a recent Commencement of the University of Pennsylvania, when he was honored with an LL.D. In addition to other books and articles, he published in 1942 *The Jews in Spain: Their Social, Political, and Cultural Life during the Middle Ages* (2 vols.).

Professor Warburton is a graduate of Brown University and Rochester Theological Seminary. For two years he was a missionary in South China and subsequently was editor of the *Baptist Missionary Magazine* and assistant secretary of the American Baptist Foreign Missionary Society. He has held two pastorates—North Stratford, N. H., and Ogdensburg, N. Y.—and was for five years secretary of literature of the Board of Promotion of the Northern Baptist Convention. Since 1924 he has been professor of Christian missions at Berkeley Baptist Divinity School.

Mr. Ayres is a scientist of distinction. After graduation from Swarthmore College he spent several years in chemical research for the Du Pont Company, and then started his own business, largely concerned with industrial consultation. He developed the first production of wool grease in the country and the first manufacture of lanolin. His work in refining vegetable oils revolutionized the industrial process. He has developed many new processes for the refining of petroleum, including the synthesis of amyl alcohols from petroleum, and the first process for the continuous esterification of mixed alcohols. Some fifty patents covering successful industrial processes in a dozen different fields stand in his name. Since 1929 he has been in charge of chemical research for the Gulf Oil Corporation. His ties with Crozer are many and intimate. He is the son of the

late Dr. Ayres, for many years professor of New Testament at Crozer, and the son-in-law of the beloved Professor Meeser. At present he is a member of the board of trustees.

Professor Skoglund is a graduate of the University of California, of Berkeley Baptist Divinity School, and of Yale University. During his graduate work at Yale, which resulted in a Ph.D. he was pastor at Yalesville, Conn. For two years he was professor of systematic theology at Kansas City Baptist Theological Seminary. In 1940 he returned to Berkeley and now holds the chair of Christian theology.

Again we are happy to present a good grist of reviews of contemporary books by scholars of distinction. To the twenty reviewers we express our hearty thanks. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer Theological Seminary. Professor Bining is a member of the department of history in the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Brightman, of Boston University, needs no introduction to our readers. They will be interested to know that another article from this eminent philosopher will appear in our pages in an early issue. Professors Davis, Enslin, and Harkness are all on the Crozer faculty, holding the chairs of theology, New Testament, and church history, respectively. Dr. Holman is professor of pastoral duties at the University of Chicago. Professor Hudson is in the department of history in the same institution. Dr. Irwin is professor of Old Testament in the University of Chicago. Professor Keighton holds the chair of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. Matthews, for twenty-five years professor of Old Testament at Crozer, is now professor *emeritus*. Dr. Newell, a frequent contributor to these pages, has just resigned the pastorate of the First Congregational Church, of Harwich, Mass., to rejoin the staff of Piedmont College, of which he was formerly president. Professor Newman is head of the department of religion at Colby College. Dr. Parsons was for many years professor of New Testament at Colgate-Rochester, retiring in 1941 as professor *emeritus*. Professor Pritchard holds the chair of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Rose is minister of the First Baptist Church of Philadelphia. Professor Steere is a member of the department of philosophy at Haverford. Dr. Stroup is an instructor in the department of sociology at Brooklyn College. Mr. Thomas joined the Crozer faculty last spring as professor of practical theology. Professor Widgery, of the department of philosophy in Duke University, is a regular and valued contributor to our pages. For alphabetical reasons his name not infrequently ends this list.

BOOK REVIEWS

Advance through Storm, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, 1945, pp. xiii, 542, \$4.

Professor Latourette has written the final chapter in his *Expansion of Christianity*. At least he must now wait for history to catch up with him. The story is up to the minute—hot off the press—and yet not quite! That is one criticism, as we shall see, that may be made of the book.

The merit of Professor Latourette's truly great work is that he has made vivid for us the world-wide influence of Christianity as a way or philosophy of life. He has not written a history of the church—if there is such an institution as *the* Christian Church. He took upon himself the task of telling the story of missions throughout the centuries, not in the narrow sense, but as the mission of Christianity to influence by its ethics and ideals the whole range of human affairs. And it is only his fair due to say that he performed his task eminently well. He has given us not a record of councils, synods, and ecclesiastical conferences with their weighty, but perhaps pointless, pronouncements. Rather, he has revealed how many of the principles and precepts most avowedly Christian have become consciously or unconsciously effectual among peoples and states which do not acknowledge its faith. This is especially true in the oriental nations of China, Japan, and India. One criterion of this, justifiably remarked upon, has been the rise and spread throughout the world of Christian organizations and agencies, outside the church, such as the Young Men's and Young Women's Associations, the Red Cross, religious, medical, and educational foundations, and other great philanthropies which have expended their millions for the welfare of all mankind.

The author believes, contrary doubtless to the general view in the light of two flaming world wars, that Christianity was more firmly established and "was a more potent factor in the total world scene" in the three decades of 1914 to 1944 than at any previous period. Swift advance had been made numerically in those thirty years. "Among non-Occidental peoples, the percentage of Christians had approximately doubled" during that time and in certain sections of Africa, India, and China Christianity was vastly more influential in 1944 than it had been in 1914. Among the "younger churches" leadership had passed to a large extent from foreign to native members. Inevitably in the last four to five years of the decade the war had hindered to a great degree the steady growth; yet, on the other hand, it was the exigencies of the war which often proved helpful to the advance of the native work.

This seventh volume, as the six preceding, amazes the reader with the scope of the writer's information; his knowledge of all the areas into which went Christianity in all its forms—Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and other sects—and his understanding of the effect of Christianity on its total environment as well as the changes wrought upon it by that environment. One may well predict that this series will remain the standard reference in its field for many years to come.

However, in such a comprehensive study (Professor Latourette must be weary by this time of the term monumental) certain weaknesses may be expected.

The question may well be raised whether in the final three paragraphs of his volume Professor Latourette does not step out of his rôle as an historian and become something of a dogmatic theologian. The Christian, he writes, holds "that Jesus is 'very God of very God.'" Is that the faith of all Christians and is it necessarily the faith for Christians? And these two sentences with which the book closes: "His [the

Christian's] confident faith is that in those who give themselves to God as they see Him in Jesus there is working the power of an endless life and that from them God will build, to be consummated beyond time, the heavenly city, the ideal community, in which will be realized fully the possibilities of the children of God." Is there no hope in this world? The author seems very doubtful. Earlier he says, the Christian "knows that if not within the long span which men call history, . . . then beyond history, God's purpose for men will be fully realized."

"This eternal life and this ideal community are, in the last analysis, not the fruit of man's striving, but the gift of a love which man does not deserve, and are from the quite unmerited grace of God." Shall we then calmly sit down in our cozy rocking chairs and thank God for a new world of peace and goodwill (if that may be realized here), and for eternal bliss, the "undeserved" gift of "the quite unmerited grace of God"? "Tell that to the marines!" To the boys of the Normandy beach-head, of Tarawa and Okinawa!

For me there are also too many footnotes—they are piled high on top of one another. On some pages almost every sentence is numbered for its documentation. It is disturbing when reading the text to be forever stumbling over numerals, in certain chapters amounting to over 350. Most readers, I dare say, are willing to take the writer's word for the truth of his statement; he hasn't time or means to check the sources. The author has been rewarded for that thankless job by the sale of his book!

Again, there is too much repetition. In the Introduction, the historical chapters, in the two "Summaries," and in the Conclusion certain facts are told and retold. In some chapters the same phrases reappear too often for the reader's enjoyment.

So, one cannot escape the feeling that the book was hastily written, under pressure. It could have been much more concise. On the other hand, why must it end with 1944—was it only for the sake of rounding out three decades? The story closes in the midst of war. Might it not have waited until the burst of bombs was heard no more and the high hopes of humanity for universal peace had found expression in some form of World Charter or Covenant? Would not that have been a fitting climax to the *Expansion of Christianity*?

Instead the clang and clatter of the printing press seems to be distinctly heard, and one has the suspicion that the author is altogether too aware of the publisher standing at the door forever urging more haste, snatching up the typed sheet as it falls and rushing it to the press that the giant machine may be kept running at top speed. Thus, at the close, having reviewed twenty centuries of the expansion of Christianity, one is left under the impression that, after all, American industry has triumphed over the things of the spirit.

R. E. E. HARKNESS

Religious Liberty: An Inquiry, by M. Searle Bates, New York, Harper, 1945, pp. xviii, 604, \$3.50.

If a good physician can defend his opinions without the aid of the magistrate, why cannot the theologians do the like? Christ could, the apostles could, surely their disciples can.

Let us therefore acknowledge the right of every one to say what he thinks about religion. God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state.

The State in choosing men to serve it takes no notice of their opinions; if they be willing faithfully to serve it, that satisfies.

I am a Catholic and will not deviate from religion, but I cannot approve the custom of Kings to confine men's creeds and religion within arbitrary limits.

Such are the sentiments respectively of Castellio, the rationalist; Coornhert, the mystic; Williams, the sectarian; Cromwell, the Erastian; and William of Orange, the spokesman for the commercial interests. During the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries, the forces represented by these men—the spirit of free inquiry fostered by the Renaissance, the subordination of dogma to experience by the Protestant mystics, the fragmentation of Christianity by the multiplying minority groups, political necessity and commercial expediency—combined to produce the doctrine and in isolated instances the fact of religious freedom. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the movement reënforced by the rise of political liberalism gained momentum, and religious liberty came to be regarded as one of the fundamental rights of man. This trend has now been reversed. The contemporary intensification of nationalism, growing out of world conflict and economic distress, has seriously imperiled or even crushed in many lands the liberties previously won.

In response to the new situation, the Federal Council of Churches and the Foreign Mission Conference of North America appointed a Joint Committee on Religious Liberty, and the committee in turn selected M. Searle Bates to prepare a basic study of the problem of religious liberty. The present volume, after a year and a half of intensive work, is the result.

On the whole, Dr. Bates' volume is an extremely valuable book, and it does precisely what the author promises in the preface. He sought comprehensiveness at the expense of what he calls "mature reflection," and he gathered "plentiful quotations of value to writers and speakers" from leaders on all sides of the question everywhere. The result is an amazing collection of pertinent observations, competently classified and arranged according to topics, but somewhat ill-digested. Such diverse characters as Francesco Ruffini, William E. Hocking, Jacques Maritain, Sebastian Castellio, Guido de Ruggiero, and Luigi Luzzatti, for example, are treated as if there were no significant issues between them. On the other hand, it is almost incredible that such a vast amount of important material could be put together in so brief a time. Particularly welcome is the information concerning the legal status of religious liberty throughout the world, and the wealth of factual data concerning Roman Catholic thought and practice which has not been readily available to Protestant Christians.

Although considerable space is allotted to the problem of religion and public education, it is to be regretted that Dr. Bates was not able to make a more thorough study of the subject. He confesses the problem to be "clearly controversial and the true answer difficult"; yet in rather cavalier fashion he suggests that only "non-religious persons, persons professing non-Christian religions, and persons of strongly sectarian views" are opposed to the introduction of religious instruction in the public schools. Among other reasons, it seems possible that some nonsectarian Christians may be alarmed at the thought of the churches shifting the responsibility for religious education onto the shoulders of the nonreligious or at best religiously neutral state. This would be secularism with a vengeance, unless one of two alternatives were to be adopted: church control of the state or the substitution of publicly supported religious schools for the present system of state-controlled public education.

As in all books, a few statements of fact are open to question. The author states, for example, that "national politics were secularized in the sixteenth century" (p. 178). To say that is to debase to a considerable extent the character of the Protestant Reformation, and such a statement is even difficult to reconcile with the seventeenth century, which was the time of Laud and Cromwell in England, the Thirty Years' War in Germany, and Louis XIV in France. If by secularism is meant the pursuit of political ambitions at the expense of religious interests, the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries were probably more secular than the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Nor were the seventeenth-century Presbyterians and Independents "democratic" in their principles of political organizations (p. 168). Probably no Presbyterian was democratic in outlook during the seventeenth century

and very few Independents were. The words of the New England Independent leader, John Winthrop ("Democracy is accounted the meanest and worst of all forms of government"—quoted on p. 181), should have given pause to the author. Also I suspect that the famous Eliot Resolutions of 1629 were introduced in parliament by Eliot rather than Holles (p. 148).

In spite of unavoidable defects, occasioned by the necessity of completing the volume before the end of the war, this book is one that ought to be carefully perused by every person concerned about the future of religious liberty. Its principal contribution is not to be found in any positive proposals for the solution of specific issues, but in its revelation of the complexity of the problem and in its presentation of the suggestive ideas of many men, both past and present, who have given serious attention to the problems of religious freedom.

WINTHROP S. HUDSON

Bringing Our World Together, by Daniel Johnson Fleming, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. xiii, 155, \$2.

A first reading of this book gives a favorable impression of breadth of vision, well-balanced judgments, and profoundly Christian temper. Further study, with critical reflection, leads me to a final verdict that, failing to face fundamental difficulties, it is essentially weak, if not indeed superficial. There are twelve pages of questions for discussion and lists of books for further reading. This may mean that the volume is for older adolescents rather than for mature thinkers, but even they should be given some indication of the serious problems involved. As the title suggests, the central conception is that of the unity of mankind. The achievement of world-wide "community is our basic social task." Step by step, the author shows how all sorts of practical and intellectual currents have been promoting the consciousness of this ideal and its partial realization. He passes specifically to Christianity in contending that "to form a true world community there should be some common moral climate across the world, an undergirding basis in world thought or opinion," and that Christianity is "uniquely suited" for this. In his final chapter, he considers movements towards Christian solidarity and the prospects of Christian missions.

Dr. Fleming's volume is a good example of a type of literature which amiable Christians write for one another: as such it deserves and will receive a wide friendly response. But it is futile and unwise to ignore difficulties. The author might have given us a more realistic treatment if he had considered in more detail the question: What keeps peoples apart and causes conflicts? Though he refers to some difficulties, usually by implication rather than with direct discussion, he entirely neglects some of the most important, and by indefinite phraseology avoids bringing others into relief. Two examples must suffice for this brief notice. He shows the need for a type of ethical attitude. Then, like so many Christian writers, he slips over into talk of Christianity in more or less indefinite terms. He says, dogmatically, that "the fact that Christianity is the bearer of the revelation through Jesus Christ" is a "fundamental for world-community." The phrase, "revelation through Jesus Christ," is indefinite and may be diversely interpreted. But through the greater part of his book, *entirely without this reference*, he has made an excellent case for his central ethical concept. He fails to face the fact that the implications of that phrase, when made a "fundamental," keep non-Christians apart from Christians. No one denies that Christianity has an ethic of world community. But the claim can be made quite reasonably, and has been made, that Islam and Buddhism imply such an ethic. It is not alien to Reform Judaism, nor even to philosophical Hinduism, its modern reform movements and its propaganda in the Occident. If cultures may be coördinated

—as the author argues they may and actually are being coördinated—it may be urged that different religions may also be brought into union. If Dr. Fleming's purpose is to promote world community, he should either refrain from interjecting "the revelation of Jesus Christ" as a "fundamental"; or he should face the difficulty of explaining how it is such.

That is one difficulty the discussion of which is avoided by the use of indefinite phraseology. The one now to be mentioned, which may be deemed even more serious, he ignores entirely. Neither the theist, Christian or other, nor the naturalistic humanist should fail to attend to the increase of populations. The German demands for *Lebensraum* were not merely effusions of propagandists. During the course of industrial development the German population had grown rapidly. Modern Italy has also had a fertile people. Both in Germany and in Italy increase in population has been encouraged. Can any one be blind to the fact of the tremendous population of Japan as a basal cause of the present conflict? The increase in India during the last fifty years has been enormous. If nature (whether conceived as created by God or not) leads to such population conditions that conflict is virtually inevitable, how is an ethic of world community ever to be realized? Some one might say: This fecundity of nature, thereby leading to conflict, constitutes the mode in which through struggle higher levels have been attained in evolution in the past and may be expected in the future. How would Dr. Fleming reply to him? He could not even maintain that rational limitation of births by scientific means is an indubitable implication of Christian ethics whereby this difficulty might eventually be overcome, for the widespread Roman Catholic Church teaches that the use of those means is unchristian. To sum up: the question the author entirely ignores might be so put: Are the processes of nature (in producing human bodies) in conformity with an ethical world community—or are they a fundamental cause for successive conflicts? If we do not give due consideration to the facts of populations, we may—from the standpoint of a simple ethic of world community—misjudge the conduct of those who do.

ALBAN G. WIDGERY

An International Bill of the Rights of Man, by H. Lauterpacht, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. x, 230, \$3.

Dr. Lauterpacht is professor of international law at Cambridge University (England). He informs the reader that the publication of his work was aided by the American Jewish Committee, but if there is any propaganda in the book, it is conservatively British rather than Jewish.

The author's purpose is to set forth the principles of the rights of man in a form suitable for incorporation into the law of nations. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, there is a historical treatment of fundamental ideas, such as the law of nature, the law of nations, and the rights of man. The second part formulates and explains the proposed International Bill of Rights. The third part deals with its enforcement, with special provision for an International High Commission.

A book of this sort is especially welcome at the present time, on account of its relevance to the World Charter. The International Bill of Rights is much more specialized and more fundamental than the Charter, yet it has many points of contact with the Preamble to the Charter. The main difference in content is that the Preamble contains a clause favoring "the equal rights of men and women." With undue caution, Dr. Lauterpacht omits from his Bill any prohibition of discrimination on account of sex. He would, perhaps, justify this partly on the ground that the Preamble is merely an expression of purpose, while his Bill of Rights is law with

teeth; and he says specifically that "it is not a problem which can be solved within the framework of a general international instrument." Despite instances of backwardness which he cites from various parts of the world, the adoption of the Preamble at San Francisco indicates that he may have been too pessimistic.

Readers of the *CROZER QUARTERLY* will be particularly interested in Part I of the book before us. In it there is a scholarly survey of the developments of the ideal of human rights in Western civilization. The author traces the germs of the idea of freedom as a natural right back to the Greeks, in opposition to German and British writers who deny this idea to the Greeks. The development runs from Herodotus to Plato to the dramatists to the Stoics to St. Thomas Aquinas and thence to modern times (p. 20). At the root of it, there is the concept of natural law, "a legal source superior to that of the State" (p. 27). Lauterpacht makes the striking statement that "when . . . the law of nature came to be identified with the law of God, it did not become a bulwark of established authority. It continued to be invoked as the authority for the subjection of rulers to principles of justice" (pp. 29-30), and he points out that St. Thomas held that "God himself is subject to the law of nature" (p. 34). These principles, rooting in Plato, are part of the basis for recent doctrines of the finiteness of God.

The book would have been stronger as a discussion of an international bill of rights had the author sought for democratic ideas in the Orient as well as in the Occident; recent studies by President Hanson, of Lucknow Christian College, have revealed more democracy in Hindu thought than has commonly been recognized. The author might also have been expected to consider contributions of Jewish thought, in the Bible, the Talmud, and elsewhere. He should also have faced the serious problems raised by the radically different conceptions of freedom entertained by Roman Catholics and by Protestants—especially of religious freedom. Catholics cannot in principle grant freedom to error and heresy. Gradually Protestants have come to see that such freedom must be granted, at least politically, if the freedom to seek truth is to be preserved. Lauterpacht writes a striking sentence: "There is," he says, "a revealing continuity of political thought from the Puritan movement in England, the Dutch practice of religious toleration and the first American immigrants and colonists to that remarkable proclamation of religious liberty embodied in the Virginia Bill of 1786 for Establishing Religious Freedom" (p. 105). While this expresses the influence of Protestantism in the development of liberty, it lays insufficient stress on the struggles within Protestantism (*Massachusetts vs. Rhode Island*) and none at all on the problems of Catholicism (*Inquisition vs. Maryland*).

Further, in the discussion of freedom of speech and opinion, too little attention is given to the evils of censorship, both in peace and war. The solution of the colonial problem is not regarded as urgent, and the author speaks only of "an eventual right to self-government of semi-independent communities and of people at present under colonial and mandatory tutelage" (p. 89).

In spite of the shortcomings of this book, it is worth the careful attention of any student of law, of ethics, of social philosophy, of religion, and of international affairs.

EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

The Authoritarian Attempt to Capture Education: Papers from the Second Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. x, 152, \$2.50.

A volume such as this—small, compact, suggestive, the result of a conference in which more than thirty experts took part—is a delight to the reader, but the despair

of the reviewer. It might be called a campaign document for democratic education or for education that educates. It is stated that this is a wartime book.

It is definitely antiauthoritarian, and the lines between that attitude and democracy are clearly drawn. While the two types of thought fundamentally are diametrically opposite, the one black and the other white, in the educational world are found all the intervening shades of gray (pp. 32-34). Moreover, the two attitudes are found in all phases of human activity and thought, the social, economic, political, intellectual, and religious. The one, authoritarianism, is dogmatic, insisting on a fixed pattern, which long ago was forged by tradition, and, on the basis of what has been, is final and not subject to modification. It is antiscientific in education and religion, and is inclined to blame the current evils on modern science (pp. 4, 5, 15, 99, 146-148). It appeals to values that transcend human experience, and in its last ditch defense rests its case in a revelation that lies beyond the range of verification by science or reason. Certainly the dogmatic attitude is democratically sterile (p. 142).

The other, the democratic spirit, is experimental. As in the physical sciences man has learned that by the exercise of his intelligence he can control and direct many of the forces of nature, so he believes he can learn the underlying laws of human relationships, and thereby direct humanity to higher life-values. Not forgetting the past, the democratic way is sensitive to contemporary human environment (p. 102). Thus it is progressive, ever calling for a wider range of facts, constantly adjusting to standards of ever higher levels in human values (pp. 103, 110), and moving forward to a far-off, limitless goal.

Authoritarianism, which is institutionalized, is today grimly and subtly fighting for its life, and is vocal and belligerent in every sphere. The pattern of thought inherited from prescientific days is not adequate for the educational program of the new day, and is disintegrating under the light of our new knowledge of the heavens and the earth and the life that is therein. The double-edged phrase of three centuries ago, "No bishop, no king," is in reverse; and "No king, no bishop" has its terrors for those whose hopes are stayed on the hierarchy of tradition.

What then must democracy do in education? It has been phrased in many ways in this little volume, but none better than: education should enable men to be masters of the forces of nature, of themselves, and of their destinies as communities (p. 99). To achieve this, education should teach the individual to find in each problem premises that are accurate and comprehensive, and to use sound logic in the solution (pp. 103-106). While much of the discussion, of necessity, is of a general nature, it is stimulating and profoundly wise.

Vocational training, so emphasized today, which is necessarily fitted into "an unregenerated economic system," the "traditional American imperialism," is not education (pp. 119, 124). Nor is the loudly acclaimed mastery of great books (pp. 14-19, 75-78, 100). Both are authoritarian, and at best are gravely limited. The problems of the press and the radio as media of education are presented by a representative of each, but without any discussion (pp. 34-49). That the press does not reflect the interests or the desires of the people as a whole is admitted. It, like the radio, is a commercial enterprise, and is controlled by financial and political interests. No forum discussion on this theme is reported. Was there one? There should have been. Institutions that should lead in the education of the nation, at least in the dissemination of accurate information, with some noteworthy exceptions, are, to say the least, but blind leaders of the blind.

The little volume will surely fulfill its purpose as indicated; to quote the last sentence: "The future belongs to these creative leaders, not to the defenders of the authoritarian past."

I. G. MATTHEWS

Experimental Sociology, by Ernest Greenwood, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. xv, 163, \$2.25.

What is the precise meaning of experimentation for the social sciences? This is the basic question entertained by Dr. Greenwood in his technical, methodological study of sociology.

According to the author *experiment* can have at least five different meanings. It can mean the pure experiment of the physical scientist who operates in a most highly controlled situation, the artificial laboratory. It can mean the uncontrolled experiment in which the experimenter does not seek actively to control the terms of the experiment, believing that controls at best are limited. Obviously this conception broadens the implications of experimentation. It can mean the *ex post facto* experiment in which the investigator works back from recorded results, thus reconstructing what might have been an experimental situation. It can mean the trial and error experiment where an experiment is seen by social researchers "every time something new is tried, whether hypotheses are involved or not and whether the action is deliberate or unreflective." It can mean, finally, the controlled *observational* study by which is indicated those researches which take segments of experience and study them at close range.

While holding to a rather broad approach to the subject of experimentation in the social sciences, the author lays considerably more stress on the *ex post facto* experiment as a choice methodology for the social sciences than he does on the other meanings of experimentation. In his final typology, developed over a number of chapters, he sees emerging two chief kinds of methodology: the projected experiment and the *ex post facto* experiment. By this typology he means to suggest that there are principally two means of experimenting: 1. select an area of investigation, establish adequate controls, apply studied stimulus, and observe results; 2. select an area of experience, define the effects possibly present in the situation, and trace backward the antecedents to the selected area of experience. There are two subtypes to each of these major types. From the book it is clear that the author favors the *ex post facto* experiment.

The energy of Dr. Greenwood is spent in a very needed field of research—social science methodology. It is fair to say that this field is sadly undeveloped in spite of some significant work already done. Considering the immaturity of the subject which the author is attacking, it is possible to say that he has accomplished little. To say this is not uncomplimentary. It simply takes note of a condition which his book does not greatly remedy.

The work, however, has a number of values for the general reader. It shows that science is not as definite as to content or method as some presume. The book also indicates that science as a methodology cannot survive or function effectively without recourse to values both for orientation and for technique. It further demonstrates the epistemological limitations of science as method; it also demonstrates the richness, variety, and possibilities of scientific application in the social sphere.

One might have wished that Dr. Greenwood would have stuck by and elaborated more on his original fivefold classification of scientific experiment. It is doubtful if the *ex post facto* experiment is actually superior to the projected experiment if the splendid achievements of the physical sciences can be taken as a guide to be contrasted with the less useful and more vague attainments of the social sciences. In fact, it can be doubted if the *ex post facto* experiment is strictly speaking an experiment in a scientific sense. Furthermore, the typology of experiments is noticeably simplified and artificial. Much of the argument which flows from the

typology, therefore, is superfluous though interesting. It is apparent that a socially significant research generally covers all or nearly all of the types of experimentation suggested in this book.

HERBERT H. STROUP

Union Policy and Incentive Wage Methods, by Van Dusen Kennedy, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. 260, \$3.

In the period of reconversion which lies in the immediate future the problem of industrial relations can be expected to assume increasing importance. Since a satisfactory solution depends upon an informed public opinion, it is essential that community leaders be informed on the basic problems which must be solved if labor and management are to work together in harmony. Mr. Kennedy's study should be helpful to those seeking information about one area in which management and labor have difficulty.

An incentive method is broadly defined as "any arrangement for compensating labor by which the rate of pay is related to output or performance on a fairly direct or continuous basis." These methods of wage payment on the basis of output instead of by time units are widely approved by management and efficiency experts as a way of increasing the volume of output while lowering the cost per production unit. It is opposed by organized labor as a threat to the welfare and security of the workers.

To understand the conflict over incentive wage methods the difference between the purposes of management and organized labor must be remembered. Management, in order to keep a given industry in existence in a competitive economy, must search constantly for methods of increasing output and of reducing production costs. Since wages represent a large proportion of the total cost of production, management must of necessity seek to find ways to reduce the labor cost for each unit produced. Through experience management has discovered that one of the most efficient ways to accomplish this end is by providing a financial incentive for increased production.

Organized labor exists primarily to protect labor from exploitation and to assure the worker adequate financial return for his labor. Its objection to incentive wage methods are:

1. They place the burden of increased efficiency of production upon the worker, and do not require a corresponding emphasis upon efficiency in plant arrangement and equipment.
2. The time schedule is often based upon the work output of the most expert and rapid worker, thus setting an impossible standard for the average person.
3. In many instances no allowance is made in the time schedule for poor material, repair and oiling of machinery, breakdowns, or other interruptions over which the individual worker has no control.
4. Incentive wages place a premium on the number of units produced with no corresponding emphasis upon the quality of work done, thereby encouraging poor workmanship.
5. These methods place emphasis on rapid production during periods of highly concentrated effort thereby promoting seasons of unemployment. Basic to the entire difficulty is labor's common distrust of management, and of its methods of increasing production.

Organized labor's alternative to the incentive wage method is a payment according to time units. In many industries management feels that such a policy is impossible if they are to continue in business.

The author suggests that a solution to the problem is to be found as representatives of management and labor work together in the establishing of time schedules and rates of pay. He bases his suggestion on the experience gained in many industries with such a procedure.

The final chapter is given over to a discussion of union agreements which have been reached in many industries. These agreements have been effective insofar as they have been based on mutual understanding, and when there have been provisions in them for conference over the inevitable differences which arise as they are being carried out.

This is a well-written, highly informative volume. It cannot be classified as easy reading, but it does give an objective, well-documented presentation of some of the crucial problems involved in the relationship of management and labor.

JOHN W. THOMAS

Plainville, U. S. A., by James West, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. xv, 238, \$2.75.

This is a study of a contemporary American farming community. It is part of a research project on acculturation being carried on by the Social Science Research Council of Columbia University. This study was made in an attempt to learn how a relatively isolated rural area reacts to the urban influences which come pouring in upon it. Plainville, the anonymous name for the area selected, was chosen because: 1. It is located in the southern part of the Midwest. 2. Its population is homogeneous racially, culturally, and religiously. 3. Its economy is based on agriculture.

The volume is based on the author's observations and upon interpretation of remarks made to him by the residents of Plainville during his ten months of residence in the village. The book, although scientific in its analysis and careful of details, is written in informal easily read prose.

Plainville is the story of a community in transition. The *mores* of pioneer life still exert a real influence on the lives of the people. Increasingly, however, with the coming of the radio, the automobile, and the daily press the attitudes, ideas, and ideals of urban America are brought to the attention of the inhabitants of the area. The result is a conflict between the old and the new. In this conflict the old customs are being abandoned more rapidly than new ways, adequate for the needs of the people, can be developed. The need of the community is for leadership in the problems encountered during this period of adjustment.

Perhaps the most tragic fact revealed by the study is the inability of the social agencies to give this leadership. The program of the public school, with the exception of the class on agriculture, has little to offer that is of value to the pupils if they continue to live in the community. Nor is it able to give a type or quality of training that will be of much use to those who leave the community for other sections of the country.

The churches, although exerting a profound influence in the community, are primarily interested in maintaining the *status quo*. Their emphasis is upon a negative morality. Their leadership is poorly trained and inadequately supported. Their members have little knowledge of the social forces that are transforming the life of the community, or little concern to put these forces to constructive use.

The one person who was found to be giving constructive leadership in the community was the county agent. He, however, was afraid to attempt to secure the coöperation of the churches, lest he be accused of attempting to destroy the spiritual life of the church.

Plainville is an important study, in that it pictures the need of countless American rural communities. In these areas, where over fifty percent of the children of America are born and reared, our churches and schools are poor in leadership, program, and equipment. Studies such as this should awaken socially minded people to the necessity for action.

JOHN W. THOMAS

The Philosophy of Edward Bellamy, by Arthur E. Morgan, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. vii, 96, \$1.60.

When Arthur Morgan began to write *Edward Bellamy, A Biography*, he discovered that the philosophy of Bellamy was as full and comprehensive a subject as his leadership of a social movement. Consequently he has published this small volume to give adequate attention to this equally important, but generally neglected, phase of the author of *Looking Backward*.

The first chapter is a substantial reprint of Bellamy's "The Religion of Solidarity" with a brief comment by Morgan. It presents the view that we are essentially parts of a universe into which we shall ultimately be absorbed, as particulars into the universal. Such a view has direct bearing upon our moral action and social concerns and leads to a religious experience and conviction that are closely allied to those of India. Hence, the second chapter, "Edward Bellamy and India," suggests the probable indebtedness of Bellamy to Emerson, Thoreau, and the Bhagavad-Gita. The relationship to theosophical literature is again presented, as in the author's former volume.

"Edward Bellamy and Nemesis," the third chapter, shows that nemesis, under many guises and names, is the human sense of destiny, guilt, and debt to the power of the past. It arises from faulty overgeneralization of man's regret for error. Bellamy deals with this problem in four steps. First, he makes us clearly aware of the problem; second, he pictures the difference it would make if this incubus could be removed; third, he outlines his philosophy of the nature of personality, which is a succession of related, but not identical, selves; fourth, he proposes that each self has an immortality (not just the last, old self), and all these "selves" will be united with God. Therefore, our dealing with nemesis is to recognize and to treat each self separately, judge it for yourself, and so live entirely in the world of the present self of ourselves and of others.

Chapter four, "The Economy of Happiness," is a plea for the moderation of happiness, in some cases its actual divorce from affections, which involve commensurate responsibility and pain. We are to centre our affections on objects immune from loss or change. Here Bellamy goes too far and eliminates basic needs of the human spirit. Certainly, also, the powers of adversity to produce some of the finest philosophies is not only a matter of everyday experience, but is implicit in Bellamy's own beautiful acceptance of the proof of our divinity in the "evil days" toward which he "looks backward" (see quotation on p. 86).

The final chapter is "The Religion of Edward Bellamy." Reared in the Baptist church of which his father was the minister, Bellamy later withdrew from any church relationship and even forbade his children to attend its services. His rebellion was against the servility, selfishness, and cowardice of conventional religion as he found it. He remained always, however, a theist and a strong admirer of Jesus.

The Edward Bellamy that emerges from this study had a mind that came to grips with great basic problems and questions of philosophy, economics, and religion, all of which he saw, not departmentalized and severally exclusive, but possible of

solution only as they were integrated into one way of life. He was a thoughtful youth and man, given to intensive consideration of the problems of right and full living. His problems were not original—how could they be?—and his answers were not created by him. He was what Morgan called him in his biography: Rebel. He certainly was that, and this small book condenses the light upon him, revealing a diligent searcher, whose at present unpublished manuscripts and notes bear testimony to a sedulous searcher for a satisfying serenity. It seems unlikely that even Morgan's intelligent interest in him will make his philosophy a contributing factor to our modern world.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Clinical Pastoral Training, edited by Seward Hiltner, New York, Commission on Religion and Health (F.C.C.C.A.), 1945, pp. xv, 176, \$1.

Clinical pastoral training, as discussed in this volume, should not be confused with the kind of apprenticeship in church work which some candidates for the pastorate serve under the direction of an experienced minister. It is rather, as Seward Hiltner has defined it, "opportunity for first-hand experience with human beings in some kind of controlled or semi-controlled situation"—usually a hospital, correctional institution, or social work agency. As Mr. Hiltner further points out, the movement "was started outside the theological schools and has largely been carried on by groups other than the schools themselves, though it is largely a school responsibility." These groups, from the beginning, have not been in complete agreement either in philosophy or method. William S. Keller, M.D., whose initiative in 1923 led to the founding at a somewhat later date of the Graduate School of Applied Religion in Cincinnati, sent his students to work in various institutions and agencies in order that they might observe and assist many different specific instances of human difficulty; Dr. Anton T. Boisen in 1925, later supported by Dr. Richard C. Cabot, centred his work in the mental hospital in order that his students might have contact with the deeper levels of personality. The fundamental reason for centring clinical training in a hospital or other institution, even though the primary concern is the preparation of men for general pastoral work, is well stated by David R. Hunter: "We saw great value in focusing our primary attention upon the fundamental stresses, strains, desires and frustrations of human personality which are more evident in the midst of illness, but which should be a primary concern of any minister in all his pastoral work."

This volume contains a full report of the addresses and discussions at the first national conference ever held of all the groups conducting clinical training programs for theological students. This conference brought together not only the leaders of these groups, but also a very large number of theological educators. Sixteen presidents or deans and many faculty members of theological seminaries as well as representatives of the four clinical training groups—the Graduate School of Applied Religion, the New England group, the Council for the Clinical Training of Theological Students, and the Philadelphia Divinity School—sat down together and found themselves in substantial agreement as to the significance and necessity for some form of clinical training as a part of the preparation of the pastor. The outcome was not only better understanding between the clinical training groups and theological educators, but the achievement of definite progress in integrating this work into the curriculum of theological study and the formulation and acceptance of minimum standards for such work. An important phase of the program dealt with clinical training in the schools in relation to postwar needs.

It is difficult in view of the important contributions of many men to the discussion, to pick out individuals for special mention, but tribute should be paid to Reverend

Otis R. Rice, chaplain of St. Luke's Hospital, New York, and chairman of the Commission on Religion and Health of the Federal Council of Churches, who also served as chairman of the conference, and to Seward Hiltner, secretary of the Commission on Religion and Health and editor of the volume, for their part in conceiving, organizing, and directing the conference to its successful achievement.

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

Under Orders, by William Laurence Sullivan, New York, Richard R. Smith, 1944, pp. viii, 200, \$2.50.

"So at the end of the long journey I have come to this: the first article of my creed is that I am a moral personality under orders." It is the deeply moving story of this long journey of a great soul from orthodox Roman Catholicism through North American Catholic modernism to liberal Protestantism which constitutes this spiritual autobiography of William Laurence Sullivan.

Dr. Sullivan was born in Roman Catholicism, trained in its best schools and seminaries, dedicated and consecrated to its priesthood, and finally driven from it because of its dogmas, chiefly that of the infallibility of the pope. In 1912 he was admitted to the Unitarian ministry, and after two successful pastorates became the greatly loved and influential minister of the Unitarian Church of Germantown (Philadelphia). He received many academic honors, wrote and spoke widely, and was well known for his brilliant preaching and his fine English style and diction. He died in 1935.

This is not an autobiography that consists merely in a succession of incidents; rather is a tale told of a lifelong religious search. It is a successful attempt to give to other voyagers who have embarked upon similar journeys "a measure of confidence from contact with a life that has known their difficulties and has not been spared their storms." Here we have the fervent orthodoxy of a young Paulist priest; the startled awakening of a mind as it came into contact with liberal thought; the lovely quest of a soul which left the security of the Mother Church and fearlessly followed an infrequently traveled path toward truth; and the affirmations of a man of true religious insight who found a faith to sustain the moral will. The lasting contributions of each are given.

A very interesting "inside" picture of the attitude of many Roman Catholic clergy toward the dogma of the pope's personal infallibility is presented.

There is a touch of sadness and loneliness throughout the book. Dr. Sullivan writes: "Singing keel there is none here, but of that spiritual thirst, yes. If this life of mine will add its mite to the centuries of testimony to the existence, the intensity, and the nobility of that thirst, and to the reality, wonder, and glory of the kingdom, I shall with heightened expectancy await the Daybreak."

The truly religious quest is always an essentially lonely one. Thus, those who are making it will welcome the companionship and inspiration to be had from one who not only went before them but who recounts his experiences in a beauty of English prose which is compelling and a joy to read. This is real autobiography.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Prophecy and the Church, by Oswald T. Allis, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1945, pp. ix, 339, \$2.50.

Dr. Allis has done us all a service in drawing attention to a new pervasive type of biblical interpretation, which he sets himself in this book to combat. It is the system that arose with the (Plymouth) Brethren about 1830, but has found a wide

popularity in recent years, disseminated among practically all branches of Protestantism, largely through the *Scofield Reference Bible*, of which, Dr. Allis states, "more than two million copies have been printed." "There are today," he says, "scores of Bible Schools and Institutes in this country and elsewhere, especially in Canada, where . . . the *Scofield Reference Bible* is used as a textbook." Ignoring details, as well as differences within the movement, its thought can be briefly summarized in the claim that the Bible must be interpreted literally; hence Old Testament prophecies of the future of Israel mean literally Israel; this carries for these folk the result that the Christian church is a "parenthesis" between the Israel of ancient times, and that of the future glorified kingdom. With the coming of Christ in the clouds of heaven the church is to be caught up to him and disappear from the earth; then the age of restored Israel will ensue. Thus "the church age is only an episode, even if a very important one, in [the] day of salvation; and the salvation of Israel and of the enormous majority of mankind will follow the removal of the Church." We may well agree with Dr. Allis that this strange perversion is "an issue of the utmost importance, a most pressing and practical question."

However, the liberal reader is in danger, through his reaction against the absurdities which Dr. Allis combats, of ascribing too great importance to his argument. That in general it is cogent none may deny. It is difficult to understand how the "dispensationalists," as Dr. Allis calls them, can now evade the necessity of seriously modifying their use of many passages of scripture. But that the book will be successful in overthrowing their whole structure of thought there is little chance. Religious perversions have the vitality of a cat. But the author is at the acute disadvantage of undertaking to supplant a distorted use of the Bible with another which while less nefarious is, notwithstanding its traditional claims, scarcely more sound. The dispensationalists are in a very strong position in demanding a literal interpretation of scripture. Dr. Allis' proper retort that some of the Bible is figurative fails to meet this, for it is apparent that such passages constitute a minor portion, and for the rest his interpretation rests on a process that they rightly stigmatize as "spiritualizing" or "allegorizing." He rightly expresses contempt for the effort to "empty words of their plain and obvious meaning." He demonstrates abundantly also that dispensationalists fall far short of their ideal, introducing instead most fanciful expositions to accord with their dogmatic theories. Yet how much better is his own method? In his basic claim that Old Testament prophecies about Israel really refer to the Christian church right through its history he is guilty of precisely that emptying of words of their plain and obvious meaning which he deprecates. The intimate and rich interrelation between the two Testaments, such that Christians have done well in regarding the church as the fulfilment of prophecy, is not to be grasped through a mechanistic concept of scripture such as Dr. Allis' amounts to. The Christian "fulfillment" is a much greater matter than his notion of prediction would permit.

The crux of the matter, then, is how to interpret the Bible. And Dr. Allis' predicament, as well as the absurdities which he so well exposes, demonstrates that the only safe, as well as sound, procedure is a painstaking search of what the Bible writers actually meant. The problem of literal or figurative interpretation, as well as that of "spiritualizing," is secondary; these answer themselves when once it is understood what the passage actually meant in its time and place. That, and that alone, is the essence of all true biblical exposition. It will not suffice, as Dr. Allis is fond of doing, to invoke Christian dogma or New Testament use for the meaning of the Old. Anyone can see that both these lie wide open to precisely the practice which he himself exemplifies of putting together ancient words and contemporary

meanings just because of a superficial resemblance. Instead the biblical exegete must bring to bear on his problems all the wealth of resources of modern scholarship in order to answer the question, What did these words mean for their author?

As illustration of the handicap under which Dr. Allis debates with the ostensibly literal dispensationalists, one may cite his discussion of the vision in Dan. 2 (pp. 123-25). For him the promised kingdom is a spiritual one realized through Christ. The others affirm that it is a literal, earthly kingdom of the Jews. And it is "obvious" that they are right! But his presuppositions rob him of such advantage as he might possess in showing the fallacy of their use of this insight, and reduces his argument to casual opinion. Similar is his lengthy struggle over the seventy weeks of Dan. 9 (pp. 111-123). His one asset is the extreme absurdity of the views of his opponents; otherwise his arguments must be adjudged weak in the extreme, whereas if he had accepted the meaning of the author, he could easily have reduced the dispensational structure to rubble. Mention in II Thess. 4:15 of those "which are alive and remain" must, he holds, refer to the Christians who will be living when the church is caught up to meet the coming Lord—because the Christians of Paul's days are long since dead! To what expedients his theory forces him, whereas a frank acceptance of the principle of *Sitz im Leben* would have rendered him unassailable.

He has taken some steps in this direction, which give promise for the time when he has gone farther. He properly repudiates the meaning "confusion" for the name Babylon—but how so? Doesn't the Bible strongly imply that that is its meaning?—but it means "gate of God." So far, good. But then he goes on, "The city was given this name because the gate was the place of judgment, and it was at Babel that the Lord judged the arrogance of the builders" (p. 270): a delightful instance of confused reasoning! But presently he will discover that the city took its name from the great Ishtar gate, a notable feature through its history. One can heartily commend his rejection of the claim that the first "was" in Gen. 1:2 should be "became"; he might have clinched his argument with a little elementary Hebrew. Not so happy, however, is his laboring of the "mystery" of the church in Paul's letters, with never a hint of the technical force of the word in the first century.

The wide circulation of the *Scofield Reference Bible* and its deleterious influence serve to emphasize the present urgent task that lies before critical scholars. Great as has been their success in exploring the world of the Bible, they have failed dismally to mediate their findings to the rank and file of the religious public, who in the large go on in superstitions as dark as those of two hundred years ago. That "superstition" is not too strong a word for the situation will be apparent from reference to the vogue of astrology even among church people, and from the welter of strange sects that flourish, all of them claiming biblical basis for their notions. There is no more imperative task for the best biblical scholarship today than that of giving in acceptable form to the wide world of Bible readers the facts which have transformed the old book into a thing of new life and interest and worth for those who understand.

WILLIAM A. IRWIN

BOOK NOTICES

Pastoral Work, by Andrew W. Blackwood, Philadelphia, Westminster, © 1945, pp. 252, \$2.

This new volume by the chairman of the practical department of Princeton Theological Seminary is intended to meet the need for a book on pastoral work which will be practical and helpful rather than theoretical and hortatory. The author probably would not claim that it contains anything especially new except in emphasis and approach, but it does seek to cover the whole range of pastoral activity on the basis of the author's working philosophy as to the things which matter most in the pastoral office. Pastoral work, public prayer, and preaching, these three, are the aspects of the minister's task which, in the mind of Professor Blackwood, should receive emphasis, and the first, if not the greatest, of these is pastoral work. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with "basic forms of pastoral work" and the second with "other forms of pastoral work." The first discusses the general round of pastoral activity, such as planning one's work, pastoral visitation, record-keeping, etc.; the second deals with special problems, such as the proper attitude toward sex tangles, the value of a "pastor's hour," the pastor's community service, and a dozen similar problems. The author deplores the lack of clinical training for the pastor as compared with the thorough clinical training provided for the medical student. One wishes that he had put forward some specific proposals as to how such training might be planned and directed so as to be fruitful of good results. He emphasizes the need for careful record-keeping but gives very slight direction as to how such records should be kept. We need to develop a good method here, and the small cards with their hieroglyphic symbols which the author suggests seem hardly adequate. Just how a minister may keep records which shall be adequate for pastoral guidance and yet not consume too much of his time in maintaining them is a practical problem of real importance. His treatment, too, of the "pastor's hour" seems to leave much to be desired. The book's chief value will be for the use of the recent seminary graduate who finds himself faced with a variety of practical problems in his first pastorate, many of them quite unanticipated; but it will be stimulating and suggestive also to men who have been long in the ministry. The conviction of this reviewer, however, is that the most urgent present need—and one largely unmet—is for books which deal scientifically with some of the technical aspects of the minister's task rather than for books which seek to cover the entire range of pastoral responsibility.

CHARLES T. HOLMAN

The Appeal to Immediate Experience, by Robert D. Mack, New York, King's Crown, 1945, pp. 86, \$1.25.

In this Woodbridge Prize Essay in Philosophy for 1943-44, written at Columbia University, Mr. Mack illuminates the use of immediate experience in three modern philosophers—F. H. Bradley, Alfred North Whitehead, and John Dewey. His endeavor throughout his exposition is to explain how the appeal to "a 'given' in terms of immediate experience found its way into modern philosophy and how this appeal came to be bound up with the 'problem' of knowledge" (p. 2). He sets the appeal to immediate experience in these three philosophers over against the approach of those who hold that the starting place of all inquiry lies in the experienced world rather than in the experience of the individual. In other words, instead of finding

the primary data for knowledge in habits, institutions, and beliefs as the externalists do, Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey discover the ultimate datum for knowledge to lie within the individual's immediate experience. The quest for immediate experience as a starting place as well as a resting place for knowledge is not new. Mr. Mack rightly points out that older rationalists, like Descartes, and older empiricists, such as Locke, searched in immediate experience for a hard datum from which all inquiry was to be derived. Aware of this long search for a given datum-point, Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey all agree that the appeal to immediate experience is to provide a setting from which knowledge arises, to provide the basic part of our thought's content, and to give us a technique for verifying and criticizing thought. Yet having traced the philosophic ancestry of the present-day appeal to immediate experience, Mr. Mack is right in stressing that the agreement of the three philosophers under consideration with their forerunners is a surface agreement rather than a fundamental one. As to Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey themselves, our author finds points of agreement and disagreement among them on this matter of immediate experience. To trace the field of agreement, as well as the disagreements among them, becomes a major purpose of the essay. There is not space here to go into these matters, but the student interested in the conception that our knowledge roots in immediate experience will want to read the entire essay and particularly the summarizing statements on pages 66-73. The basic agreement and the united strength of Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey lie in their contention that the individual is the primary datum for knowledge. They call us back to the importance of man as contrasted with all externals.

GEORGE W. DAVIS

Many Creeds, One Cross, by Christopher E. Storrs, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. 154, \$1.75.

The author champions the Christian faith as it stands related to Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Confucianism, and Shintoism. He sees God's truth revealed through the leading faiths of mankind. Moreover, Storrs' thesis is that the cross of Christianity includes the best in all. The book, far from dwelling on the defects, rather excels in sympathetic treatment. His evaluations are penetrating, e.g., "But the Karma of others' weakness he took upon Himself" (p. 49). In the *Bodhisattva* of Mahayana Buddhism a near approach is made to the mind of Christ; by them Nirvana, though earned, is laid aside to save others by accumulated merit. "The Cross puts in true perspective faith and works" and "offers a final synthesis of human effort and grace divine" (p. 72). Storrs pays great tribute to Mohammed's grasp of brotherhood, culture, theocracy, revelation in the *Koran*, prayer, and missionary zeal. Nevertheless, the rivalry between the cross and crescent was inevitable because (tragic fact) Mohammed knew only a distorted Christianity. Confucius wished to build a religion of humanity based on *tao* (or *logos*) found in the harmony of the starry heavens and the sincerity of the moral law of filial piety. Storrs maintains that brotherhood, reciprocity, and a truly princely man emanate only from divinity with a cross. In the "mystical nationalism" (p. 127) of Shintoism and similar omniscient States lurks defeat for democracy and the church. State-absolutism and state-theocracy are at one with this "cult of Cæsar" (p. 140). Against these the cross champions human personality, serves as a conscience for the state, proclaims divine charity and the shedding of innocent blood for the sins of men. Especially is such a book timely for getting acquainted with other faiths. It should prove valuable for classes and discussion groups on world religions, the meaning of the cross, and the perspective of Christians in community.

HERBERT L. NEWMAN

A Life of Christ, by H. E. Dana, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1945, pp. 88, no price.

This little paperbound book is intended, according to the introductory statement written by the secretary of the Christian Education Department of the Board of Education and Publication of the Northern Baptist Convention, to serve as one of the "four Basic Courses in the new 'Northern Baptist Training Series.'" Since 250 minutes is the time allotted for the course, brevity was naturally essential. It was written "according to certain very definite specifications." It would be of interest to know the nature of those specifications. Surely if this volume met them, one of them must have been that it was to be kept scrupulously free from any contact with contemporary biblical scholarship. All four gospels are without discrimination blended together, following A. T. Robertson's utterly useless *A Harmony of the [Four] Gospels*; all critical problems are ignored, and the student is repeatedly told that if he is "willing to accept the supernatural," he can easily accept the story as presented. It is pathetic—no, *tragic* is the word—that this is the sort of stuff which a great denomination foists on its churches. Dr. Dana has very probably done the best that could be expected under the circumstances. Just so long as our so-called leaders insist on publishing material fifty years out of date and discredited by every scholar of repute, simply because of the fear that sales would fall off if anything smacking of educational competence should be allowed to slip by, just so long will the churches which have any sense of responsibility for their members continue to do as they are doing, utterly ignore this sort of material.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Church and the Returning Soldier, by Roy A. Burkhardt, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. xiii, 204, \$2.

Few men to whom has been given the responsibility of leadership in the modern church have done more than Dr. Burkhardt in keeping the ministry of the church realistic and humbly devoted to things as they are. It was no surprise to find him and his Columbus church in the very forefront of practical helpfulness to those called into service and to those dear to them left at home. Nor were we surprised to have a book of his experiences and discernment in this important field. The church and its ministry in general may well thank him for the urgency of his emphasis and the pertinent direction he gives on points large and small. There is a wealth of suggestive detail as to approach to the task and the consequent program of effective helpfulness. There is, as well, the sterling challenge for the church to prove herself equal to the task in spirit and in fact. We are not unmindful of the apparent speed with which this material has been put together for timely release. Nor are we quite sure of our "returned soldier" type: a fairly extended series of contacts with those now back in the United States makes us confident of only one thing, namely, that whatever the "type," these men do not constitute a "problem," nor are they wisely so regarded. But a realistic challenge such as Dr. Burkhardt gives us in his book surely puts us in his debt. For we are not only very definitely helped in our planning of programs, but, in addition, we are seriously moved by his proper emphasis upon what constitutes a truly Christian church to which the returning men and women may move with effectiveness and mutual delight. At our best we never do too much in meeting our great opportunities.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

Journal: Second Session of the UNRRA Council, Washington [New York, Columbia University Press], 1944, pp. 182, \$2.

This detailed record of the second UNRRA Council meeting which was held in Montreal in September, 1944, is a public document of more than passing interest.

For it tells the story not only of the world's terrible need for material assistance and of UNRRA's admirable organization to meet the need, but also of countless obstacles that even an organization as internationally organized and sponsored as UNRRA encounters at every point in its attempt to serve its member countries. The frank speech of the British delegate, Richard Law, to the Council sounded the watchword of the session. He declared, "It is a fact that UNRRA (in the past 12 months) has fallen back in the public mind and in the public esteem. Unless we can dissipate this fog and can sweep it away with the clear light of reason and above all of action, it would be better that this great idea of UNRRA had never been conceived at all" (p. 46). This was ably seconded by General Edgerton and Dean Acheson, of the United States, when the latter declared: "We are at a time when, whether we like it or not, we must stop meeting, we must stop talking, we must act. As General Edgerton said yesterday, the watchword of this period is *urgency*. This is not a waiting war. There can be no waiting, there can be no delay, there can be no more meetings. We must be prepared to act" (p. 53). This longed-for action, Governor Lehman pointed out, had been blocked up to the time of the Council's meeting (November, 1944) by the lack of shipping, lack of release of needed materials by various governmental control boards, lack of faith in UNRRA, or even sinister desires on the part of receiving countries where groups hope to gain political prestige by getting UNRRA supplies but by barring UNRRA supervisory personnel from entering the country. These, the governor insisted, had all contributed to keeping UNRRA largely a paper organization. The Council's record connected with the granting \$50,000,000 for work in an ex-enemy country (Italy) tells a fascinating story of the generous impulses of the smaller national delegates who make up the Council being weighed off against their natural self-interest and their desire to put an ex-enemy at the bottom of the list. In the end the generous impulses prevailed, and Italy was promised help but only after certain assurances were given in regard to the needs of the other smaller nations. Elizabeth Barrett Browning's words on the mutuality of any aid rendered were quoted by the Prime Minister of Canada in his opening address:

"A poor man served by thee, shall make thee rich,
A sick man helped by thee, shall make thee strong,
Thou shalt be served by every sense
Of service that thou renderest."

This may not be the full Christian *agape* (love), but incorporated into UNRRA policy it is a lower-story motivation that may go far to open the way in men's hearts for faith in each other and in the orderly processes of life.

DOUGLAS V. STEERE

Christ Transcendent, by A. Boylan Fitz-Gerald, Jr., New York, Methodist Publishing House, ©1945, pp. 112, \$1.25.

This little book which the author describes as "an invitation to the great crusade," and which he dedicates, "To the crusaders for Christ, yesterday, today and forever," is presented by the publishers as "a book of inspiration designed for lay readers and preachers alike." The present reviewer is not happy over his task, for the book, so far as he is concerned, does not seem to deserve the enthusiastic plaudits which the publisher's announcement carries. The author seems to have an almost fatal fondness for words and too often gives the unfortunate impression of being hypnotized by his own wordiness. He seems more concerned with the form than the content of his

message. The book contains a plethora of affirmation supported by ecstatic exclamation, and a paucity of honest, thoughtful argument. Refutation of any possible disagreement or opposition is largely confined to the doubtful method of scornful sarcasm. Probably readers who like this book will like it very much, but it is doubtful if it has great appeal to the thinking liberal. The present reviewer laid it aside wishing that the author would try again. So enthusiastic a believer in the theological doctrine of the Trinity should endeavor to present in simple, honest language the reasons for that belief untrammelled by the handicap of fine writing and the weakness of cheap sarcasm.

HENRY C. NEWELL

Amerigo Vespucci, Pilot Major, by Frederick J. Pohl, New York, Columbia University Press, 1944, pp. xiii, 249, \$3.

Although two continents were named after him, bitter controversy still exists about the character of Amerigo Vespucci, and much misunderstanding continues over the circumstances relating to the naming of the Americas. Vespucci has been denounced by many as an imposter and a charlatan. The charges against him have been based on two documents supposed to have been written by him, *Mundus Novus* and the *Four Voyages*. These present claims far beyond the truth of his actual explorations. In 1926 the Italian scholar Alberto Magnaghi repudiated these documents, advancing evidence that they were forgeries and accepting as genuine three letters of Vespucci from Seville, Cape Verde, and Lisbon, previously accepted as apocryphal. Magnaghi suggested that overenthusiastic friends were responsible for the pompous and braggart documents which he brands as forgeries.

The author of *Amerigo Vespucci, Pilot Major* follows the thesis of the Italian scholar. Instead of the four expeditions of 1497, 1499, 1501, and 1503, only the two voyages of 1499 and 1501 are accepted. He concedes that Columbus on his third voyage, in 1498, reached the mainland, which was one year before Vespucci's first voyage. However Mr. Pohl claims for Vespucci the distinction that he was the first man to realize clearly that a new continent had been discovered and not the eastern part of Asia. On the basis of this priority, he justifies the naming of the New World in his honor. Columbus died in the belief that he had explored only parts of the Orient. Further, the author points out that Martin Waldseemüller, on whose map Vespucci's name first appeared in 1507, was aware of the work of Columbus and credited him with exploring certain islands. Posterity has honored Columbus as the discoverer of the New World, but a large part of the land surface of the globe perpetuates the memory of Vespucci.

Mr. Pohl claims that Vespucci was far ahead of all of his contemporaries in astronomy and cosmography. He asserts that the Florentine worked out a fairly accurate method of determining longitude by lunar observations and thus proved himself "one of the original thinkers of the world." He states, also, that Vespucci estimated the circumference of the world to within fifty miles. Much stress is laid on the technical abilities of the hero of this work.

The study is a stimulating one. It is very readable and for those who have been puzzled about the controversy, it is revealing. However, it cannot be considered definitive or in any way complete. Part of the book is based on documentary sources, but much of it rests on inference. Before this new interpretation of a much-maligned character can be entirely accepted, a great deal more research and thought will have to be applied. The author, a teacher of English, who has an enthusiastic interest in the early voyages of exploration, has presented a good biography of Vespucci based on Magnaghi's thesis. It is a valuable contribution to a difficult subject.

ARTHUR C. BINING

The Lord's Supper in Protestantism, by Elmer S. Freeman, New York, Macmillan, 1945, pp. xviii, 174, \$1.75.

Very possibly there are some people who will consider this book of value. Frankly, I am not one of them. To me it is utterly disappointing. The first eight chapters purport to give a history of this *sacramentum tremendum*. The sole value of these chapters is to use up eighty-two of the pages. They are shallow, scattering, inaccurate, and generally destitute of learning, exclusively dependent upon a handful of secondary sources, lavishly quoted. Secondhand scholarship is generally second-rate scholarship. Certainly it is here. The attempt to be scrupulously fair is simply superficial and evidences the hand of the amateur. The author says in his preface that one of the values of the book (he hopes) is that it brings "within the compass of one volume of modest size information concerning the Lord's Supper which the ordinary person interested in the subject would not have time or facilities to dig out for himself." Perhaps so, though personally I saw little evidence of digging. It would appear to me that even the most ordinary reader could have squeezed most of this information out of one or two encyclopædia articles or handbooks—as apparently the author did. The impression I received throughout these chapters was that I was reading another term paper—the book has all their depressing earmarks—of which I have read and graded hundreds, and to which I usually append a few sad comments and, if I feel kindly disposed, a C minus. And worst of all, the introductory section does not introduce. The conviction grows on me that elementary and popular books should never be written by amateurs, whose sole equipment for brevity lies in their lack of detailed information. The second half of the volume has to do with the conduct of this "sacrament" in the present day. The author thinks it highly important. I am inclined wholeheartedly to agree, but nonetheless I found myself in an utterly uncongenial atmosphere. Not that he does not say many admirable things, but I am afraid that I do not speak easily the language of Zion—at least this particular dialect. *Real Presence, sacrament, altar*—all these when intoned by a Congregationalist who obviously thinks that he is a liberal leave me cold; while the detailed, almost fussy, prescriptions for "personal preparation" and the sections devoted to the preparation for and conduct of private celebrations in the home (on various and sundry occasions) and as a sort of holy preliminary or (as some prefer) significant appendix to the wedding service (when conducted in church) left me gasping for breath. Again I repeat the opening sentence of this notice. To them my words will seem utterly unfair and unfeeling. And yet I do not think that my failure to breathe easily in this atmosphere is due to any subliminal hankering for the vulgar or the boisterous. Quite the contrary. It is my happy privilege each month to serve with my brother deacons in a service which is to me lovely and rewarding in its simple dignity and simplicity. Each to his own taste. If this is the sort of thing you like, this is the sort of thing which you will like.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

A Manual of Ecclesiology, by H. E. Dana and L. M. Sipes, Kansas City, Central Seminary Press, ©1944, pp. 358, \$2.

This volume is a revision and expansion of Dr. Dana's *Christ's Ecclesia* published several years ago by a board of the Southern Baptist Convention. It is designed for use in Baptist schools and seminaries. Starting with a discussion of the terms *church* and *ecclesia* it proceeds to examine the New Testament records to discover the organizational ideas and procedures of Jesus and the early Christians. This is followed by a survey of early Christian literature and life in order to point out the development

of ecclesiastical organization and to note departures from New Testament ideals and practices. A sketch of Protestant church development from the Reformation to the present gives opportunity for an outline of the ecumenical movement and an estimate of its value. The second part of the book is concerned with a presentation of the authors' views on the governing principles of church polity. It is a broad field which is covered, and much labor has gone into the making of the book. It follows the lines of conventional Baptist ideas on the subject; in fact these ideas at times come close to being presuppositions. A serious shortcoming of the volume is the absence of historical and literary perspective in dealing with the New Testament and the failure to relate early catholic development in an understanding way to the inner problems of the enlarging Christian movement and to the important environmental factor of Roman imperial organization. The presentation will serve the purpose for which it was intended but it, as well as some similar treatises from other branches of the Christian movement, leaves one with the impression that we need much more careful and unprejudiced thought than we have yet given to the question of what are the really important matters in religious, and particularly Christian, life and organization.

ERNEST W. PARSONS

History of Photography, by Josef Maria Eder, translated by Edward Epstein, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. xx, 860, \$10.

The number of pages and chapters of this book is an indication of the extent of the material it contains. Going as far back as there are available records and references, the author has written not only of photography, but also of the many related fields that have a bearing upon it and a contribution to the subject. Included are such matters as photochemistry, light effects upon dyestuffs, phosphorescence, stereoscopic vision, microphotography, cinematography, electrotypes, the solar camera, and projection. By-products of these chapters are a wealth of biographical information concerning the experimenters and discoverers, as well as a large bibliography for those who desire to make further research. The whole volume is done with a painstaking thoroughness that seems to have considered every contributing stream, however small, that has brought us today's great river of photography. Incidentally, this is the kind of book that ministers ought occasionally to read; it has absolutely nothing to do with the preparation of sermons and makes no contribution to religious thinking. It merely shows how much one man thinks he ought to know about a subject before he writes a book on it.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

One World and One God, by Francis C. Capozzi, Boston, John W. Luce, ©1945, pp. 94, \$1.50.

This "Twentieth Century Homily" is obviously inspired by Wendell Willkie's *One World*. It is a spirited appeal, in four chapters, addressed to Christians of various creeds for a truly ecumenical church. Few will disagree with the major thesis of the book. The author pleads passionately—sometimes lapsing into the second person as he addresses the leaders of various religious bodies—for coöperation, for unity, for union. While one agrees fully with the author's objective, he may question the effectiveness of his method. He is not as careful to enumerate the virtues of the Roman Church as he is to point out its vices. He speaks of "Rome's monopoly of divine grace"; he asserts that "Rome has stood for totalitarianism. . . . She . . . has furnished the pattern for the European dictators' New Order." These and similar references will probably not persuade the Roman hierarchy to join the march to the one church of the future.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

BOOKS RECEIVED

Magnifico, by Joseph Stephens, Boston, Chapman and Grimes, ©1945, pp. 209, \$2.50.

The story of the love of Chad, the grateful Samaritan leper, and Judith, the neglected daughter of an aristocratic but land-poor Sadducean family.

**Studies in the Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament*, by Kenneth S. Wuest, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 149, \$1.50.

**Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, by Raphaël Lemkin, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (New York, Columbia University Press), 1944, pp. xxxviii, 674, \$7.50.

**Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race*, by M. F. Ashley Montagu, 2nd ed., New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. xvi, 304, \$3.25.

**Religion in the Post-War World*, edited by Willard L. Sperry, 4 vols., Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1945, pp. 115, 115, 106, 114, \$1.50 each.

Clash by Night, by Wallace Hamilton, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Pamphlet 23, ©1945, pp. 58, 25 cents.

Disturbers of the Peace, by Leon Pritcher and Catharine Harger, Boston, Bruce Humphries, ©1945, pp. 231, \$2.50.

The subtitle of this unusual story might well be *Mother Eve Lives On*. Eve had eaten the forbidden fruit deliberately, unwilling, as she told the Lord, to give birth to a race destined to remain ignorant and unenlightened. Through the centuries she lived on, met all the world's great—Moses, Confucius, Gautama, Plato, Jesus—and saw repeatedly man's inhumanity to man. The story starts in the Garden of Eden and ends in Nero's amphitheatre, where, following the martyrdom of Peter, Eve cries aloud in her sorrow, "Oh, Cain, my son! See what your greed has done!"

Darkness to Dawn, by Hazel Griffith Davis, Boston, Chapman and Grimes, ©1945, pp. 64, 75 cents.

A volume of poems which evidence a poise and serenity well characterized by the title.

**God Is Not Dead*, by Bernard Iddings Bell, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. xvi, 185, \$1.50.

**The Christian Answer*, edited by Henry P. Van Dusen, New York, Scribner, 1945, pp. xi, 195, \$2.50.

We Are Accountable, by Leonard Edelstein, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Pamphlet 24, ©1945, pp. 32, 25 cents.

Militarism for America, by Grover L. Hartman, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Pamphlet 25, ©1945, pp. 42, 25 cents.

**A Book of Comfort*, compiled by Eric Parker, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. 320, no price.

**The Ease Era*, by Paul Mallon, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 119, \$1.50.

**Discovering Plato*, by Alexander Koyré, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, pp. ix, 119, \$1.50.

When Christ Takes Over, by Simon Blocker, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1945, pp. 105, \$1.25.

The golden text of this book is: "Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest."

**Can These Bones Live?* by Roger Babson and Dudley Zuver, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. x, 254, \$2.

* To be reviewed.

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